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ABSTRACT 
 
In order to satisfy customer demand for a high performance “global” mobility service, network operators 
(ISPs, carriers, mobile operators, etc.) are facing the need to evolve to a converged “all-IP” centric 
heterogeneous access infrastructure. However, the integration of such heterogeneous access networks 
(e.g. 802.11, 802.16e, UMTS etc) brings major mobility issues. This thesis tackles issues plaguing 
existing mobility management solutions in converged IP-based heterogeneous networks. In order to do so, 
the thesis firstly proposes a cross-layer mechanism using the upcoming IEEE802.21 MIH services to 
make intelligent and optimized handovers. In this respect, FMIPv6 is integrated with the IEEE802.21 
mechanism to provide seamless mobility during the overall handover process. The proposed solution is 
then applied in a simulated vehicular environment to optimize the NEMO handover process. It is shown 
through analysis and simulations of the signalling process that the overall expected handover (both L2 
and L3) latency in FMIPv6 can be reduced by the proposed mechanism by 69%. Secondly, it is expected 
that the operator of a Next Generation Network will provide mobility as a service that will generate 
significant revenues. As a result, dynamic service bootstrapping and authorization mechanisms must be in 
place to efficiently deploy a mobility service (without static provisioning), which will allow only 
legitimate users to access the service. A GNU Linux based test-bed has been implemented to demonstrate 
this. The experiments presented show the handover performance of the secured FMIPv6 over the 
implemented test-bed compared to plain FMIPv6 and MIPv6 by providing quantitative measurements and 
results on the quality of experience perceived by the users of IPv6 multimedia applications. The results 
show the inclusion of the additional signalling of the proposed architecture for the purpose of 
authorization and bootstrapping (i.e. key distribution using HOKEY) has no adverse effect on the overall 
handover process. Also, using a formal security analysis tool, it is shown that the proposed mechanism is 
safe/secure from the induced security threats. Lastly, a novel IEEE802.21 assisted EAP based re-
authentication scheme over a service authorization and bootstrapping framework is presented. AAA based 
authentication mechanisms like EAP incur signalling overheads due to large RTTs. As a result, overall 
handover latency also increases. Therefore, a fast re-authentication scheme is presented which utilizes 
IEEE802.21 MIH services to minimize the EAP authentication process delays and as a result reduce the 
overall handover latency. Analysis of the signalling process based on analytical results shows that the 
overall handover latency for mobility protocols will be approximately reduced by 70% by the proposed 
scheme. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Mobile communications is entering a new era where service provision in mobility is evolving to 
exploit the capabilities of converged 'all-IP' centric networks. The rapid proliferation of mobile 
devices along with the presence of a plethora of distinct cellular telecommunications, wireless 
local area networks and broadcast to hand-held device standards, e.g. GSM, GPRS, EDGE, 
UMTS, 802.11a/b/g/n, DVB-H, etc has led to a massive growth in users accessing the Internet 
from portable hand-held devices. According to reports, mobile Internet service providers have 
over 100 million customers worldwide using more than 300 active networks [1]. By January 
2009, there were 247 commercial HSDPA networks launched in 110 countries with an estimated 
65 million HSPA users [2]. Vodafone, the world's second largest Telecommunications operator, 
reported an increase of 55% in revenues from data traffic from March 2007 to March 2008. 
Informa Telecoms & Media forecasts that the volume of data transported over wireless 
connections will increase by 1000% between 2007 and 2012 [1]. The consumer demand for a 
truly mobile broadband experience, which involves a combination of wired broadband data 
speeds, global coverage and mobility, and ubiquitous access to services across heterogeneous 
networks, is changing the wireless landscape and providing the incentive for a migration towards 
the so called Fourth-Generation (4G) networks (WiMAX, 3GPP LTE, LTE Advanced etc). Thus, 
the demand for global mobility and “any time- anywhere” type services is paving the way for 
Next Generation Networks (NGN) which essentially represent the integration of existing (2/2.5, 
3G,  WLANs etc) and upcoming(i.e. 4G based) heterogeneous access networks where the 
underlying converged infrastructure is completely IP based. That said there seems to be 
confusion amongst researchers about how 4G networks and NGN should be defined. Apart from 
representing the natural evolution of 3G systems, 4G by definition means a fully IP-based 
convergence of existing and new wired and wireless networks (i.e. LTE, 802.16m etc.), as well 
as of the computers, consumer-electronics, and communications technology generally, necessary 
for the provision of IP based data services at data rates of  100 Mbit/s to 1Gbit/s. Therefore, 4G 
and NGN essentially represent the same concepts and this thesis will use these terms 
interchangeably. 
Chapter 1 
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The vision of Next Generation Networks (i.e. 4G) is inherently of an intricate mesh of multi-
access and multi-operator convergence. It is assumed that every end-device will be multi modal 
(i.e. different interfaces for each of the access technologies). End users will have different 
technology options with which to access the Internet while mobile, in a market where service 
providers (fixed and mobile), in some cases joined in consortium co-exist with smaller and often 
unmanaged entities (e.g. private or home WLANs). Another element to be considered is the 
presence of on-board vehicular networks placed in trains, cars, buses or other moving vehicles. 
Typically these networks use 802.11 WLAN infrastructure and offer connectivity to travellers or 
exchange information between on-board devices, e.g., satellite navigation systems, sensors, etc.  
In such a context, providing users with seamless mobility with zero service interruption across 
such a heterogeneous access environment is becoming a necessity. Given below in Figure 1.1 is 
a depiction of the envisaged network scenario for Next-Generation Networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Envisaged Network Deployment for Next Generation Networks 
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Seamless mobility requires seamless handover. Providing such handover in an integrated multi-
access environment is challenging but very important. Essentially, vertical handover, which 
means inter-technology handover and which may also be between different operator domains, 
will be a particularly complicated process. Handover between cells of the same technology is 
called horizontal handover and is said to be intra-technology in nature; this of course may also be 
across different operator domains. Any handover whether inter or intra technology can be 
broadly classified as providing either micro or macro-mobility. Micro-mobility refers to mobility 
inside a given domain that is between subnets, while macro-mobility refers to mobility between 
different administrative domains. Various handover scenarios could be envisaged based on the 
mobility requirements of 4G networks.  Examples of such mobility scenarios are given in section 
2.2 of this thesis.   
IPv6 [16] has been chosen not only for the core backbone infrastructure of 4G but also for its 
ubiquitous inter-networking layer for the provisioning of seamless mobility between the 
integrated heterogeneous access networks. Another reason for choosing IPv6 is because of the 
rapidly depleting IPv4 [17] address pool. However, interworking with IPv4 based networks will 
also be supported in 4G with plans for a smooth migration to IPv6. Network Layer/Layer 3 
(i.e.IPv6) mobility will be fundamental in providing global mobility, i.e. the ability to move 
freely within large geographical areas and still be reachable/addressable in the Internet for 
uninterrupted services. It must be noted that there have been extensive discussions about which 
is the most suitable layer in the TCP/IP protocol stack [18] for dealing with mobility efficiently. 
Mobility solutions exist in all the layers of the protocol stack. Examples of mobility management 
protocols at different layers are Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [4], Host Identity Protocol 
(HIP) [5], etc. As such, different levels of convergence could be defined. The choice of the layer 
used to implement handover and thus mobility is driven by design trade-offs. Different wireless 
access network technologies, e.g., 802.16e, UMTS, come with technology specific standardised 
mobility solutions. That is to say that they each provide distinct handover mechanisms for intra-
technology handover. Each type of access technology has distinct advantages/disadvantages and 
applications scope in terms of coverage, data transfer speed, frequency, spectrum availability, 
etc. It is reasonable to state that convergence at layer 2, i.e., the link layer, would require every 
individual standard to drastically modify its existing access technologies and that it would be 
unwise and costly to converge at the link layer. On the other hand, real-time applications are very 
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sensitive to handover latency, packet loss, etc., and may want to handle mobility themselves to 
dynamically adapt to the changing context using mobility protocols such as SIP. However 
applications come and go and it would be a significant burden for each one to develop its own 
mobility protocol. The same is true for mobility management or convergence at the transport 
layer. Taking this into account and given the ubiquitous interworking nature of IP, solutions 
based on network layer mobility may seem natural. However, multiple mobility protocols may 
exist and operate at the same time so such solutions would cause maintenance and scalability 
“nightmares” for operators and users alike.  
A number of network layer mobility management solutions have been proposed to provide 
mobility and handover management services. Amongst candidate technologies, Mobile IPv6 
(MIPv6) [6][3] has been widely accepted by academia and industry alike and standardized by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a viable option for delivering the required ubiquitous 
mobility services across integrated heterogeneous networks. MIPv6 arbitrarily allows a mobile 
node (MN) to change its location on the Internet due to a change in its link while roaming 
between access networks belonging to different subnets of administrative domains. A graphical 
illustration of how MIPv6 works is given in Figure 1.2.   
 
          Figure 1.2: Mobile IPv6 overview  
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Its main objective is to maintain session continuity between the MNs and Corresponding Nodes 
(CNs) with which the MN is communicating with while it changes its Point-of-Attachment 
(PoA), i.e. APs, BSs [7]. The MN updates its change in IP subnet at an anchor point known as 
the Home Agent (HA) by sending a prefix-scope Binding Update (BU) message that associates 
its Care-of-Address (CoA) which is its current IP address with its Home Address (HoA) [7]. The 
HA intercepts any packet destined for the MN and tunnels it to the MN's current CoA.  
1.1.1 Research Issues 
There are many obstacles and issues that will have to be resolved to realise the efficient 
deployment of large scale 'All-IP' based converged heterogeneous networks. This thesis focuses 
on mobility management for optimized handover mechanisms at the network/IP layer. This 
includes providing security management in terms of authentication and authorization to allow IP 
mobility to be provided as a commercial service by a network operator/service provider. Other 
mobility management issues such as radio interference and management, power control, etc. are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1.1.1.1 Long Handover Latencies for Mobile IPv6 based Mobility protocols   
Unfortunately, the overall handover latency of the MIPv6 protocol is unacceptable for most time 
delay sensitive applications such as VoIP, video conferencing and streaming multimedia. 
Handover performance plays a crucial role in the QoS provisioning of real-time multimedia 
services/applications. For such reasons the IETF Mobility for IP: Performance, Signalling, and 
Handoff Optimization (MIPSHOP) Working Group (WG) has developed MIPv6 extension 
protocols which include, Fast Handovers for MIPv6 (FMIPv6) [7], Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) 
[8] and Hierarchical MIPv6 (HMIPv6) [9], for reducing the signalling overhead and handover 
latency incurred by MIPv6. FMIPv6 has proven to be a strong contender among mobility 
optimization protocols by providing a ‘make-before-break’ type handover solution with the 
assistance of layer 2 (L2) triggering mechanisms. Using anticipation mechanisms (i.e. L2 
triggers), FMIPv6 prepares for handovers in advance. FMIPv6 aims at reducing the handover 
latency by formulating a prospective IPv6 address known as a New Care-of-Address (NCoA), 
while it is still present on the current/previous AR's (pAR) link [7]. Details of the FMIPv6 
protocol operations are given in chapter 2.  However, it must be noted that HMIPv6 or FMIPv6 
alone, or a combination of them both (HFMIPv6 [81]) is not sufficient to reduce packet losses 
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and handover latency enough to efficiently provide the required QoS for delay sensitive real-time 
multimedia traffic.   
1.1.1.2 Need for Cross Layer interactions for Intelligent Media Independent 
Handover Management 
One of the major drawbacks of mobility management mechanisms in a multi-access environment 
is the lack of interaction between different layers of the protocol stack. The mobility 
management protocols at layer 3 (L3) or above are not capable of making intelligent handover 
decisions without cross-layer interactions with other layers below or above it. For instance, 
providing link layer or various network information (e.g. Layer 2 triggers, network 
neighbourhood information such as PoA MAC addresses, PoA channel ranges, Network Type, 
Security details etc)  to Layer 3 or higher mobility protocols would allow for informed and 
intelligent/optimized handovers across heterogeneous access networks. 
 The IEEE802.21 standard WG, named the Media Independent Handover (MIH) Standard WG 
[13], officially established in 2004, is developing a standard that provides generic link layer 
intelligence and other network related information to upper layers to optimize handover between 
different heterogeneous media, such as 3GPP/3GPP2, and both wired and wireless media of the 
IEEE802 standard family [13]. In order words, the IEEE802.21 standard is developing solutions 
to enable efficient cross-layer mechanisms. At the moment, there is a lack of clearly defined 
handover optimization mechanisms in IETF and IEEE802 standards (e.g. 802.11, 802.16). By 
taking into account the details of the interworking of MIPv6 extension protocols such as FMIPv6 
with IEEE802.21 MIH services, optimized handover solutions could be defined. Moreover, the 
current 802.21 draft standard does not take into account mobility management in vehicular 
environments. Already, CALM (Continuous Air interface for Long and Medium range) which is 
a family of umbrella protocols developed in ISO/TC204/WG16 (“Wide Area ITS 
Communications”) is developing standards in order “to provide a uniform environment for 
vehicle data communications that allows vehicles to stay connected using the best 
communications technology available both in the vehicle and in the infrastructure wherever the 
vehicle is located” [14].  In fact, in CALM, MIPv6 and Network Mobility (NEMO) [15] are 
included as two viable options for supporting host mobility and network mobility respectively in 
vehicular environments. Considering the overlap of work between CALM and IEEE802.21, with 
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respect to defining cross-layer solutions for optimized handover mechanisms, there is a great 
need to link the work done by both the standards. Therefore, extensive research needs to be done 
if MIH services are to be provided in vehicular environments. 
1.1.1.3 Mobility Service Bootstrapping Problem 
In order to successfully deploy Mobile IPv6 based mobility solutions across large scale IPv6   
heterogeneous networks, it is crucial to develop mechanisms to dynamically and securely 
provide the end hosts with the necessary information for service access based on some long term 
credential, which is typically a shared secret or a X.509 certificate. However, in the current 
MIPv6 specification defined in [6], the MN is assumed to be statically provisioned with the 
necessary information (i.e. HoA, HA address and necessary security associations with the HA). 
From an operational point of view, such an assumption prevents any large scale MIPv6 
deployment since it is not feasible or scalable to manually configure thousands of users and HAs.  
The availability of a dynamic solution, which is also known as “MIPv6 Bootstrapping” [20] is, 
therefore, a fundamental building block for enabling large scale MIPv6 deployment. 
1.1.1.4 Need for a Mobility Service Authorization Framework 
It is becoming clearer to operators that mobility will become an inherent part of 4G networks. A 
big proportion of their revenues will come from considering and providing mobility as a service. 
As a result basic Mobile IPv6 could be enriched with a set of additional features such as 
HMIPv6, or FMIPv6. For instance, FMIPv6, which offers an enhancement to the MIPv6 
features, could be considered as a “premium” type service from an operator’s point of view. 
Therefore, it must be noted that Mobile IPv6 and its extension protocols (FMIPv6 in our case) or 
any other services such as multi-homing, video streaming/conferencing, needs extensive 
authentication and authorization to maintain efficient accounting information and prevent 
potential security threats being introduced by such services. Authorization is often a neglected 
problem. The main focus of the existing bootstrapping architecture is to establish related 
information and security associations between the involved parties to authenticate successfully. 
However it is not clear whether a MN which is able authenticate successfully with a HA, should 
be automatically allowed to access a service in mobility. Consider a scenario where a MN 
interacts with a HA to utilize a MIPv6 service to maintain session continuity. The HA could be 
located in the access network and an additional authorization step from the user's home domain 
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would be necessary to ensure the user is in fact authorized to obtain the requested service and 
start credit control and accounting. This leads to the notion that authenticating for initial network 
access in a visited domain does not necessarily mean that the user is authorized to use other 
network services. In other words, authentication and authorization should be decoupled for 
efficient service provisioning. 
1.1.1.5 IEEE802.21 assisted fast Re-authentication  
Wireless handovers between PoAs (APs, Bss) across heterogeneous networks are typically a 
complicated process that involves several layers of protocol execution, which results in long 
latencies causing undesirable service disruptions. Apart from the mobility protocol signalling, 
additional latencies are incurred due to AAA services for re-authentication purposes. At the 
moment, there is a great lack in research on how IEEE802.21 MIH services could assist in 
optimizing the AAA based re-authentication process to reduce the overall handover latency. 
Moreover, operators may treat the IEEE802.21 assisted fast re-authentication mechanism as a 
“premium” service. As a result, an efficient scheme should be in place for IEEEE802.21 assisted 
fast re-authentication service authorization and bootstrapping.   
1.2 Thesis Contributions  
This thesis takes into account the challenges/issues described in the previous section as the 
driving forces behind the motivation to pursue detailed research, which aims at enabling efficient 
mobility management across heterogeneous IPv6 based networks. During the course of the 
research period, the thesis has contributed relevant research to the body of literature in the field 
and to standardisation. These contributions are detailed below: 
1.2.1 Handover Enhancement for Mobile IPv6 based Solutions using 
IEEE802.21 MIH Service 
Enhancement of Mobile IPv6 based solutions (namely FMIPv6) is proposed to allow for 
seamless mobility across heterogeneous networks using IEEE802.21 Media Independent 
Handover (MIH) services. A detailed cross-layer mechanism has been defined which greatly 
reduces the FMIPv6 (also applicable to other MIPv6 solutions) overall handover latency (i.e. 
both at Layer 2 and Layer 3) with the assistance of existing and newly defined MIH service 
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primitives. With the aid of the lower three layers’ knowledge of the MN/Mobile Router (MR) 
and the neighbouring access networks, the radio access discovery and candidate AR discovery 
issues (refer to chapter 2, section 2.7.1) of FMIPv6 are tackled. FMIPv6 has been applied in 
simulated vehicular environments to optimize the handover procedure by using IEEE802.21 
MIH services. FMIPv6 is used to enhance the performance of handover in Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) 
and its basic extension for Network Mobility (NEMO), the fundamental mobility management 
protocols used in vehicular networks.  
The thesis shows through analysis and simulations using Network Simulation (NS2) that the 
proposed mechanism will significantly reduce the overall expected handover latency (both at 
Layer 2 and Layer 3) in FMIPv6. 
 
 1.2.2 Experimental Evaluation of secured FMIPv6 over a Generic 
Authorization and Bootstrapping Architecture 
A novel service authorization and bootstrapping architecture is presented in order to provide the 
MN with the necessary configuration parameters and distributed keying materials to successfully 
bootstrap FMIPv6 services across heterogeneous access networks in terms of authentication and 
authorization. 
In this respect, experimental analysis is provided through implementation of a practical Linux 
operating system based test-bed. The purpose of the experiments carried out on the test bed was 
to investigate the handover performance of the proposed secured FMIPv6 mechanism compared 
to plain FMIPv6 and MIPv6 by providing quantitative measurements of the quality perceived by 
the users of the IPv6 multimedia applications subject to handover. 
 
1.2.3 IEEE802.21 assisted Re-Authentication scheme over a service 
authorization and bootstrapping framework 
A novel IEEE802.21 assisted Re-Authentication scheme over a service authorization and 
bootstrapping framework is presented to reduce the signalling overhead during the re-
authentication process, and as a result reduce the overall handover delay. The thesis shows 
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through analysis that the proposed mechanism will enhance the re-authentication process and 
significantly reduce the overall expected handover latency. 
1.3 The EU IST 'ENABLE' Project 
This thesis has been partly affiliated with and produced within the EU IST F6 framework 
'ENABLE' project.  The project included nine worldwide partners including Brunel University. 
The partners were Telecom Italia (Italy), Siemens (Germany), IABG (Germany), University of 
Murcia (Spain), Consulintel (Spain), TSSG (Ireland), Georg-August-University of Goettingen 
(Germany), Huawei Technologies (China).  Brunel has actively collaborated with its project 
partners to fulfil the goal of ENABLE which has been to research, develop, test, integrate and 
evaluate mechanisms and technologies for the successful deployment of efficient and operational 
mobility as a service in large scale IPv6 based heterogeneous networks [118].  
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters: 
 
• Chapter 2 provides the background to the pursued research.  
• Chapter 3 gives a comprehensive survey of the related work on mobility management in 
heterogeneous networks. 
• Chapter 4 investigates the potential of applying FMIPv6 in vehicular environments by 
optimizing the handover procedure using IEEE802.21 MIH services.  
• Chapter 5 presents a novel service bootstrapping and authorization architecture for 
FMIPv6 in order to provide the MN with necessary configuration parameters and 
distributed keying materials to secure FMIPv6 messages in terms of authentication and 
authorization.   
• Chapter 6 presents a novel IEEE802.21 assisted Re-Authentication scheme over a service 
authorization and bootstrapping framework. The purpose of the proposed scheme is to 
reduce the signalling latency during the re-authentication process, and as a result reduce 
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the overall handover delay. Also, the proposed scheme enables 802.21 service 
authorization and enables SAs to be established for securely exchanging MIH services. 
• Chapter 7 presents proposals for future work and conclusions. 
1.5 Publications 
Transactions/Journals Papers 
• Q.B.Mussabbir, W.Yao, Z.Niu and X.Fu, “Optimized FMIPv6 using IEEE802.21 MIH 
Services in Vehicular Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Volume 
56, Issue 6, November 2007, Page(s):3397-3407 
Conference Papers 
• Q. B.Mussabbir and W.Yao, “Optimized FMIPv6 handover using IEEE802.21 MIH 
services”, In Proceedings of ACM/IEEE International Workshop on Mobility in the 
Evolving internet Architecture, MobiArch, San Francisco, 2006 
• Q.B.Mussabbir, W.Yao and J.Cosmas, “IEEE802.21 Assisted Network Layer Mobility 
Support”, Accepted in The Third International Conference on Mobile Computing and 
Ubiquitous Networking, ICMU, London 2006   
1.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has introduced the thesis and presented the current research issues of its research 
area of mobility management in Next Generation Networks. The original contributions made by 
the thesis to its research area have been summarized. 
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CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND 
2.1 Supported Services and Devices in Next Generation Networks 
In chapter 1(see section 1.1) the envisaged network scenario for NGNs was highlighted. Before 
delving deeper into the realms of mobility management, it is important to highlight the services 
and terminals that will be supported in NGNs. It is quite difficult and risky to lay down customer 
needs for the future. However, a basic knowledge of the type of services, terminals and business 
entities that will exist in NGNs, can be derived from the concept of integrated heterogeneous 
access networks. The end-users should be able to utilize all the services and applications which 
are common in today's networks (mostly in wired networks such as ADSL, LAN etc) and are 
typical across the wired Internet. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 highlight a list of the core services and 
devices which will exist in 4G networks. It must be noted that the list in the tables is not 
exhaustive because future services and devices which were not envisioned at the time of writing 
are not included.  
 
Popular Internet Service Multimedia Services Upcoming 
Services in NGNs 
Overall 
Services   
Web, E-mail, Chat and 
Instant Messenger, P2P 
Applications (Limewire  
Bittorrent), Enterprise 
Applications (e.g. SAP), VPN 
Access, Telnet, FTP, ssh, .... 
Video-Conferencing, 
VoIP, Audio/Video 
Streaming, Video on 
Demand (VoD), Online 
Gaming Real-time 
Information Sharing, .... 
Location-Based 
Services, 
Mobility Services 
(e.g. MIPv6, 
FMIPv6 etc), 
Multihoming, .... 
                   Table 2.1: Services for NGN  
 
Handheld Other 
Target 
Devices 
Laptops, PDAs, Cameras, 
Mobile Phones, Portable 
Game Devices, Multimedia 
Devices 
Sensory Devices, Satellite Navigation 
Systems 
Table 2.2: Target Devices 
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The purpose of an integrated multi-access network is to allow users to be able to roam across 
different access technologies and administrative domains and utilize a wide array of ubiquitous 
services irrespective of their geographic location. Mobility is the core underlying principal of 
heterogeneous access networks which allows users to roam freely across multi-access 
environments. As a result, mobility will be the “De-Facto” service and it is only rational for 
Telecom operators to generate a massive revenue stream from it if they can. In other words, 
customers will have to subscribe and pay for services which will allow them seamless (i.e. 
without any service interruption) roaming in multi-access environments using mobility protocols 
such as Mobile IPv6, FMIPv6 etc. Therefore, it is important that an efficient business model is in 
place to provide solutions for mobility service bootstrapping (i.e. configuration and SA 
parameter provisioning) and  access control ( authentication and authorization) mechanisms. 
2.2 Business Models 
It is clear that NGNs will support a wealth of services (shown in Table 2.1). Such a magnitude of 
services calls for clearly defined business models which will allow operators to provide such 
services efficiently to their customers. The complex network scenario envisaged for NGNs has 
led the IETF to define specialized business entities to provide mobility services. Such business 
entities may in turn require sophisticated business relationships among themselves. Since the 
core of this thesis focuses on mobility management for 4G networks, the simplified business 
model shown in Figure 2.1 is applicable only for mobility services. 
The four clearly distinguishable macro entities shown in Figure 2.1 are the End users, Access 
Service Providers (ASP), Access Service Authorizer (ASA), Mobility Service Providers (MSP) 
and   Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA).  
The ASP provides network access services to the end-users (i.e. IP connectivity). The end-users 
maintain their subscriptions to a “Home” ASP which stores the user's service profile and 
contractual agreements. The user's ASA is responsible for granting authorization to the user's 
network access, even in a roaming scenario where the user is in a foreign ASP network. The 
“Home” ASP is also the user's ASA. Possible examples of ASPs are ISPs, mobile operator 
networks, virtual providers (Wireless ISPs), corporate networks etc. 
Chapter 2 
28 
 
Similarly the mobility service has been separated with specialized business roles. The MSP 
delivers IP mobility services to end-users. The MSP hosts the necessary mobility management 
infrastructure such as Home Agents or global mobility anchor points. The MSP stores the user's 
service profile and contractual agreements. The “Home” MSP also constitutes the MSA which is 
in charge of authorizing the user for mobility services such MIPv6, FMIPv6 etc. The “Home” 
MSA may delegate mobility services to one or many MSPs (through “service roaming” 
agreements) as deemed necessary.   
In Figure 2.1, the Roaming Broker (RB) will act as a trusted third party and central hub among 
the service providers. This will avoid the establishment and maintenance of number of one-to-
one relationships between service providers. The RB can be used by both network services (i.e. 
ASP – RB – ASA) and mobility services (i.e. MSP – RB – MSA).The iPass is an example of a 
Roaming Broker for access service. 
 
Figure: 2.1. Foreseen Business Entities 
 
MSA MSA 
Roaming 
Broker MSP 
End 
User 
ASA 
ASP 
Contractual relationship and/or service level agreement 
Mobility Service 
Access Service 
Roaming 
Broker 
ASA 
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The end-user category is quite varied and involves many actors which can be easily classified.  
The groups defined below are not necessarily separate and a user may belong to more than one 
group. For example, cellular users may want to leverage their corporate network while they are 
at work. 
Cellular users are customers of mobile operators. Cellular users use an (U) SIM to access the 
mobile network (e.g. GSM/UMTS networks)  
Private citizens use the Internet providers network (ISP, carrier, Wireless ISP, etc) using 
technologies such as dial-up, ADSL, Wireless MAN, hotspots, etc.   
Employees who use their corporate networks from work using both wired and wireless 
technologies.  
2.3 Mobility Scenarios 
2.3.1 Access Technologies 
The mobility scenarios in 4G networks will comprise of various access technologies. In Table 
2.3, a list of the main access technologies involved in the mobility scenarios are provided. Note 
that the list is not exhaustive as future access technologies are not considered.  
 
 
Local Area Networks Cellular  Wireless Metropolitan 
Networks 
Satellite 
Main Access 
Technologies 
Wired Networks (e.g. 
Ethernet), Wireless LAN 
(IEEE 802.11x), 
Bluetooth, Ultra Wide 
Band (UWB), Fibre 
Optics... 
GSM, 
GPRS/UMTS 
(2.5/3G), 3GPP 
LTE (4G), ... 
IEEE802.16REVd 
(i.e. Wireless DSL), 
IEEE802.16e, IEEE 
802.16m, Pre-standard 
Solutions (e.g. 
Samsung WiBro), ... 
DVB-S, 
DVB-S2, 
DVB-RCS, 
SCPC, ..... 
 
Table 2.3: Access Technologies 
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2.3.2 Mobility Definitions 
Different kinds of mobility definitions could be derived based on the network deployment 
scenarios.  
Global Mobility occurs when the MN moves between access technologies involving a change in 
the IP link or subnet. Generally such mobility incurs both layer 2 and 3 mobility mechanisms.  
Intra-link Mobility is the movement of MNs between different wireless APs within the same IP 
subnet. This kind of mobility involves only layer 2 mechanisms. Intra-link is often referred as 
intra-subnet handover since no IP link re-configuration is required upon movement. However 
some IP signalling may be needed to confirm whether or not the change in APs resulted in a 
change of IP subnets. 
Localized Mobility occurs when the MNs movement is restricted over an access network. The 
area in which the MN moves may be restricted by geographical topology. However the actual 
geographical area could be very large, depending on the mapping between the wireless coverage 
area and network topology. Figure 2.2 illustrates the concepts behind the three mobility scenarios 
described.  
2.4 Types of Handovers 
2.4.1 Intra-subnet/Inter-subnet and Intra-technology/Inter-technology 
handover 
Mobility between two access networks that are part of the same IP subnet and same broadcast 
domain is known as Intra-subnet handover.  
An Inter-subnet handover results in the movement between two access networks that belong to 
two different IP subnets. This causes the L3 identifier (i.e. IP address) to change, giving rise to a 
need for a mobility management protocol to maintain session continuity. Inter-subnet handover 
involves both layer 2 and 3 mobility mechanisms and triggers delays which results in packet loss 
and jitter (i.e. QoS degradation).  
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When a MN moves between the same access-technologies, it is known as Intra-technology 
handover. Inter-technology handover occurs when a MN moves between different access-
technologies (e.g. 802.11g to 802.16e). During an Inter-technology handover, a MN may move 
out of the coverage or footprint area of the radio access of one technology (e.g. 802.11g) and 
move into the coverage area of a different access technology (e.g. 802.16e). Inter-technology 
handover causes a change in the communication interface (i.e. L2 Identifier) being used by the 
MN. 
Different combinations of Intra/Inter-subnet and Intra/Inter-technology handovers may exist. For 
example, an Intra-subnet handover may be accompanied by an Inter-technology handover, or, 
vice-versa. Alternatively an intra-technology handover may involve intra-subnet or inter-subnet 
mobility, which may be associated with a change in the L3 identifier of the MN.  
2.4.2 Intra domain/Inter domain handover 
A domain by definition could have several meanings. However, for the purpose of roaming, a 
domain could be defined as a single administrative entity which manages one or many networks. 
The administrative entity which may be a service provider, an enterprise or any organization is 
responsible for authenticating and authorizing a MN to access the various networks.  
When a MN’s movement is confined within a single administrative domain, it is referred as 
Intra-domain mobility. Intra-domain mobility could involve Intra/Inter-subnet, Intra/Inter-
technology handover.  
Inter-domain handover by definition provides mobility between two administrative domains. By 
default, Inter-domain handover is subjected to Inter-subnet handover since the two different 
domains exclusively have two different subnets. In addition it may be associated with either Intra 
or Inter-technology handover. Therefore, Inter-domain handover will consist of all the 
transitions/steps a subnet handover goes through with the addition of authentication to the new 
domain. The extra procedures will bring additional latencies during the overall handover process 
(i.e. L2 + L3). Figure 2.2 depicts the Intra and Inter-domain handovers consisting of Intra/Inter-
subnet, Intra/Inter-technology handovers. 
Based on the classification of various types of mobility and handover, different requirements on 
mobility management can be derived. For example, each of the categories of mobility has a 
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specific tolerance to packet loss during handover latency. Based on these tolerances a certain 
minimum mobility support will be required, which could be one of following: 
Seamless handover: In this case, the handover occurs with no delay, and consequently no packet 
loss. 
Lossless handover: In this case, the handover occurs with some delay, but mechanisms are in 
place to prevent packet loss. 
Session Continuity: In this case, the handover occurs with some delay and some packet loss; 
however, the session will survive the handover and continue afterwards. 
 
 
       Figure 2.2: Various type of mobility 
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2.5 IP/Network Layer Mobility Management Protocols 
2.5.1 Mobile IPv6 Handover Mechanisms 
Due to various limitation of the IPv4 protocol, IPv6 has been chosen as the convergence layer for 
future heterogeneous access networks. Consequently, MIPv6 is meant to replace the IETF 
defined MIPv4 standard as the base mobility management protocol for NGNs. MIPv6 is 
incorporated by substantial changes to MIPv4, such as elimination of the Foreign Agent (FA) 
entity, security enhancements and route optimization. 
The MIPv6 specification defined by the IETF provides transparent host mobility within IPv6 
networks. MIPv6 assists a MN to freely move between IP subnets without change in its original 
IPv6 address configuration. This means that the MN is always addressable in the Internet by its 
Home Address (HoA). The HoA is the IPv6 address assigned to the MN in its home network. 
While away from the home network, a MN can still be reachable in the Internet, since packets 
can be routed to its HoA. In this way, mobility transparency of higher layer protocols (e.g. 
Transport layer or higher) is achieved. 
MIPv6 arbitrarily allows a MN to change its location in the Internet when it moves from one 
IPv6 subnet to another. During such mobility, the MN will perform the MIPv6 handover 
procedure. The overall handover procedure of MIPv6 involves several stages which are listed 
below. Figure 2.3 illustrates the overall message flow for the MIPv6 protocol operation. 
2.5.1.1 Movement Detection 
Movement Detection refers to the process by which a MN detects whether or not it has moved to 
a different IPv6 subnet. As a general rule, such movement can be detected when two events have 
taken place.  
      1.   The current default router is not reachable, and 
      2.    A new prefix has appeared on the link 
The first event can be observed when a MN performs Neighbour Reach-ability Detection (NUD) 
on a continual basis to determine whether the current default router is still bi-directionally 
reachable. Briefly speaking, NUD works by maintaining a 'Neighbour Cache' to determine the 
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link layer address of the next hop node (either an on-link router or its current router). A detailed 
explanation of NUD can be found in [16][109][110]. The second event occurs in two ways: 1) 
The MN sends a Router Solicitation (RS) message, and, in response receives a Router 
Advertisement (RA) containing new prefix information; 2) The MN receives unsolicited RAs 
when it moves to a new network before the RA interval of the previously connected AR has 
terminated. The amount of time that elapses before a RA is received depends on the 
advertisement frequency. MIPv6 has a minimum RA interval time of 0.05 seconds. 
2.5.1.2 Address Configuration 
When a MN moves into a new IPv6 subnet (i.e. foreign network), it must configure itself with an 
IPv6 address to use on the new network. This process of forming a new IPv6 address is known as 
Care-of-Address (CoA) configuration. The MN may use both stateless and stateful address auto-
configuration mechanisms to form the CoA.  
Stateless auto-configuration requires no manual configuration of hosts and minimal 
configuration of servers. A MN combines local information such as RA prefix information and a 
unique host identifier to form an IPv6 address (i.e. CoA in a MIPv6 scenario). Stateful auto-
configuration allows a MN to obtain an IPv6 address or configuration parameters from a 
DHCPv6 [19] server. 
Upon formation of a CoA, the MN must perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) in order to 
validate its new CoA, which is essentially a link local IPv6 address, against any other node that 
may have been assigned the same IPv6 address. In [16], a detailed explanation of DAD is 
provided.  
2.5.1.3 Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement 
Following the address auto-configuration, the MN must inform it's HA of its new CoA by 
sending a Binding Update (BU) message. The BU message is one of several MIPv6 message 
options encoded in a new header known as a mobility header. The purpose of the BU is to inform 
the HA of the MN's current address (i.e. CoA). The HA binds the MN's HoA with the CoA and 
stores it in a binding cache. When the HA receives a BU, it performs a number of actions before 
it can accept the BU message. Firstly, it checks the binding cache to see if an entry exists. If an 
entry does exist, then that entry is updated with the new information received. If there are no 
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entries, then a new one is created. The HA also defends the MN's HoA by performing DAD to 
validate that no other node on the home network has configured an IPv6 address that collides 
with the MN's HoA. The HA, upon validating the BU, sends back a Binding Acknowledgement 
(BA) message to the MN to indicate whether or not the BU has been accepted. Like the BU, the 
BA is also a mobility header. If accepted, the MN starts to receive IP packets in the foreign 
network.  
2.5.1.4 Authentication and Authorization 
When an Inter-domain handover is encountered, the MN will have to utilize some form of AAA 
infrastructure to gain authentication and authorization for network access. Also, since MIPv6 
will be considered as a separate specialized service, additional latencies will be incurred for 
authenticating and authorizing a MN for mobility services. Authentication and authorization for 
initial network access will occur before the MIPv6 service is requested by the MN. The details of 
the AAA infrastructure interaction which is necessary in order to authenticate and authorize the 
MN for network access and mobility services is explained in chapter 5.   
2.5.1.5 Message flow for MIPv6 
In Figure 2.3, the detailed message flow of MIPv6 is presented, which also highlights the overall 
handover latency.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: MIPv6 Message Flow 
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2.5.2 Fast Handovers for MIPv6  
The latencies involved in the movement detection, CoA configuration, and CoA testing (i.e. 
DAD) in MIPv6 could be reduced if there is knowledge of the neighbouring ARs and subnet 
affiliations prior to handover. Such information would allow a MN to anticipate its attachment to 
a new router by asking its default router to provide the subnet prefix, IP address and MAC 
address of a target router attached to a neighbouring access point. The procedure of anticipating 
network layer mobility results in a make-before-break handover. In the following sections, the 
overall handover procedure for FMIPv6 is presented as a sequence of events. Figure 2.4 presents 
an overview of FMIPv6 handover and Figure 2.5 illustrates the overall message flows involved.  
2.5.2.1 Anticipation and Handover Initiation  
FMIPv6 is designed to allow MNs to anticipate and initiate an IP layer handover through the use 
of link layer triggers. These link layer triggers are delivered to the network layer modules as 
events reporting changes with regard to the link and physical layer conditions. For instance, 
when the MN detects that its signal quality with its attached AP is going down or about to go 
down, the link layer sends a trigger to the network layer which in turn starts the IP layer 
movement anticipation and initiation.  
During the anticipation phase, the MN sends a Router Solicitation for a Proxy Advertisement 
(RtSolPr) message to the default access router to resolve one or more AP Identifiers (AP-ID) to 
subnet-specific items of information [7]. The default router known as the pAR (Previous Access 
Router) replies with a Proxy Router Advertisement (PrRtAdv) message which contains the 
neighbouring router’s advertisement that includes one or more [AP-ID, AR-Info] tuples [7]. 
Using this information the MN forms a new CoA (NCoA) while still being a part of the pAR’s 
link. Hence, the latency incurred as a result of discovering a new prefix (in other words due to 
router discovery in MIPv6) is eliminated [7]. 
2.5.2.2 Updating the Previous Access Router 
After anticipating an IP layer handover, the MN will send a Fast Binding Update (FBU) message 
which contains the NCoA to the pAR. The purpose of the pAR is to provide local HA 
functionality to redirect the MN's traffic to its new location belonging in the nAR's link. The 
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pAR upon receiving the FBU will send a Handover Initiate (HI) message containing the 
prospective NCoA to the new AR (nAR) [127].  
The HI message serves two purposes: firstly it establishes a tunnel between the pAR and nAR 
[127].  The purpose of the tunnel is to forward packets arriving at the Previous Care-of-Address 
(PCoA) to the NCoA. Such a tunnel remains active until the MN moves to the nAR's link and 
completes binding updates with its correspondents [7] [127]. Secondly, after the tunnel is set up, 
the nAR determines whether it is aware of any address duplication for the NCoA [7][127]. The 
nAR sends a DAD probe for the NCoA to verify uniqueness. If there is no collision, the nAR 
starts defending it. Otherwise, the nAR will assign a new NCoA on behalf of the MN. In either 
case, the nAR will respond back to the pAR with a Handover Acknowledgement (HAcK) 
message [7] [127]. If the nAR assigns the NCoA, the HAcK message will contain the assigned 
NCoA. Upon receiving the HAcK message, the pAR sends a Fast Binding Acknowledgement 
(FBack) to the MN. If HAck contains an assigned NCoA, the FBack must include it, and the MN 
must use the address provided in the FBack [7] [127]. 
2.5.2.3 Moving to the New Access Router's link 
As soon as the MN establishes link connectivity with nAR, it immediately sends an Unsolicited 
Neighbour Advertisement (UNA) message. When the nAR receives the UNA message, it 
immediately starts forwarding arriving and buffered packets to the MN. The UNA message is 
used to inform the nAR that the MN is now attached to its link and requests any buffered packets 
to be forwarded to the MN. This scenario is only valid when the MN receives the FBack message 
while it was still connected to the pAR's link. In the event the MN moves without receiving an 
FBack, the MN can start using its NCoA after sending a FBU from the nAR's link [7] [127]. If 
the nAR provides a different IP address to the MN to use, it should send a Router Advertisement 
with the "Neighbor Advertisement Acknowledge (NAACK)" option which contains an alternate 
IP address for the MN [7] [127]. In this case, the MN will resend the FBU. The nAR will tunnel 
the FBU to the pAR. If the nAR is already proxying the NCoA as a result of the HI and HAcK 
exchanged before the MN moved [7] [127], then, the pAR will only send the FBack message to 
the MN. If the nAR is not proxying the NCoA, then the pAR and nAR will exchange HI, HaCK 
and FBack messages as described in [7].  Hence, two types of operational modes in FMIPv6 can 
be defined based on the scenarios described above: 
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• the Predictive mode, and, 
• the Reactive mode. 
In the Predictive mode, the FBU is sent from the pAR’s link and the FBack is also received in 
the pAR’s link before it moves to the new link [7]. In the Reactive mode, the FBU is sent from 
the nAR’s link [7]. The reactive mode also includes the case when FBU is sent from the pAR’s 
link but the Fast Binding Acknowledgement (FBack) has not been received yet [7]. Therefore, in 
the reactive mode, long handover delays would be induced due to NCoA configuration and 
Binding Updates. Due to this reason, it is desirable that the FMIPv6 protocol always operates in 
the predictive mode. Given below is a diagram which illustrates the operations of the FMIPv6 
protocol. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Overview of FMIPv6 
In Figure 2.5, the detailed message flow of FMIPv6 is illustrated (as explained earlier) which 
also highlights the overall handover latency.  
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Figure 2.5: FMIPv6 Message Flow 
2.5.3 Network Mobility (NEMO) 
In order to address the requirement for transparent Internet access for mobile networks, the IETF 
has standardized the NEMO Basic Support Protocol. By definition, a mobile network (or 
Network that moves) is a network whose point of attachment to the Internet varies with time 
[128]. In terms of architecture, a mobile network is composed of Mobile Network Nodes (MNN) 
with some of the nodes (typically the most capable) acting as gateways to external nodes and 
infrastructure based networks such as the Internet. Like MIPv6, NEMO consists of a mobility 
anchor point (i.e. HA) in the home network with which it maintains a HoA. The MNN within 
NEMO that connects to the Internet is called the Mobile Router (MR) [128]. The handover 
procedure of NEMO is very similar to that of MIPv6. When a mobile network moves away from 
its home network, the MR acquires a CoA and sends a BU message on behalf of all the MNNs, 
which associates its Care of Address (CoA) with the network prefix [128]. Essentially, it creates 
a bi-directional tunnel between the HA and CoA of the MR [128].  The handover process of 
NEMO is very similar to that of MIPv6 and involves Movement Detection, Address 
Configuration and Sending Binding Updates.  Figure 2.6 illustrates an overview of NEMO. 
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Figure 2.6: NEMO operations overview [10] 
2.6 IEEE802.21 Media Independent Handover Framework 
The IEEE802.21 WG, named the “Media Independent Handover (MIH) Standard WG [8], and 
officially formed in 2004 is developing a standard that provides generic link layer intelligence 
and other network related information to upper layers to optimize handovers between different 
heterogeneous media, such as 3GPP/3GPP2, and both wired and wireless media of the 
IEEE802.21 family” [13]. The framework relies on the presence of a mobility management 
protocol stack (e.g. MIPv6, FMIPv6 etc) to enable session continuity while the MN moves 
across heterogeneous access networks [13]. The IEEE802.21 WG has defined a new logical 
entity within the protocol stack of the network elements with a set of handover-enabling 
functions to assist in Inter-technology (i.e. Vertical) handovers.  
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2.6.1 IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover Function 
The IEEE802.21 standard maintains that information about the condition and configuration of 
the surrounding networks will be received and transmitted by the MIHF, regardless of where it 
may be residing(i.e. on the MN or the access network). 
The IEEE802.21 MIHF is a logical component that resides between L2 and the IP layer. Using 
Service Access Points (SAPs), both asynchronous and synchronous services are provided by the 
MIHF. Essentially, the SAPs are a list of primitives, where each primitive contains parameters 
that are defined utilising abstract data types.  A unified SAP known as the MIH_SAP provides 
MIH services (i.e. Independent of access technologies) to upper layers. On the other hand, the 
lowers layers and provided services thorough media dependant SAPs known as 
MIH_Link_SAPs.  
Three primary services that facilitate handovers between heterogeneous networks are defined by 
MIHF: MIH Event Services (MIES), MIH Command Services (MICS) and MIH Information 
Services (MIIS). Figure 2.7 shows the MIH Framework. A detailed discussion of each of the 
services is presented below.  
Figure 2.7: IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover Framework [13] 
 
Media Independent Event Service (MIES) “provides an event reporting, event filtering and 
event classification service corresponding to the dynamic changes in link characteristics, link 
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quality and link status. The Event Service is also used to indicate management actions and 
command status on behalf of the” [13] management entity residing on the MN or a network 
entity. The MIES reports both local and remote events to the upper layers. A transport protocol is 
required in order to support remote events. Events originate from MIHF or lower layers within 
the protocol stack of a MN or network entity [13]. In the case of local events, the message 
propagates from the lower layer (i.e. PHY, MAC) to the MIHF and from there to the upper layers 
located within the same protocol stack [13]. In case of remote events, messages traverse across 
the network medium from one MIH entity to another located remotely [13]. Link Events 
originate from layers below the MIHF and terminate at the MIHF [13]. The Link Events are 
media-specific triggers which include, but are not limited to, various IEEE802 defined and 
3GPP/3GPP2 defined interfaces [13]. The upper layer entities (i.e. MIH users) receive events 
through an event subscription mechanism. The event subscription consists of the Link Event 
subscription and the MIH Event subscription. Link Event subscription takes place when the 
MIHF subscribes with the link source entities (MAC or PHY layers) for Link Event 
notifications. MIH Event subscriptions are performed by the MIH users with the MIHF to select 
which events they will receive.   
The MIES is used to anticipate handovers. For example, an indication that the link with which 
the MN is connected will cease to carry layer 2 data frames in the near future can be used by the 
MIH users to prepare for handover to a new PoA [13]. Some of the events that have been 
specified by IEEE 802.21 are “Link Up”, “Link Down”, “Link Detect”, “Link Parameter 
Reports” and “Link Going Down”. Mobility management protocols can use some of these 
events, for example, “Link Down” or “Link Going Down” as handover triggers. The MIES 
together with the QoS requirements of the applications, the reported link status, quality and 
characteristics, will be very useful for the mobility management entity to make handover 
decisions, i.e. decide which network and PoA the MN should switch to, and when the MN should 
make the handover.  
Media Independent Command Service (MICS) uses the MIHF primitives to send commands 
from higher layers (e.g. Policy Engines, Mobility protocols) to lower layers [13].  The higher 
layers would pass commands regarding mobility and connectivity to lower layers, based on the 
status of the connected interfaces. In other words, MICS controls, reconfigures or selects an 
appropriate link through a list of pre-defined handover commands [13]. MIH user invoked 
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commands are known as MIH Commands. Commands originating from the MIHF are known as 
Link Commands. MICS can be both local and remote in nature. Local command messages 
propagate from the MIH users to the MIHF and from there to the lowers layers located within the 
same protocol stack.  In case of remote commands, the messages traverse across the network 
medium from one MIH entity to another with the assistance of the MIH protocol. A typical use 
case of MICS is to inform the link layer to get ready before the actual handover happens, and to 
give the command to the link layer to switch from one network interface to another. It also 
allows the mobility management protocols to enquire about the link layer’s status before making 
the handover decision. 
Media Independent Information Service (MIIS) provides a framework and mechanism for an 
MIHF entity to discover available neighbouring network information within a geographical area 
to facilitate the handover process. In order to represent the information across different access 
technologies, the MIIS specifies a common way of representing this information by using a 
standard format such as XML (Extensible Markup Language), ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation 
One), or TLV (Type Length Value), and this information can be obtained through a certain 
query/response mechanism [13]. Both static and dynamic information is provided by the MIIS. 
Examples of this static information include the names of service providers, MAC addresses, and 
channel information of the MN’s current network neighbourhood. Dynamic information includes 
link layer parameters such as, data rate, throughput, and other higher layer service information 
needed to make an intelligent handover decision.  
In the current 802.21 MIIS specification, a MN gets the heterogeneous neighbourhood 
information by requesting Information Elements (IEs) from the Information Server (IS). It also 
allows the neighbourhood information to be delivered to the MN using pre-defined Information 
Reports/IE Containers to effectively represent the heterogeneous neighbourhood information in 
TLV format. In the IEEE 802.21 draft, the defined IEs provide mostly static L2 information. The 
neighbouring network information discovered and obtained by the MIIS can be used in 
conjunction with user and network operator policies for optimum network selection. MIIS relies 
on existing media specific transport and security mechanisms or L3 transport and security 
mechanisms to deliver access to surrounding network information [13].  
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2.6.2 The MIH Protocol  
The MIH protocol allows two remote MIH entities to exchange messages to support MIHF 
services. Remote MIHF can send each other reports and other information by utilizing the MIES, 
MICS and MIIS. MIH protocol is responsible for encapsulating the MIH services in MIH Frames 
and sending them over the physical link. Each of the physical links will require a slightly 
different method, but the reference models defined in [13] will take care of it. MIH protocol 
transactions are recognized through sequences of messages with a Transaction-ID. MIH protocol 
also uses a message acknowledgement service when the underlying transport used for the remote 
communication does not provide reliability. However, the acknowledgement service is not 
needed when the underlying transport provides reliable transport services. A detailed explanation 
of the MIH protocol can be found in [13]. 
2.6.2.1 MIH protocol Frame Format 
In Figure 2.8, a general frame format for the MIH protocol is shown. In the MIH protocol 
messages, all TLV definitions are assigned a boundary of one octet, and, as a result no padding is 
required. The frame carries a MIH Header, Source MIHF Identifier TLV, a Destination MIHF 
Identifier TLV, followed by the MIH service specific TLVs [13]. A detailed description of each 
of the components of the MIH protocol is provided in [13].  
 
    Figure 2.8: MIH Protocol Frame Format [13] 
2.7 Motivation 
This section aims to provide the motivation behind pursuing the field of research of this thesis; 
i.e. Mobility Management across Converged –IP Based Heterogeneous Access Networks. The 
motivation stems from the issues that need to be tackled for efficient mobility management to 
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enable the deployment of large IPv6 heterogeneous networks. In chapter 1(section 1.1.1), general 
details of the research issues were presented. In this section the motivation for the research 
undertaken in this thesis is presented in terms of the underlying issues that it aims to resolve.  
2.7.1 Handover Enhancements for FMIPv6  
The handover process for MIPv6 and FMIPv6 presented in section 2.5 of this chapter, gives an 
insight into the overall handover latencies incurred for each of the mobility protocols (i.e. MIPv6 
and FMIPv6).  The handover service for MIPv6 does not assure seamless movement and causes 
non-negligible handover latency without connectivity which causes data packets to be lost. The 
handover latency is mainly caused by movement detection, address configuration, and, sending 
binding updates and Binding Acknowledgements. The acceptable handover latency depends on 
the type of application in use. In section 2.4, handovers were classified based on packet loss 
tolerance. MIPv6 is not capable of providing transparent seamless mobility to most multimedia 
applications (real-time or non-real-time), such as VoIP, and Video Conferencing. However, 
MIPv6 is a matured solution and extensive research has been conducted by academics, industry 
and standards organizations, into enhancing its handover latency. As a result, MIPv6 handovers 
can be considered an exhausted area of research. An overview of the related work on MIPv6 
handovers and their optimization is presented in the next chapter. It must be noted, that, MIPV6 
is a base mobility protocol from which other extension protocols like HMIPv6 and FMIPv6 
derive. In the context of NGNs, MIPv6 will exist as the fundamental mobility protocol which 
will provide basic mobility services for any roaming users requiring session continuity. 
Extension protocols like FMIPv6, which are designed to reduce the handover latencies of MIPv6 
can be thought of as “premium” type services for users requiring seamless mobility. 
Compared to MIPv6, FMIPv6 is relatively new and has not enjoyed the same mainstream 
attention that MIPv6 enjoyed. At the moment there seems to be great interest in FMIPv6 among 
the research community for its “make-before-break” handover capabilities which rely on lower 
layer triggers and neighbouring network information. As a result, FMIPv6 holds great potential 
for applying cross-layer information and network intelligence (i.e. neighbouring network 
information) to provide seamless mobility. Therefore, this thesis has chosen FMIPv6 as the 
protocol for its solutions for providing mobility management across heterogeneous networks. 
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Even though FMIPv6 stands as a promising solution for seamless mobility there are issues which 
need to be tackled for it to be successfully deployed in NGNs. 
The FMIPv6 specification focuses on the protocol operation itself and neglects issues such as 
radio access network discovery and candidate AR discovery (i.e. how the network prefixes for 
the ARs are mapped with the corresponding L2 identifier). Although the anticipation mechanism 
specified by FMIPv6 is useful, it introduces additional problems.  
Need for standardized L2 triggers: FMIPv6 relies on L2 triggers to anticipate and perform 
“make-before-break” type handovers. However, the FMIPv6 only mentions the use of L2 
triggers it does not specify or define any such L2 triggers. Therefore, it is essential that 
standardized L2 triggers are defined to assist FMIPv6 in providing seamless mobility.  
Neighbouring access network discovery: FMIPv6 does not address any radio access network 
discovery mechanism. Discovering the available PoAs by actively scanning all the channels 
provided by the neighbouring networks takes a considerable amount of time which makes a 
significant contribution to the overall handover latency. For example, in 802.11b, the L2 
scanning can take 400ms to 800ms [57] and takes 90% of overall L2 handover time.  
Information exchange with neighbouring ARs: How neighbouring ARs exchange information 
to construct PrRtAdv messages is not specified in the RFC of FMIPv6. The IETF SEAMOBY 
WG has developed the Candidate Access Router Discovery (CARD) protocol [101] to address 
this issue. However, it does not support the sharing of L2 information between the ARs. 
Reduced cost of anticipation: There are three FMIPv6 signalling messages involved in the 
anticipation phase: Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement (RtSolPr), Proxy Router 
Advertisement (PrRtAdv) and Fast Binding Update (FBU). These messages are used for 
assisting IP movement detection and NCoA configuration. In FMIPv6, the L2 handover is 
triggered by the degraded link condition. It is likely that the MN will not be connected to the 
pAR long enough to send and receive all FMIPv6 messages.  When anticipation is used, the MN 
may not have sufficient time to update the pAR with the FBU. As a result, if the MN has already 
lost connection with pAR, it will then be forced to operate in the reactive mode and the handover 
latency will increase consequently. 
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2.7.2 IEEE802.21 Assisted Cross Layer Techniques for FMIPv6 Optimization 
FMIPv6 alone is not capable of tackling the advanced mobility scenarios in NGNs. There is great 
interest in the research community to interwork IEEE802.21 MIH services (e.g. MIES, MICS 
and MIIIS) with mobility management protocols to assist in seamless mobility. The potential of 
IEEE802.21 MIH services can help in tackling the FMIPv6 issues by providing: 
Generic L2 triggers by utilizing the MIES. Various L2 triggers (e.g. Link Going Down, Link 
Up, etc) have been clearly defined by IEEE802.21 which can assist FMIPv6 in resolving the 
need for standardized L2 triggers 
Neighbouring Network Information (both L2 and L3) information provided by the MIIS can 
help FMIPv6 tackle the issues related to radio access discovery, candidate AR discovery, and 
anticipation mechanisms.  
Intelligent Network Selection can be possible with help of both MICS and MIIS. The diverse 
static information provided by MIIS, together with the dynamic neighbouring information (e.g. 
QoS information such as packet loss, available data rates etc) collected by MICS from candidate 
PoAs, can be utilized for intelligent network selection.   
At the moment, there is lack of clearly defined and detailed interworking mechanisms between 
IEEE802.21 and FMIPv6 from standards bodies such as the IETF and IEEE. Moreover, the 
services defined by IEEE802.21 alone are not sufficient for intelligent seamless handovers across 
heterogeneous access networks. Current mobility decision engines do not take user, application, 
and context information into account. As a result, there is a need to define cross layer 
mechanisms which allow mobility or policy decision engines to acquire user, application, and 
context information to make informed and intelligent handover decisions.  
Network Mobility will play an intrinsic part in 4G networks. Users are demanding Internet 
access not only from fixed locations (e.g., at home, at work, in hotels, etc), but also in public 
transportation systems (e.g. planes, trains, and buses). At the moment, NEMO has been specified 
by the IETF for supporting network mobility in vehicular environments.  However, handover 
optimization for network mobility is often neglected and few research contributions address this. 
The handover latency for NEMO has been presented in section 2.5. Like MIPv6, NEMO suffers 
from long handover delays associated with movement detection; address configuration and 
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sending binding updates. For delay sensitive applications (real-time multimedia, time critical 
safety and traffic applications) such delays are unacceptable. In order to provide seamless 
mobility, it is essential that the handover latencies of NEMO be reduced. As a result, the 
potential for realising fast handovers in NEMO must be examined.  In this regard, FMIPv6 can 
be used to support network mobility with minor protocol modifications. Also, IEEE802.21 MIH 
services could be utilized to support FMIPv6 to further optimize handovers in vehicular 
environments.  
2.7.3 Service Authorization and Bootstrapping Framework for Mobility 
Services 
Mobility will be a fundamental feature of NGNs. As a result, operators will charge users for 
mobility services and it is expected that a huge proportion of the operators’ revenues will come 
from them. As mentioned earlier, the basic MIPv6 could be enriched with a set of additional 
features that provide optimized handovers services. For example, FMIPv6 which offers 
enhancements to the MIPv6 features can be considered a “premium” type service. Therefore, it 
must be noted that Mobile IPv6 and its extension protocols (FMIPv6 in our case) or any other 
services such as IEEE802.21 MIH Services, multi-homing, video streaming/conferencing need 
extensive authentication and authorization to maintain efficient accounting information and 
prevent potential security threats introduced by such services from being realised.  
Based on the business entities described in section 2.2, various complicated scenarios could be 
envisaged taking into account whether the ASA or MSA are the same entity or not. In order to 
successfully deploy an efficient mobility service authorization framework, the business entities 
would have to be integrated within an AAA infrastructure. Therefore, a detailed service 
authorization framework needs to be defined taking into account all the required components; 
i.e., business entities such as ASA, ASP, MSA, and MSP, integrated within an AAA 
infrastructure.  
2.7.4 IEEE802.21 assisted fast Re-Authentication for Handover 
Enhancements 
It must be noted that additional latencies are incurred for network access authentication/re-
authentication due to AAA services during handovers across heterogeneous networks. This is 
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due to the fact that existing re-authentication implementations run a full authentication method (a 
very time-consuming process) when a MN encounters a new authenticator (i.e. PoA), 
irrespective of whether it has been authenticated to the network domain recently and has 
unexpired keying material. 
Moreover, different access technologies have different authentication techniques, which make 
the overall handover process more intrinsic and prone to long latencies. As a result a method 
independent re-authentication mechanism is required which will utilize cross-layer information, 
such as, information on candidate PoA, candidate PoA IP and MAC address, etc, to optimize and 
reduce handovers delays associated with re-authentication mechanisms in a heterogeneous access 
environment. Also, optimized re-authentication mechanisms could be considered as a “premium” 
service. Therefore, IEEE802.21 assisted fast re-authentications mechanisms will need to operate 
over an efficient service authorization and bootstrapping framework. 
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CHAPTER 3- Survey of Research on Mobility Management across 
Heterogeneous IP-based Access Networks 
3.1 Introduction  
Mobility management across converged IP-based heterogeneous access networks is an area of 
active investigation by researchers in academia and industry. This chapter attempts to report, as 
far as possible, some of the related work that is of relevance to the research undertaken in this 
thesis.    
3.2 Related Work on Mobility Protocol Optimizations 
3.2.1 Host Mobility Management 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 1, MIPv6 has been widely studied and is accepted as the 
fundamental underlying protocol for providing global mobility across converged IP-based 
heterogeneous networks (i.e. NGNs). Various results obtained from practical implementation or 
simulations, such as [73][74][76] respectively, have suggested the overall handover latency for 
MIPv6 is unacceptable for real-time or streaming multimedia traffic (e.g. VoIP, video-
conferring, on-demand video etc).  For instance, the authors of both [73] and [74] have found 
that MIPv6 takes an average of 3-4 seconds for a vertical MIPv6 handover to complete.  Others 
studies such as [77][78] [79] have provided similar results.  
The IETF has defined extension protocols, such as HMIPv6, PMIPv6 and FMIPv6 to tackle the 
issues associated  with MIPv6 handovers, such as  movement detection, CoA acquiring/forming 
and CoA registration delay to the HA and CN(s). Research conducted to optimize the issues 
associated with MIPv6 handover is reviewed in the following subsections.  
CoA Registration and Signalling Overhead Optimization 
In order to reduce the CoA registration (i.e. BU) delay and its associated signalling overhead, 
HMIPv6 has been defined. The introduction of a hierarchy only makes sense if the Mobility 
Anchor Points (MAP) are located between the MNs location and the HA/ CN locations. In [80], 
an analytical study has shown that the HMIPv6 outperforms MIPv6 by reducing the overall 
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handover latency when the MN roams within a single (i.e. micro) MAP. The research reported in 
[85] defines an optimized HMIPv6 handover mechanism where each AR collects information 
broadcast by neighbouring ARs. For this to work a neighbour AR discovery scheme was 
proposed. When a MN senses that it will perform a handover to a new network, it performs an 
Address Auto-configuration procedure on its Local CoA (LCoA) (Regional CoA and LCoA in 
case of handover to a new MAP domain) in advance using the neighbour AR information 
received from the current AR [85]. These features allow for a reduction in the average handover 
latency of 550ms for intra-MAP handovers and roughly 800ms for inter-MAP cases. Without 
such reductions the delays would cause unacceptable service disruptions during handovers in 
NGNs.  
In [81], a fast macro handover scheme (FMHS) is proposed that reduces BU cost, in which a MN 
sends a BU message including the newly obtained Regional CoA (RCoA) to the previous MAP 
instead of its own home agent (HA) where several MAPs exist in the administration domain. The 
FMHS reduces by about 56% the binding update cost and shortens macro-handover delays 
compared to HMIPv6. 
PMIPv6 is a network-based mobility protocol defined by the IETF NETLMM WG. Network-
based mobility management enables IP mobility for a host without requiring its participation in 
any mobility-related signalling [8]. The network is responsible for managing IP mobility on 
behalf of the host by extending the MIPv6 signaling [8]. The mobility entities in the network 
track the movements of the MN and initiate the required mobility signalling on its behalf [8]. 
PMIPv6 is similar to HMIPv6 in the sense that it aims to optimize the handover latency by 
reducing the CoA registration and signalling overheads associated with MIPv6.    
In [84], an experimental evaluation of MIPv6 and PMIPv6 is presented, which gives qualitative 
and quantitative analysis that highlights the main desirable features and key strengths of 
PMIPv6. However, the average latency is found to be 711 ms, which is quite high and 
unacceptable for many of the services in NGNs.   
CoA Formation and Movement Detection enhancement: 
The FMIPv6 protocol aims to reduce the handover latencies associated with the CoA formation 
and Movement Detection phases in MIPv6, with the aid of anticipation mechanisms using L2 
triggers. A detailed explanation of the FMIPv6 handover process is provided in chapter 2 
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(section 2.5.2) of this thesis. The amount of research conducted in the area of mobility 
management using FMIPv6 across heterogeneous networks is much less compared MIPv6 and 
HMIPv6.  A few of the relevant works are summarized in this subsection.  
In [93] and [94], experimental evaluations of FMIPv6 over WLANs are reported. The test-bed 
was developed by implementing FMIPv6 as an open source code project [52]. The experiments 
conducted addressed both predictive and reactive handover. The FMIPv6 predictive handover 
was shown to have zero packet loss with an average of 33.2ms handover latency. An average of 
1.52 seconds is required for a reactive handover. However, [93] and [94] report low handover 
latencies which are achieved by modifying the wireless drivers and using a secondary wireless 
interface for scanning purposes only. Such modifications are quite unrealistic (i.e. it cannot be 
expected that MNs will have a secondary interface just to reduce the L2 scanning time).  
The current FMIPv6 specification defines a general and non-standardized L2 trigger model for 
seamless handover operation, but it does not address the exact timing and definitive criteria of 
the L2 triggers which have a significant effect on the handover performance of FMIPv6. In [73], 
a solution is proposed which considers the available timing and accurate criteria of L2 triggers. 
With the definitive L2 triggers, a practical mechanism has been defined which allows for low 
overall handover latency and packet loss during handovers. In order to study the impact of such 
definitive L2 triggers, an FMIPv6 test-bed was developed. The results obtained from it suggest 
that the overall FMIPv6 handover latency (for predictive cases) is roughly 1 second. Such delays 
are still very high and would cause undesirable service disruptions during handovers. 
In [92], the Access Router Information Protocol (ARIP) is proposed which tackles the candidate 
AR discovery and radio access network discovery issues described in chapter 2 (see section 2.7) 
in one protocol suite. ARIP is designed to cope with heterogeneous networks as well as 
homogeneous networks and to be closely coupled with FMIPv6. The proposed mechanism has 
been evaluated by developing a practical test-bed which has shown the overall handover latency 
to be reduced to 250ms. In [101], the CARD protocol has been defined to address the issue of 
candidate AR discovery. However, the solutions proposed in [92] and [101] require major 
changes at the ARs and adds additional complexities to the network infrastructure. 
Solutions which reap the individual benefits of both FMIPv6 and HMIPv6 in a single optimized 
handover solution have been proposed in [95] and [96]. However, such solutions are either based 
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on theoretical analysis or simulation models which fails to consider realistic deployment 
scenarios and also all the intricate layers of the overall handover process (e.g. scanning, network 
access authentication, etc).  
Since FMIPv6 has been chosen for this thesis as the mobility protocol that will be investigated 
for handover optimization across NGNs, it is necessary to present the related work on securing 
FMIPv6 signalling. At the moment, the current FMIPv6 specification specifies a companion 
protocol SEND [37] to be applied to secure the FMIPv6 signalling procedure. However, it is 
unknown whether SEND will always be available on access networks where FMIPv6 is likely to 
be deployed. Since NGNs will be highly dependent on the AAA infrastructure, it is only rational 
to design solutions which are AAA reliant, in order to secure FMIPv6 signalling (e.g. FBU and 
UNA). 
3.2.2 Mobility Management in Vehicular Environments 
It has been mentioned earlier in chapters 1 and 2 that NEMO has been chosen as the underlying 
mobility protocol to provide a uniform environment for vehicular data communications that 
allows vehicles to stay connected using the best communications technology available both in 
the vehicle and in the infrastructure, wherever the vehicle is located. In fact, under CALM, 
MIPv6 and NEMO defined by the IETF are selected as two options for supporting host mobility 
and network mobility in vehicular communications. CALM has defined mechanisms for cross-
layer interactions in [99] and [100]. However, the services provided by CALM are quite abstract 
and no concrete solution has been defined as of yet. Also, CALM makes no assumptions based 
on the long handover latencies associated with NEMO.  
Quite a few papers which deal with tackling the handover latencies of NEMO have been 
published. In [87], a GNU/Linux OS based test-bed deployed in Louis Pasteur University’s 
campus in France, demonstrated the applicability and feasibility of NEMO in real world 
deployments. However, [87] it failed to provide any quantitative results for NEMO handover 
latency.  
In [88], a test-bed has implemented the NEMO basic support protocol and has identified 
problems in the architecture which affect the handover and routing performance. The handover 
latency found for the basic NEMO is roughly 2.7 seconds. Such delays would bring undesirable 
service disruptions during handovers in NGNs. To address the identified handoff performance 
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issue, the use of make-before-break handoffs with two network interfaces for NEMO has been 
proposed. A comparison study of handovers with NEMO with MIPv6 has shown that the 
optimized scheme provides near-optimal performance [88]. Several Route Optimization (RO) 
techniques have been proposed in the context of single-level and nested mobile networks, such 
as [89], [90], and [91] respectively. However, such solutions either require significant support 
from the network infrastructure, or introduce additional signalling overhead on the wireless link.  
 
• 3.3 Cross-layer Mechanisms to Enhance Handovers for NGNs 
The literature that is available regarding cross layer mechanisms to enhance the Vertical 
Handovers for 4G networks is discussed in the following sub-sections.  
3.3.1 Related Work on Optimizing Mobility Protocols utilizing IEEE802.21 
MIH services  
Formed in 2004, the IEEE802.21 standard WG is relatively new. So far, a lot of research effort 
has been made within the IEEE 802.21 WG itself, for standardization of the MIHF framework.  
The IEEE802.21 WG has liaised with the IETF MIPSHOP WG to define protocols for transport 
and other functions like discovery and security for 802.21 MIH services at Layer 3 in [11], [12], 
[58], [59] and [24]. However, very little research has been done to integrate the IEEE802.21 
MIH services with mobility managements protocols (e.g. MIPv6, HMIPv6, FMIPv6 etc.) to 
optimize the overall handover process. In this subsection, an attempt is made to summarize some 
of the recent related research. 
In [98], an enhanced handover scheme for MIPv6 across a heterogeneous access environment 
using IEEE802.21 MIH services to reduce the latencies associated with DAD is proposed. By 
utilizing the Layer 2 triggers, the proposed scheme reduces DAD delays, and the number of 
Layer 3 message exchanges during Mobile IPv6 handover is greatly reduced.  
A HMIPv6 based solution using IEEE802.21 MIH services to design an efficient handover 
scheme is provided in [83], by defining various handover scenarios and strategies to deal with 
each scenario.  
In [82], a fast vertical handover HMIPv6 (FVH-HMIPv6) solution has been proposed which uses 
IEEE802.21 cross-layer information to obtain domain prefixes of MAPs belonging to  
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heterogeneous neighbouring access networks, which is critical to the HMIPv6 handover latency. 
It is shown through analysis that FVH-HMIPv6 great reduces the handover latency compared to 
the original HMIPv6.  
In [86], a novel PMIPv6 based solution is presented using MIH services to reduce the overall 
channel scanning time which can substantially reduce the Layer 2 handover delay. By using MIH 
services, a QoS-aware target PoS selection may be performed based on the information obtained 
from the negotiation. By utilizing ideas of FMIPv6, a proactive handover scheme for PMIPv6 
was proposed. An efficient buffering scheme to allow reduction of packet loss during handover 
is also presented. The results show that the 802.21 MIH assisted PMIPv6 solution reduced the 
overall handover delay by 50% compared to basic PMIPv6. 
3.3.2 Existing Research on Optimizing Re-Authentication latencies during 
Vertical Handovers  
Very little research has been conducted to reduce the handover delays associated with the re-
authentication process across heterogeneous access networks. The IETF has provided some 
solutions to reduce the handover delay when Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (see 
chapter 5 section 5.3.2 for a detailed explanation of EAP) authentication is required. The PANA 
WG has proposed mechanisms to pre-authenticate users to a new domain while connected to 
their current PoA in [53]. On the other hand, the HOKEY WG has defined mechanisms in [60], 
[61], [62], and [63] for providing fast re-authentication mechanisms without re-executing a full 
EAP method and re-using EAP derived keying material for handovers. However, such solutions, 
which are either method specific or method independent in nature, suffer from issues such as 
high signalling overheads and require major changes to the EAP protocol.  
 
• 3.4 The Need for Further Research in Mobility Management 
across heterogeneous IP-based access networks  
It is evident from 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 that most of the research efforts in [73-97] are focused mainly 
on optimizing the operation of the actual mobility protocol itself. None of the research work 
presented in the previous subsections (i.e.3.2.1 and 3.2.2) utilizes a cross-layer mechanism which 
would assist in optimizing the overall handover process. Moreover, as explained in earlier 
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chapters, cross-layer interaction will be crucial for enhancing mobility management for NGNs. 
Therefore, based on the related work presented in the previous sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3, there is 
scope for extensive research, such as: 
• FMIPv6 has been acknowledged to be one of the most promising mobility 
management solutions for NGNs. Even though there is a lot of discussion in the 
research community at the moment (particularly in the IETF) centring around 
FMIPv6, there is no existing academic literature regarding optimizing the FMIPv6 
handover process using cross-layer mechanisms (e.g. IEEE802.21 MIH services). As 
a result, extensive research is required to integrate FMIPv6 with the IEEE802.21 
MIHF framework. Such work would also help the IEEE802.21 standard to define a 
much needed detailed analysis of the overall integrated FMIPv6 handover process, in 
terms of message flows and required service primitives.  
• Mobility management in vehicular environments using cross layer mechanisms is a 
research area that has been completely neglected. Much work is needed to optimize 
the long latencies incurred by the NEMO handover process. Therefore, it is 
fundamental that fast handover mechanisms (e.g. FMIPv6) are in place to optimize 
the NEMO handover process using IEEE802.21 MIH services. However, at the 
moment no such work exists.  
• As mentioned in chapter 2, mobility will be provided as a service in NGNs, which 
will be a major source of revenue for operators. Therefore a service authorization and 
bootstrapping architecture is required for the mobility protocols (e.g. FMIPv6). There 
is no existing work that defines a generic framework through which mobility 
protocols, like the FMIPv6 service could be authorized and bootstrapped (e.g. 
establishing SAs). This would allow for securing FMIPv6 signalling by dynamically 
establishing SAs between the MN and ARs.  
It can be concluded that very little research has been done in the area of enhancing the EAP re-
authentication mechanism to further optimize the overall handover process in NGNs. At the 
moment, no research work has been conducted which applies the cross-layers information (e.g. 
IEEE802.21 MIH services) to reduce the overall network access re-authentication delay. As a 
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result, an IEEE802.21 assisted re-authentication mechanism must be defined to optimize the 
handover process across heterogeneous access networks.   
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Chapter 4- Optimized FMIPv6 using IEEE802.21 MIH Services in 
Vehicular Networks 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The provisioning of seamless mobility to vehicles across heterogeneous access networks is 
essential for the next generation’s vehicular communication networks. A variety of access 
network technologies (e.g. 802.11a/b/g, WiFi, 802.11p, WAVE, 802.16 WiMAX, GPRS and 
UMTS networks) are converging their core network infrastructure to the Internet Protocol 
(IPv4/6) suite. While IPv6 is being chosen as an underlying convergence protocol for vehicle 
networking, the introduction of high speed Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) 
is necessitated by the need to support ‘breakthrough’ safety and commercial applications in 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In particular, the new emerging ‘infotainment’ 
applications call for the vehicular networks to support multimedia and real-time services.  
In order to enable MNs and networked vehicles to seamlessly roam across heterogeneous 
networks while enjoying a plethora of ‘all-IP-based’ services, there are many challenges arising 
from the need for inter-technology ‘vertical’ handovers. As mentioned in earlier chapters, Mobile 
IPv6 has been widely accepted for providing IP mobility solutions across heterogeneous access 
platforms. Since MIPv6 was designed to support the mobility of single mobile hosts, the IETF 
NEMO (Network Mobility) WG has extended it to support the mobility of moving networks. 
As an extension to the Mobile IPv6 protocol, the NEMO Basic Support [15] is concerned with 
the mobility of an entire network which dynamically changes its Point-of-Attachment (PoA) (i.e. 
Access Points, Base Stations) and thus its reachability in the Internet. Its main objective is to 
maintain session continuity between the Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs) and CNs while the 
Mobile Router (MR) changes its PoA. The MNNs behind the MR are IPv6 nodes and do not 
need to register or bind their home addresses with the HA individually. The MR, acting as a 
gateway between the inter-vehicle network and the network infrastructure, updates its change in 
IP subnets at the HA by sending a prefix-scope BU message that associates its CoA with the 
Mobile Network Prefix (MNP) used by MNNs.  
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CALM (Continuous Air interface for Long and Medium range) is a family of umbrella protocols 
being developed in ISO/TC204/WG16 (“Wide Area ITS Communications”) in order “to provide 
a uniform environment for vehicle data communications that allows vehicles to stay connected 
using the best communications technology available both in the vehicle and in the infrastructure 
wherever the vehicle is located” [14].  In fact, under CALM, MIPv6 and NEMO are selected as 
two options for supporting host mobility and network mobility in vehicular communications.  
Handover performance plays a crucial role in the Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning for real-
time services in heterogeneous networks. The period during which the MN/MR looses 
connectivity with its current link till the time it receives the first IP packet after connecting to the 
new link is known as the handover latency. The overall handover latency in NEMO and MIPv6 
consists of Layer 2 (L2) latency and Layer 3 (L3) latency. The L2 handover latency is the period 
when the MN/MR is disconnected from the air-link of the current Access Router (AR) till the 
time it successfully accesses the air-link of the new AR. The L3 handover latency is comprised 
of the latencies incurred during the IP layer movement detection, network re-authentication, CoA 
configuration and BU. The Fast Handover for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) protocol, which was 
developed within the IETF MIPSHOP (Mobility for IP: Performance, Signalling and Handoff 
Optimization) WG can reduce handover delays in MIPv6 with the help of L2 triggers. 
FMIPv6 reduces the handover delay by exploiting various L2 triggers to prepare a New CoA 
(NCoA) at the new AR (nAR) while being connected to the link of the previous AR (pAR). It 
relies on the pAR to resolve the network prefix of the nAR based on the L2 identifier reported by 
the link layer triggers in the MN. Note that although FMIPv6 was originally designed to reduce 
the handover delay in MIPv6, it can also be used to support NEMO after minor extensions. The 
idea is very simple: the traffic addressed to MNNs in a Mobile Network would need to be 
tunnelled to the MR’s CoA; the MR here will be treated like a MN by FMIPv6 for traffic 
redirection between the pAR and the nAR using the binding of the Previous CoA (PCoA) and the 
NCoA maintained at the pAR. The overall handover process (i.e. handover message signalling) 
would be identical to the procedure described in the original FMIPv6 RFC [7] with minor 
extensions. Details of the FMIPv6 extensions will be discussed later in sub-section 4.3.  
As mentioned earlier in the previous chapters, the Media Independent Handover (MIH) Standard 
WG is developing a standard, namely, IEEE802.21 that provides generic link layer intelligence 
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and other network related information to upper layers to optimize handovers between 
heterogeneous media, such as 3GPP/3GPP2, and both wired and wireless media of the 
IEEE802.21 family. Considering the overlap of work in IEEE802.21 and CALM with respect to 
vertical handovers using cross layer mechanisms, a liaison between the two groups responsible is 
being discussed. The IETF MIPSHOP WG has liaised with the IEEE802.21 WG to investigate 
the delivery and security issues of transporting MIH services over IP.  
In this chapter, the potential of applying FMIPv6 in vehicular environments is investigated. By 
optimising the handover procedure of the FMIPv6 protocol in vehicular environments using 
IEEE802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH) services, with the aid of the lower three layers’ 
information on the MN/MR and the neighbouring access networks, the radio access discovery 
and candidate AR discovery issues of FMIPv6 are tackled. An ‘Information Element Container’ 
is designed to store static and dynamic L2 and L3 information of neighbouring access networks, 
and the use a special cache maintained by the MN/MR is proposed to reduce the anticipation 
time in FMIPv6, thus increasing the probability of the predictive mode of operation.  
Furthermore, a cross-layer mechanism is proposed for making intelligent handover decisions in 
FMIPv6. Lower layer information on the available links obtained by MIH services as well as the 
higher layer information such as Quality of Service (QoS) parameter requirements of the 
applications is used by a Policy Engine (PE) to make intelligent handover decisions. It will be 
shown through analysis and simulations of the signalling process that the overall expected 
handover (both L2 and L3) latency in FMIPv6 can be reduced by the proposed mechanism. 
 
4.2 Problem statement 
The latencies incurred during a typical NEMO handover are unacceptable for multimedia and 
delay sensitive vehicular (e.g. safety) applications. In order to fully appreciate the proposed 
mechanism of applying FMIPv6 using IEEE802.21 MIH services in vehicular environments, it 
essential to understand the issues associated with NEMO handovers.  A detailed message flow of 
the overall NEMO handover process is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Please note that in chapter 2, an 
overview of the NEMO protocol has been provided.  
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Figure 4.1: NEMO Handover Message Flow  
Based on the message flow shown in Figure 4.1, the handover procedure is explained in the 
following steps: 
• Service Authentication and Authorization: When a handover is encountered, some form 
of AAA infrastructure will be utilized to grant the MR authentication and authorization 
for network access. This step will only be encountered when the MR needs to be 
authenticated and authorized for services such as network access and mobility services. 
• IP Movement Detection: consisting of determining if an IP subnet change has occurred.  
Like MIPv6, NEMO also relies on RA messages for IP movement detection. 
• New Address Configuration: When the vehicle moves to a new IPv6 subnet, the MR 
generates a new CoA with the new subnet prefix contained in the RA packet. In order to 
verify the uniqueness of this CoA, it should run DAD.  
• Binding Update: After the CoA has been formulated and configured, the MR sends a BU 
message to inform its’ HA of the change of location. The HA validates the BU message 
in exactly the same way as in MIPv6. After BU validation, the HA sends a BA message 
back to the MR. Upon reception of the BA message, the MR starts receiving IP packets in 
the new subnet. 
In Figure 4.2, an illustration of the NEMO handover process with respect to time is shown.  
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Figure 4.2: NEMO handover process with respect to time 
 
4.3 Improving FMIPv6 performance with IEEE 802.21 Services in 
Vehicular Networks 
In chapter 2, a detailed explanation of the handover issues related with FMIPv6 as a standalone 
protocol has been provided. The main issues that were identified were neighbouring access 
network discovery, information exchange with neighbouring ARs, and the cost of anticipation. It 
has also been mentioned earlier in chapters 1 and 2, how IEEE802.21 MIH services could be 
utilised to provide a cross-layer mechanism to optimize FMIPv6 handovers and tackle the issues 
associated with them. Before delving deeper in order to understand the proposed mechanism, it is 
important to present the overall network architecture. In the following section the architectural 
model for the proposed mechanism is presented.  
4.3.1Architectural Overview 
The network architecture considered in this chapter is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In general, 
handover is an intricate process which requires co-operation of both the network infrastructure 
and the MN in order to meet the demands of network operators and end-users [13]. As illustrated 
in the architectural model in Figure 4.3, the MIHF instances on different network entities are 
communicating with each other for various purposes. Note that this architectural model is an 
instantiation of the communication model developed in this chapter. 
 The different network entities along with their functional components are defined as follows: 
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MIH Enabled 
Mobile Node (MN)
R
NAT
R
AR
ARAccess
Router
Firewall
Correspondent
Nodes (CNs) Internet or other
IP backbone
R
R
Mobility Service Provider (MSP)
Home
Agents
AAA
ServersDNS
Other services
(QoS, SIP, etc.)
BS (PoA/PoS)
R
Other MSPs
MIIS(PoS)
IS
MIIS/PoS
R
AP(PoA
/PoS)
MIH Enabled 
Moving Network
AR
IS
IS
*MIIS: Media Independent 
Information Server
* PoS: MIH Point of Service (PoS)
* PoA: Point of Attachement  
Figure 4.3: Architectural Overview 
 
• 
The MRs/MNs are assumed to be MIH capable multi-modal devices with a protocol stack that is 
described in [13]. 
MRs/MNs 
• 
This a network-side MIHF instance that exchanges MIH messages with a MR-based MIHF. For 
every MIH enabled MN it communicates with, this network entity contains an MIH PoS. More 
than one MIH service can be hosted by a single MIH PoS. The same MIH network entity is 
capable of including multiple MIH PoSs to provide MIH services to respective MNs [13]. In 
Figure 4.3, the MIH PoS is collocated with a PoA (i.e. AP or BS). 
MIH Point of Service (MIH PoS) on the network entity - Serving PoA 
Serving PoA Candidate PoA 
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• 
This is a network-side MIHF instance that includes a candidate PoA for the Mobile device. A 
candidate PoA is an attachment point the mobile device is aware of but not currently attached to. 
However, when the handover happens, it may become the target PoA. 
MIH Point of Service (MIH PoS) on the network entity - Candidate PoAs 
• 
The IS is a network entity which serves as a MIH PoS but is located deeper in the access 
network. The IS could be thought of as the network knowledge reservoir which can be used to 
provide essential network related information, e.g., list of network providers, PoA MAC address, 
channel information, higher layer services etc, which may allow for optimized/enhanced network 
selection [13].  
Information Server (IS) 
• 
In the proposed mechanism, the ARs are referred to the pAR and the nAR. The ARs are MIHF 
enabled and assumed to have the protocol stack of a normal IP AR. 
ARs 
4.3.2 Extending FMIPv6 to Support Network Mobility Solution – NEMO 
As mentioned in section 4.1, FMIPv6 could be used to support network mobility, but needs 
minor extensions in order to fulfil the mobility requirements of a vehicular environment. The 
necessary extensions will include extending the FBU, HI, HAck, FBack and UNA messages 
defined in the FMIPv6 specification [7].  The extensions are as follows: 
The FBU message - A new Flag Option(R) will be needed in the original FBU message to 
distinguish whether the message sender is a single MN or a MR of a mobile network. The R flag 
is set to be 0 for a MN and 1 for a MR.  A new Mobility Header Option will be needed to carry 
the Mobile Network Prefix (MNP). Upon receiving a FBU message, the PAR will first check the 
R flag. If R is 0, i.e. the FBU is sent from a MN, and the FMIPv6 will operate as originally 
defined. 
 If R is 1, the pAR will understand that the FBU is sent from a MR of a mobile network and that 
it needs to forward incoming packets that are destined to the mobile network of the MR. If the 
MR is operating in explicit mode, it will include the MNP as a mobility header option in the 
FBU. The pAR, upon receiving the FBU will then find out the MNP from the Mobile Header 
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option and tunnel the packets with this MNP (destined to the MNNs in the mobile network) to 
the nAR during handovers.  
On the other hand, if the MR is operating in implicit mode, then, the MR does not include any 
MNP, and the pAR can use any mechanism (e.g. static configuration) to determine the route to 
the MNNs. The MNP message format is provided in [15]. The rest of the message processing 
and operation is the same as that described in [7]. 
 
    Figure 4.4: FBU message extension  
 
The FBack Message - A new Flag Option(R) will be needed in the original FBack message to 
distinguish whether the FBack message receiver is a single MN or a MR of a mobile network. 
The R flag is included to indicate that the Home Agent which processed the corresponding BU 
supports MRs. If the FBU is accepted but the NCoA is invalid (i.e. status is 1), then a new NCoA 
is supplied as an "alternate" CoA. Also, if the MNP is not accepted by the nAR, then a new MNP 
option will be included in the FBack message. The rest of the message processing and operation 
is the same as that described in [7]. 
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Figure 4.5: FBack message extension 
 
The HI message – The NCoA can be transmitted between the pAR and the nAR using one of the 
“Options” fields of the HI message. If the MR is operating in implicit mode, then the MNP is 
also included as an option. Both the pAR and the nAR could maintain a Prefix Table [7] for 
preventing a clash between a newly claimed MNP and a MNP that is being used. The mechanism 
for tackling duplicate MNPs is out of the scope of this thesis.  The rest of the message processing 
and operation is the same as that described in [7]. 
 
    Figure 4.6: HI message extension  
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The HAck message - should contain new status results indicating success or failure in accepting 
the NCoA and MNPs maintained by the MR. If the nAR does not accept the MNPs, then it will 
include new MNPs. The rest of the message processing and operation is the same as that 
described in [7]. 
 
Figure 4.7: HAck message extension 
The UNA Message: In the Predictive mode of operation, the UNA message processing and 
operation is the same as that described in [7].  However, in the Reactive mode of operation, the 
UNA will include the MNP as a mobility header option. In case of address collision, the nAR 
may wish to assign a MNP to the MR different from the one in the UNA message. In such a case, 
the nAR must send a Router Advertisement with a NAACK option containing a new MNP. As 
mentioned earlier, the mechanism for tackling duplicate MNPs is out of the scope of this thesis.
 
Figure 4.8: UNA message extension 
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4.3.3 Overview of the 802.21 Assisted FMIPv6 Mechanism 
In this section, IEEE802.21 MIH services have been utilized to assist FMIPv6 to enhance the 
overall handover performance in vehicular environments by addressing the issues discussed in 
Section 4.2 as follows:  
1)  A Heterogeneous Network Information (HNI) Container has been defined to facilitate the 
storage and retrieval of the L2 and L3 static information of neighbouring networks obtained 
through the IEEE 802.21 MIIS. The IE known as the ‘Subnet Prefix’ is used to provide subnet 
prefixes of neighbouring ARs. Alongside the L2 information, they form the proposed pre-defined 
Heterogeneous Network Information (HNI) container/report. The IEEE 802.21 draft has defined 
a PoA container and an Access Network Container (ANE) [13] which includes many IEs such as 
MAC address, channel range, Network Type, Cost, Roaming Agreements, and Network 
Security. Instead of including all of the IEs from these two containers only the ones which can 
further optimize the proposed mechanism have been selected and put in a single IE container 
which is known as the HNI container. Having a single predefined HNI container will be ideal in 
vehicular environments and will help in reducing the message overheads, processing and 
lookup/indexing times.  
The handover latency caused by the radio access discovery in FMIPv6 will be eliminated by 
using the L2 link information retrieved from the MIIS. Furthermore, from the L3 information of 
corresponding PoAs, the MN will learn of subnet prefixes of the nAR and form the NCoA prior 
to handover. This eliminates the router discovery time and optimizes the L3 handover latency in 
FMIPv6. Note that the HNI Report maintained by an IS will be similar to the mapping table 
maintained by the ARs for resolving L2 Identifiers of corresponding subnet prefixes. This could 
eliminate the need for ARs to exchange neighbouring information for maintaining the mapping 
table thereby tackling the candidate AR discovery issue in FMIPv6. 
2)  In order to reduce the adverse impact of the long anticipation time in FMIPv6, a 
Neighbouring Network Report (NNR) Cache is created to be held in the MR for storing and 
maintaining the HNI Report. This would help to reduce the number of signalling messages 
during the anticipation phase thereby reducing the overall anticipation time. The HNI Report will 
be delivered to the MN through the ‘MIH_Get_Information’ service primitives. By reducing the 
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anticipation time, the probability of operations in predictive mode is increased. Also the CoA 
configuration time can be reduced, thus the L3 handover latency is reduced.  
3)  The MICS is used to collect/obtain dynamic QoS link layer parameters directly from MIH 
enabled Candidate PoAs. Dynamic neighbouring network information includes packet loss rate, 
average packet transfer delay, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), available data rates, etc.  
4)  A new MICS service primitive is defined for requesting application QoS requirements, and a 
new MIES is defined for delivering the application QoS parameters to the policy engine. A 
cross-layer mechanism is proposed for intelligent handover decision making by using the static 
and dynamic information of neighbouring networks, the local link condition and application QoS 
requirements. 
4.3.4 The IEEE 802.21 MIH Services To Be Used 
A subset of existing IEEE802.21 MIH services is utilized to enhance the handover process in 
FMIPv6. Their corresponding primitives and parameters are listed in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Existing MIH Service Primitives Used 
Primitives Service Parameter 
MIH_Link_Going_Down MIES MN MAC Addr, MAC Addr of Curent PoA 
MIH_Link_Up MIES MN MAC Addr, MAC Addr of new PoA, Link ID 
MIH_Link_Down MIES MN MAC Addr, MAC Addr of new PoA, Reason  
MIH_MN_HO_Commit MICS  Old Link ID, New Link ID 
MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query 
(extended) 
MICS 
SNR, Available Data Rate, number of associated 
users, Throughput, Packet Error Rate, CoS 
Minimum Packet Transfer Delay, CoS Average 
Packet Transfer Delay, CoS Maximum Packet 
Transfer Delay, CoS Packet Loss 
MIH_N2N_HO_Candidate_Query MICS 
SNR, Available Data Rate, number of associated 
users, Throughput, Packet Error Rate, CoS 
Minimum Packet Transfer Delay, CoS Average 
Packet Transfer Delay, CoS Maximum Packet 
Transfer Delay, CoS Packet Loss 
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In Table 4.2 the new MIH service primitives that have been defined for handover decision 
making are presented. 
Primitives Service Parameters 
MIH_App_Par MIES Required data rate, delay, jitter, priority of applications 
MIH_App_req MICS SNR,  Required data rate, throughput , jitter, delay 
Table 4.2: Newly Defined MIH Service Primitives Used 
4.3.5The Structure of the HNI Report 
The MIIS ‘HNI’ report will be delivered through a request/response mechanism and will be 
represented in a standard format such as XML, ASN.1 or TLV. Table 4.3 shows the HNI request 
message in TLV format by which the MN/MR can obtain the HNI_report by specifying the Link 
Type and Operator Identifiers as parameters.  
Type = TYPE_ 
IE_HNI_REPORT 
Length = Variable 
Type_IE_Container_HNI Report 
 
Table 4.3: HNI Request 
Table 4.4 shows the HNI response message. The HNI Report containing the IEs will be produced 
and stored in an IS. 
Type = 
TYPE_IE_HNI_REPORT 
Length = Variable 
HNI Container #1 
PoA MAC Address IE 
POA Channel Range IE 
POA MAC Type IE 
POA PHY Type IE 
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PoA Subnet Prefix IE 
PoA Subnet Prefix IE 
Network Type IE 
Roaming Partners IE 
Cost IE 
Network Security IE 
HNI Container #2 
... ... ... 
 
Table 4.4: HNI Response 
4. 4 Detailed Handover Procedure of the 802.21 Assisted FMIPv6 
In this section a detailed explanation of the overall handover procedure of the proposed 
mechanism is presented. Figure 4.10 provides an overview of the message flow, where as 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 provide a detailed illustration of the overall message flow. 
4.4.1 MIH Capability Discovery  
At the very beginning, when the MR is activated or switched on, it will need to discover its peer 
MIHFs in the access network in which it is currently residing. The MIH Capability Discovery 
service primitive is used by the MIHF to convey the supported MIH capabilities about Event 
Service, Command Service, and Information Service to the MIH Users (i.e. Upper layers).  
 As explained in Chapter 4, the MIHF discovery can be done either at layer 2 or layer 3. The MR 
can discover the MIHF capabilities of its peers (e.g. MIH PoSs, MIIS, ARs, etc.) using 
unsolicited mechanisms by listening to a media-specific broadcast message such as a Beacon 
Frame [21] in IEEE 802.11 or a DCD [22] in IEEE 802.16.  
The MIH entities will periodically broadcast their capabilities over the data plane using the 
‘MIH_Capability_Discovery’ response message. Alternatively, the MR can discover its peers 
MIHF capabilities by broadcasting or unicasting a ‘MIH_Capability_Discovery’ request message 
to either its broadcast domain or a known MIHF address. In response, only the MIH network 
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entities (MIH PoSs, MIIS and ARs) will respond with a ‘MIH_Capability_Discovery’ response 
message. A detailed explanation and the message format of ‘MIH_Capability_Discovery’ 
request/response are provided in [13].  
4.4.2 Events Subscription 
After the MIH Capability Discovery procedure, the FMIPv6 protocol in the MR will register for 
MIES notifications (i.e. L2 triggers) within its local stack. This will be done via a MIH Event 
Subscription service primitive that is listed in Table 4.1. A detailed explanation of MIH Event 
Subscription mechanism is presented in [13]. 
4.4.3 IS Discovery and Usage 
The MR can discover valid ISs through either layer 2 or layer 3 mechanisms. At the time of 
writing, Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) is one of the candidate solutions for 
discovering the IS [23, 24]. Figure 4.9 shows the three phases related to the MIIS usage scenario: 
IS Discovery, SA bootstrap, IS Query/Response. The MIIS serves the upper layer entity that 
implements network selection and handover algorithms, i.e. the Mobility Management Entity 
(MME). 
DHCP MIIS
DHCP Server InformationServerMobile DHCP/IS Client
1. IS Server Discovery
2. IS Server Address
3. Contact Server
4. SA Bootstrap
5. IS Query
6. IS Response
 
Figure 4.9: Is Discovery and Usage 
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Figure 4.10: Overview of the proposed mechanism's message flow 
4.4.4 SA Bootstrap 
Before the MME can exchange any messages with the IS server, a set of Security Associations 
(SA) has to be established. Authentication and encryption parameters must be provided by each 
SA to preserve mobile device anonymity and prevent eavesdropping. The SA negotiation 
mechanism depends on the transport layer used and the required security services [23]. For 
Instance, TLS (Transport Layer Security) will be recommended for use if upper layer protocols 
use TCP, while ESP (Encapsulation Security Payload) using IPSec/IKE will work in most 
situations without the need to worry about the upper layer protocols, as long as the IS protocol 
identifiers are handled by IKE [23].  
4.4.5. Retrieval of Neighbouring Network Information from the IS 
It must be noted that the communications between the MR and the IS will be handled by the 
MIH protocol as specified in the IEEE802.21 draft. The MIH protocol defines the frame 
structure for exchanging messages between MIH functional entities. The payload of the MIH 
message contains service specific TLVs. Details of the MIH protocol message structure are 
provided in [13]. 
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After the IS discovery and SA association phase, the MR will send a MIH message that carries 
the ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request TLV as its payload to request the HNI Report from the IS. 
The HNI Report will then be delivered in a returned MIH message from the IS to the MR in the 
format shown in Table 4.4. The contents of the report will be processed by the MR and stored in 
its NNR cache.  
A time stamp is suggested to be maintained by the MN for periodic access to the IS. This would 
help the MN renew its contents and also check whether it is in the same or different IS domain. 
4.4.6. Handover Operations  
In the proposed 802.21 assisted FMIP6, the RtSolPr/PrRtAdv messages are replaced with 
‘MIH_Get_Information’ request/reply messages which are exchanged before the L2 trigger 
occurs. This is different from the original FMIPv6 in which the RtSolPr/PrRtAdv messages only 
occur after L2 triggers (i.e. when the MR senses that the signal strength of its existing link is 
becoming too weak). Later, when the signal strength of the current PoA becomes weak, the 
MIES will be informed by the link layer of the MR.  
The MIES will scope and filter this link layer information against the rules set by the MIH user 
(FMIPv6 in this case), and then produce a ‘MIH_Link_Going_Down’ event indication message, 
and send it to network layer where the FMIPv6 protocol resides. Upon receiving this event 
notification, the MR checks its NNR Cache and selects an appropriate PoA to handover to. Since 
the MR already knows the radio link information (i.e. MAC address and channel range of PoAs, 
etc.) of the candidate access networks from the HNI Report, the time to discover them is 
eliminated.  
In IEEE802.11 networks for example, there will be no need to use the ‘scanning’ mechanism to 
find the neighbouring APs. After the MN discovers all the necessary information about the 
neighbouring access networks using the HNI Report, the MR will have to select a target PoA 
from a list of candidate PoAs belonging to different neighbouring access networks. In order to 
efficiently and intelligently select an appropriate PoA, a cross-layer mechanism is proposed in 
the next section.   
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Figure: 4.11: Detailed message flow of the proposed mechanism (i)              
 
Figure 4.12: Detailed message flow of the proposed mechanism (ii) 
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4.4.7. Intelligent Handover Decision making using Cross Layer Mechanisms 
The decision to select the appropriate (i.e. optimal) network is based on a policy engine which 
takes into account the QoS parameter requirements of the application and matches them with the 
dynamic QoS link parameters from the lower layers (L2 and below) of the available networks. 
As mentioned before, it is clearly specified in [13] that dynamic link layer parameters (e.g. QoS 
parameters such as Throughput, Average Packet Transfer Delay, Packet Loss Rate, SNR, etc.) 
have to be obtained based on direct interaction with the access networks and MIIS may not to be 
able to help much in this regard. Such dynamic QoS link parameters will have to be delivered to 
the MN through the MICS. As a result the IEEE802.21 standard has defined the 
'MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query' and 'MIH_N2N_HO_Query_Resources' MICS service 
primitives. The 'MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query' is used by MIH users on the MN/MR to 
inform the MIHF to query candidates for possible handover initiation. In other words, the 
'MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ primitive is generated when a MIH User in the MR wants to 
query other candidate networks for possible handover initiation. The ‘QoSResourceRequirement’ 
parameter in ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ message, which provides information about the 
minimal QoS resources required at the candidate network, is not specified by the IEEE 802.21 
standard. For this purpose, the service primitive ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ defined in 
[13] has been extended to include the list of resources shown in Table 4.2 as the 
‘QoSResourceRequirement’. The ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ service primitive works in 
a request/reply fashion and is carried as the payload of a MIH message as service specific TLV. 
Upon choosing a PoA from the HNI Container/Report in the NNR solely on the grounds of the 
static L2 and L3 information (e.g., MAC address, channel range, subnet prefix), the PE in the 
MR will use the extended ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ service primitive via the MIHF to 
send a request to the serving PoA.  
After the Serving PoA receives the ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ request, it will use the 
‘MIH_N2N_HO_Query_Resources’ request message to query to one or more candidate PoAs 
about their available link resources and IP address related information, and to prepare available 
resources in the candidate Networks. The Candidate PoAs respond with 
‘MIH_N2N_HO_Query_Resources’ responses and the serving PoA notifies the MR of the 
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resulting resource availability at the candidate networks through a 
‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ response message.  
 After receiving the ‘MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query’ response, the PE receives the QoS 
requirements of the applications. Using the newly defined MICS service primitive 
‘MIH_App_Req’, the QoS requirement parameters are delivered from the application layer to the 
MIH Layer. After which, the newly defined MIES service primitive ‘MIH_App_Parameter’ is 
triggered to deliver the application QoS parameter requirements to the PE. Figure 4.13 illustrates 
how the newly defined MIH service primitives help the PE in the MN/MR acquire the dynamic 
QoS parameters of neighbour networks. 
The PE takes the application QoS parameter requirements and compares them with the dynamic 
QoS parameters from the lower layers of the candidate access networks. The “best” PoA to 
attach to can be selected according to the rules or policies input by the users. It is very important 
for the MN/MR to have a good network selection strategy. Note that the network selection 
results may vary drastically when different criteria are applied.  
From the user’s perspective, network selection could be carried out for the purposes of: 
• Improving performance that matches the subscriber’s QoS requirements (Handover QoS, 
Application QoS). 
• Optimising cost. 
• Optimising power consumption. 
• Improving security. 
• Obtaining better services. 
From the network operators’ perspective, apart from the above mentioned criteria, the network 
operators would also need to consider optimizing the overall network performance, e.g. 
balancing the load in the network. It is important to understand that the handover policies should 
also be made according to these criteria.  
In Figure 4.13 the IEs related to each network selection criterion are shown. When the MN 
chooses to select a network based on one of the criteria, e.g. to optimize its power consumption, 
it must retrieve the information about network type, along with the network operator ID, and the 
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access network ID, as knowledge of the types of access network available will allow the MR to 
judge the potential level of power consumption of a particular connection. A finer decision could 
be made if the MR also retrieves the information of neighbouring PoA’s, the network QoS, and 
available MIH services. The network selection algorithm could be as simple as comparing the 
IEs value with desired thresholds and scoring each available network using a weighted linear 
equation. The final network selection decision could be made based on the final score. Note that 
more sophisticated and complicated algorithms can be implemented in the PE to make intelligent 
decisions.  Discussion of the details of such complex policies and algorithms is out of the scope 
of this thesis. The overall cross-layer mechanism is depicted in Figure 4.14 below. 
 
QoS
Performance
Cost Power 
Consumption
Security Services
Network Type M M M M M
Network Operator ID M M M M M
Network Cost Y
Service Provider ID M Y
Available Service ID1 M Y
Service Cost Y Y
Roaming Partner ID M M
Roaming Cost Y
Access Network ID M M M M M
Network Security (EAP) Y
MIH Serivices Y Y
Network QoS Y Y
PoA  Info Y Y  
IE needed for different network selection criteria. (M stands for “Must have”, and Y stands 
for “Good to have”) 
Figure 4.13: Intelligent Network Selection criteria 
4.4.8. Handover Operations – Switching Link 
After selecting an appropriate radio access network, the MME in the MN/MR utilizes MIHF 
MICS and generates a link switch command using ‘MIH_MN_HO_Commit’ and 
‘MIH_N2N_HO_Commit’ primitives as described in [13]. The parameters are shown in Table 
4.1.  Prior to sending the ‘MIH_MN_HO_Commit’ command, the MR uses the L3 information, 
the PoA Subnet Prefix, to form an NCoA, and sends a FBU to its default AR (pAR). There is no 
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longer any need to send the RtSolPr/PrRtAdv messages for router discovery as the candidate AR 
information (i.e. ‘Subnet Prefix’ IE) is already in the NNR Cache. The CoA address 
configuration procedure that is related to the candidate AR discovery or RtSolPr/PrRtAdv 
messages is eliminated. During the anticipation phase, only the FBU message will be sent to the 
pAR. Unlike the original FMIPv6 operation, the proposed mechanism needs only a single 
signalling overhead that will be incurred during the anticipation phase. The probability of a 
Predictive Mode of operation in FMIP6 will be increased, and the L3 handover latency in 
FMIPv6 will be optimized. After receiving the FBack (Fast Binding Acknowledgement) message 
on the pAR’s link, and the necessary L2 authentication and association procedure, a 
‘MIH_Link_Up’ event notification will be sent to inform the FMIP6 that a L2 connection with 
the target PoA is established. After the ‘MIH_Link_Up’ notification, the UNA (Unsolicited 
Neighbour Advertisement) message is immediately sent and the traffic starts to flow from the 
new link. Figure 4.14 shows the operation of the cross layer mechanism for selecting the optimal 
network with the assistance of the newly defined MIH services.  
Application
TCP / UDP
IP &
Mobility Management (MIPv6/FMIPv6)
MIH Functions
Media Specific Link Layers
(802.11, 802.16, 802.3, 3GPP, 3GPP2)
Policy Engine 
(Network Selection 
Entity)
MIH_SAP
MIH_LINK_SAP
Q
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QoS Requirements 
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QoS Parameters of 
Different Links
Selected Network
 
Figure: 4.14: Cross-layer mechanism for Intelligent Handover Selection 
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4. 5 Handover Performance Evaluation 
As explained in Section 4.3, FMIPv6 can improve the handover performance of MIPv6 as well 
as NEMO. The proposed IEEE 802.21 assisted FMIPv6 mechanism should also enable NEMO 
handover procedures to be optimised. In this section the handover delay of the original NEMO, 
original FMIPv6, and IEEE 802.21 assisted FMIPv6 are analysed. The overall handover latency 
(both L2 and L3), i.e. the time interval between the moment the MN/MR loses connectivity with 
its current PoA till the moment it receives the first IP packets in the new subnet is analysed. For 
this reason, both the L2 and L3 handover are addressed. 
4.5.1Numerical Analysis 
The fundamental aspects of the IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 handover optimization presented 
earlier in this chapter ( see section 4.3 and 4.4) are focused on reducing the adverse effects of  
the long anticipation phase, and its ability to tackle the  neighbouring access network discovery 
issue (see chapter 2, section 2.7.1) suffered by the original FMIPv6. As mentioned earlier in 
section 4.4, the neighbouring network discovery issue is resolved by removing the L2 scanning 
time from the overall handover process. On the other hand, the long anticipation cost of FMIPv6 
is resolved by eliminating the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages from the overall FMIPv6 
handover signalling, which in effect increases the probability of a predictive mode of operation.   
The numerical analysis presented in the following sub-sections take into account the overall 
handover signalling process which highlights the impact of both the neighbouring radio/access 
discovery process and the cost of anticipation.  
The total cost of the overall handover signalling process is derived in order to evaluate the effects 
of the anticipation phase on the proposed IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 handover in comparison 
to other mobility management protocols (i.e. original FMIPv6 and NEMO). In this respect, a 
model based on the probability of a predictive mode failure is used which highlights the impact 
of the FMIPv6 anticipation phase.  The overall handover latency is dependent on not only the 
mobility management signalling delays but also on other factors such as throughput, data rate, 
packet loss, network complexity etc.  As a result, an extended handover evaluation is derived 
based on stochastic analysis which takes into account the effects of throughput, data rate, and 
network complexity on the overall handover latency.  
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4.5.1.1 Handover Latency in NEMO 
The handover latency for both FMIPv6 and NEMO can be expressed as:- 
                             dt = DL2 + DL3           (1)  
where dt is the overall handover latency time, including both L2 and L3 latencies. Here DL3 is the 
time period when the connected MN/MR is unable to send or receive any IP packets due to 
handover action. DL2 is the time period the MN/MR loses connectivity with its current air link 
(i.e. PoA) till the time it connects to a new PoA. The overall handover procedure in both NEMO 
and FMIPv6 is started when L2 handover is initiated.  
The L2 handover latency in an IEEE802.11 WLAN, for example, could occur in two distinct 
phases: the discovery phase and the re-authentication phase. During the ‘discovery’ phase, when 
the MR detects that the signal strength from the current AP is degraded to an unacceptable level, 
the MR/MN will start to scan available neighbouring APs and generate a list of APs prioritized 
by their corresponding signal strength. The ‘Re-authentication’ phase involves exchanging 
authentication and association messages between the MR and the AP. Extensive details of the L2 
handover in IEEE802.11 can be found in [24]. The 802.11 L2 handover delay can be expressed 
as:                                  DL2 = DDiscovery+DRe-authentication + DAssociation= μ  + Ψ                     (2) 
Where, Ψ is equal to the PoA switching delay (i.e. new AP re-association and authentication 
latency) and μ is equal to L2 Scanning latency which could be expressed as:-  
                                                   μ =   (NPoA) X (tsc)                                                     
where NPoA is the total number of PoAs and tsc is the delay to discover/scan a single PoA. For a 
MR in NEMO, the first step in the L3 handover is to perform the movement detection, during 
which the MR sends a Router Solicitation (RS) to the nAR.  Upon reception of the RS, the nAR 
sends a Router Advertisement (RA) to the MR. After receiving the RA, the MR will know that it 
has moved. The delay caused by movement detection can be expressed as:            DMV = DRD + DCoA + DDAD  
           where                                                                                                                   (3) 
             DRD = DRS + DRA       
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Here DMV is the time required for a MR to detect its movement and to form a new CoA. DRD is 
the router discovery time and includes the delays caused by sending the RS (i.e. DRS) and the RA 
(i.e. DRA). DMV also includes the time the MR takes to form a new CoA (i.e. DCoA) and to 
perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), i.e. DDAD. 
After movement detection, the MR must send a BU to inform the HA and the CN of its new 
location (i.e. NCoA). The time taken to do this is expressed as DBU (MN-HA).  The total handover 
signalling latency can be expressed as the sum of the L2 and L3 handover latency as:  
dt = DHO-NEMO = 
                                     (4) 
In NEMO, there is no scope for anticipating a handover. As a result, it can be inferred that in 
NEMO, there is no provision for a predictive mode of operation. The total cost of the NEM0 
handover is:- 
                              Cc-nemo=   
                                            = (  + 2 θ.β)  + 2θ.β + θ.β + θ.β  )     (5) 
                                            = (  + 2 θ.β) + 4 θ.β  )         
 Where, θ is the unit signalling cost and β is the weight for a wireless link to highlight the delays 
associated with shared medium access delay and collisions.  Note that the latencies incurred due 
to L2 scanning have been included in the overall signalling cost because it is a fundamental 
proponent in the proposed mechanism and as well as the overall handover latency.         
4.5.1.2 Handover Latency in FMIPv6  
The handover latency in FMIPv6 is also comprised of both L2 and L3 latency. However, the 
delays associated with movement detection, new CoA configuration, and DAD, are eliminated in 
FMIPv6. FMIPv6 performs the handover initiation prior to the L2 handover. The handover 
initiation time includes the CoA configuration and BU times. After the L2 handover, the MR 
sends a UNA message to the nAR to inform it of its presence and then performs the BU 
operations. In equation (6), the overall handover latency in FMIPv6 is given as:                                   DHO-FMIPv6 = DL2 + DMN_nAR                                                           (6) 
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In equation (6), DMN-nAR is the delay caused by sending the UNA message from the MR to the 
nAR. In the reactive mode, this will take a single Round Trip Time (RTT) since the MR will 
have to wait for the NAACK (Neighbour Advertisement Acknowledgement) message after 
sending the UNA. The Handover Initiation (HI) anticipation time is equal to the time required to 
send the RtSolPr, PrRtAdv, FBU, and FBack messages (i.e. the anticipation phase).  
Note that it is not necessary to include the FBack in the HI time as it is not required to be 
received on the current link. However, for operations in predictive mode, it is mandatory for the 
FBack message to be received while being connected to the pAR’s link. The handover initiation 
in case of predictive handover, is divided into two independent components; THI, the procedure 
to be executed by MN itself with the PAR and NAR, and THII, which is executed by the 
signalling process between the pAR and nAR.                              THI = DPrRD + DFMIPv6 = DRtSolPr + DPrRtAdv + DFBU + DFBack                                       (7) 
Here, DPrRD is the time spent sending the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages. DFMIPv6 is the time it 
takes to send the FBU and receive the FBack message. 
                                         THII = DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD                           (8) 
where DHI +DHAck is the total time taken to exchange the HI and HAck messages between the 
pAR and nAR. The value of ω is the weighing factor of tunnelling between the pAR and nAR.  
DLU/DAD is the delay associated with the duplicate address detection at the nAR for the testing 
the uniqueness of the NCoA.  The total FMIPv6 handover signalling latency can be expressed as: DHO-P-FMIPv6 = 
 
                            (9) 
For a reactive handover, the total handover signalling latency is as follows:- 
    DHO- R-FMIPv6 = 
 + DFBU + DFBack   
                                                  +DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD                                                    (10) 
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In FMIPv6, the effects of the anticipation phase on the overall handover signalling latency must 
be taken into account. During an anticipation phase, there will be mobility management 
signalling exchanges between the MN and pAR. A failure in the predictive mode of operation 
will only occur if the MN leaves the overlapped area between the pAR and nAR before all the 
required signalling during the anticipation phase (i.e. the RtSolPr, PrRtAdv, FBU, and FBack 
messages) has been executed.  The probability of a predictive mode of failure according to [106] 
is calculated as: 
                                                                                                           (11) 
 
and if   
where T represents a random variable for the time from a L2 Link Going Down  trigger to a Link 
Down and is assumed to be exponentially distributed. Tpre is the time taken to send the required 
anticipation messages, and    is time when the Link Down trigger is received by 
FMIPv6.  θ represents a decreasing factor, which is introduced to consider a variety of 
decreasing patterns as explained in [106] [107].  Based on equations (9) (10) and (11), the total 
handover signalling cost is derived as: 
                              Cc-fmip = (1- Prreact). Cpred + Prreact. Creact                                        (12) 
                                             = (1- Prreact). Cpred + (1- ). Creact                               (13)     
                             where 
                                                          Cpred  =   Cpre + CL2 + Cnew                                        (14)  
 
In equation (13), Cpred and Creact are the total handover signalling costs for  predictive and  
reactive handovers respectively. In equation (14), Cpre is time required to exchange the RtSolPr 
PrRtAdv, FBU and FBack messages. CL2 is the cost of the L2 latency (i.e ) and Cnew is 
the time required for the MN to send the UNA message when it connects to the nAR’s link (i.e. 
DMN_nAR ). As a result from equation (14), the following can be derived: 
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                         Cpred = Cpre + CL2 +  DMN_nAR                                     
         =  max{DRtSolPr + DPrRtAdv + DFBU + DFBack             
                                 +DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD}  +  + DMN_nAR                    (15) 
                                 = max{ 2 θ.β + 2 θ.β + 2 θ + ω + θ.β } +   + 2θ.β + θ.β      
                                 = max{ 5θ( β +   ) + ω  } +  3 θ.β                              
                                  where         
                                                          Cpre    =      
                                   and 
  Cpre < T 
In equation (15), Cpre is considered as the maximum acceptable value during which all the 
anticipation phase messages must be executed for a successful predictive operation. From 
equation (12), the total cost of the reactive handover is as follows: 
                                            Creact = Cprt  + DMN_Nar + Crt                                    (16) 
Where, Cprt is the time taken for the MN to exchange the FMIPv6 signalling prior to moving to 
the nAR’s link. In this instance, Cprt would include the time to exchange the RtSolPr and 
PrRtAdv messages before being abruptly disconnected.  Due to the reactive nature of the 
handover, the MN will not have sufficient time to send the FBU and FBack messages. Crt is the 
time to exchange the messages after the MN connects to the nAR’s link. Crt could be expressed 
as follows: 
            Crt   = DFBU + DFBack +DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD                          (17)                  
              Creact   = ( DRtSolPr + DPrRtAdv ) +   + DMN_nAR + DFBU + DFBack   
                                         +DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD  
                                            = (2 θ.β) +  + 2 θ.β + θ.β + 2 θ.β + 2 θ + ω + θ.β  
                      =(2 θ.β) +   + 2θ ( 3β + 1  ) + ω                                                 (18) 
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From equations (15) and (18), the total handover signalling cost Cc-fmip is calculated as: 
Cc-fmip   = (max{ 5θ( β +   ) + ω  } +  3 θ.β). (1- Prreact)) 
        +((2 θ.β) +   + 2θ ( 3β + 1  ) + ω  ) (1- )                             (19) 
4.5.1.3 Handover Latency of the 802.21 assisted FMIPv6 
In the proposed mechanism, L2 handover latency is significantly reduced by removing the radio 
access network discovery delay (i.e. scanning time). The handover initiation/anticipation time is 
reduced by removing the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv delays from DPrRD.                           
                      THI(opt) = DFBU + DFBack = DFMIPv6                                       (20) 
The ‘discovery’ phase will be eliminated from the L2 handover time in the proposed mechanism. 
Therefore, the total optimized handover signalling latency is expressed as: 
    DHO-FMIPv6(opt) =                                                     (21) 
The total handover signalling cost for the proposed IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 can be 
expressed as:- 
             Cc-pr-fmip  = (1- Prreact). Cpred + Prreact .Creact                                 (22)  
    where 
                                Cpred =max {DFBU + DFBack                                                       
                              +DHI + DHAck + ω + DLU/DAD} +  + DMN_nAR                            
                                        =max{  θ(3β + 2 )  + ω } +    + 3θ.β                                               (23)      
                           where         
                                                              Cpre =      
                                                   and Cpred < T 
Note, that the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv have been eliminated from the predictive cost (i.e. Cpred), 
thus reducing the overall handover cost (i.e. Cc-pr-fmip). Naturally, the latencies incurred during 
the anticipation phase are also reduced which increases the probability of a predictive mode of 
operation. From equations (18) and (23)  Cc-pr-fmip can be calculated as:  
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      Cc-pr-fmip = (max{  θ(3β + 2 )  + ω } +    + 3θ.β ) } ).      
(1- Prreact)) 
          +((2θ.β)+  +2θ(3β+1)+ω)(1- )                                            (24) 
It can be inferred from equations (19) and (24) that Cc-pr-fmip  <  Cc-fmip, which highlights the 
fact that the overall handover cost for the proposed IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 mechanism is 
less than the original FMIPv6. Also, the signalling cost during the anticipation phase is reduced 
in the proposed mechanism, which increases the probability of a predictive mode of operation. 
Table 4.5 compares the handover latencies of the original NEMO, FMIPv6, and the 802.21 
assisted FMIPv6. 
Handover 
Mechanism 
Handover Latency Cost 
Handover Initiation 
Time 
NEMO  
(  + 2 θ.β) + 4 θ.β  )   None 
 FMIPv6  
(max{ 5θ( β +   ) + ω  } +  3 θ.β).   
 (1-Prreact)) 
+((2 θ.β) +   + 2θ ( 3β + 1  ) + ω  ) (1-
) 
 
DPrRD + DFMIPv6 
802.21 assisted FMIPv6 
(max{  θ(3β + 2 )  + ω } +    + 3θ.β )}). 
(1- Prreact)) 
+((2θ.β)+  +2θ(3β+1)+ω)(1- ) 
DFMIPv6 
   
     Table 4.5: Comparison of Handover Latencies of NEMO, FMIPv6, and the 802.21 assisted 
FMIPv6 
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4.5.1.4 Extended Handover Performance Evaluation  
An extended analysis of the handover latency of FMIPv6 (see section 4.5.1.2) of the proposed 
IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 mechanism (see section 4.5.5) provides a more thorough and 
detailed handover evaluation. The overall handover delays expressed in equations (9) and (21) 
can be broken into the following latency contributing components: 
         HLF = LQueue + LProc + Lsig/Tran                                                     (25) 
In equation (25), LProc is the packet processing delay both at the MN and intermediate nodes 
(e.g. ARs). An example of LProc is when the ARs check for bit-level errors in the packet that 
occurred during transmission as well as the time taken to determine the packet's next destination. 
Additional processing delays may be incurred if the FMIPv6 messages are secured using 
mechanisms such as SEND. Lsig/Tran is the delay associated with transmitting packets across the 
physical access medium.  The only variable delay component in equation (25) is the queuing 
delay (i.e. LQueue).  The queuing delays are very hard to predict and are heavily dependent on the 
network load. So investigation into how to reduce the queuing latency is an important aspect of 
QoS research.   
From equation (25), the signalling latency involves the delays associated with exchanging the 
mobility management messages. The handover signalling latencies for NEMO, FMIPv6 and 
802.21 assisted FMIPv6 are derived in equations (4), (9) and (21) respectively.  As a result, 
Lsig/Tran can be represented as:                                                                           
                         Lsig/Tran=             (26) 
In this thesis, the queuing latency along with various parameters such as throughput, data rate, 
packet loss, network complexity are considered, and, its impact on the overall IEEE802.21 
assisted FMIPv6 handover latency are investigated. The processing latency (i.e. LProc) is not 
considered since it is fixed in nature and depends on the deployed system. The Transmission 
delay (Lsig/Tran) which is indirectly dependent on the queuing latency is considered through 
other parameters such as the throughput and data rate.  
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4.5.1.5 Queuing Latency  
To estimate, the queuing latency, LQueue, it is assumed that there are n transit ARs in the path 
between the source and destination. Li  is the latency at the ith transit AR. Then the total queuing 
delay LQueue is calculated as:               
                                                    LQueue =                                      (27) 
The queuing latency at Li relies on the packet arrival rate which is denoted by λ. The probability 
of the having j number of packets arriving at any instant is given in [108] and expressed as: 
                                                Pj =   =  .   .j =0,1,...k                           (28) 
where k is the maximum(finite) number of packets residing in a queue.  The parameter χ 
expresses the density of the queue (i.e. the number of packets that could reside in the queue). If ts 
represents the packet servicing time, the value of χ is given in [108] as: 
                        χ = λ / ts            (29) 
Based on the probability function shown in equation (28), the expected length of the queue QL at 
any time is expressed as:                                                                    QL =                       (30) 
The probability Ч of a packet being accepted by the queue is given by: 
                                                                  Ч = 1 – PK                                                        (31) 
Where PK  is the probability of the maximum number of packets in the queue.  As a result, the 
queuing time Li at the ith AR expressed in equation (27) can be derived as: 
                 Li = QL/ Ч                      (32) 
The overall queuing latency has a significant impact on other network parameters such as 
throughput /data rate, network complexity and packet loss, all of which individually have an 
effect on the overall handover latency (i.e. HLF shown in equation (25)).  As a result, the effects 
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of the throughput/data rate, network complexity and packet loss on the overall handover latency 
are highlighted in the following subsections. 
Throughput and data rate 
The throughput and data rate which are heavily reliant on the average session arrival rate and the 
queuing length (i.e. buffer length) are investigated in this section. In other words, the effects of 
the queuing latency on throughput and data rate are evaluated. The throughput of a network is 
defined as the average number of successfully received packets per time slot. The packet arrival 
rate of IP packets at the ARs (i.e. pAR and nAR), would largely contribute to the queuing 
latency. The average throughput in essence is directly related to the average arrival rate and 
hence the queuing length. When the network is not overloaded, an increment in packet arrival 
rate at the ARs means an equal level of departure rate (i.e. transmission rate) towards the MNs 
and other end devices. Since a wireless network is a shared medium, it can be assumed that the 
bandwidth (i.e. data rate) is distributed fairly. As the packet arrival rate increases, more data 
needs to be transmitted across the physical medium towards the MNs and end-devices. This 
leads to a decrease in both the average available throughput and data rate. If the data rate, 
amount of information, and number of packets successfully transmitted are defined as R(bps), 
T(bit) and n respectively, the normalized throughput S is given as:  
 
                            S =            (33) 
When no transmission packets are generated or all transmission packets are destroyed by 
collision, S is equal to 0. In an idealized situation, the normalized throughput value of S is equal 
to 1.  When S =1, all the bit are transmitted correctly. When S >1, then, the aggregate throughput 
of the system decreases. As a result, the network approaches its channel capacity (i.e. QL in 
equation (30) reaches a value of K) which leads to a decline in the available data rate. In this 
instance, the transmission delay which is a function of the data rate and amount of traffic to be 
transmitted (i.e. packet length and number of packets) will also be affected. The transmission 
delay Td can be derived as follows: 
                                          Td =(n-1)  +2                (34) 
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Where  is the length of the packet. R is the data rate of the wired link and Rw is the data rate of 
the wireless link between the MN and AR.  It can be inferred from equation (34) that when the 
data rate decreases, the transmission delay Td increases. The transmission delay has a very 
negative impact on the overall FMIPv6 handover (see equation (9) and (21)). For example, the 
amount of time it would require to complete all the FMIPv6 signalling along with all the 
IEEE802.21 MIH messages would increase proportionally as the transmission delay increases.   
Complexity 
The complexity of the network is defined as the latencies incurred due to an increase in the 
number of end-devices (e.g. MNs, MRs) accompanied by the level of RSS  and the speed of an 
individual mobile device at any given instance.  As the number of the MNs/MRs increases, the 
network tends to become congested.  The average packet arrival rate would increase. This would 
cause the queuing length to become longer and eventually lead to delays caused by queuing and 
processing latencies. The average throughput and data rate would decrease which would cause 
transmission delays.  
The handover decision method in FMIPv6 relies on attempts to predict the travelling distance in 
a cell coverage area by using the rate of change of RSS. The relationship between RSS (in mW) 
and the distance between a PoA and the MR/MN at any point inside the WLAN coverage area 
can be obtained by using the path loss model in [111] and is  as follows: 
                RSS = E* к^ -и*10^(є/10)          (35) 
Where E (in MW) is the transmit power of PoA. The path loss exponent (a value between 2 and 
4 chosen depending on the transmission environment) is determined by и and є which are 
Gaussian distribution random variables with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of up to 12 
dB. The transmit power is given in [111] as:                      Tpw = N ( Ц(Packets/s)* K(bits)/ R(bps)                    (36) 
Where N is the number of connections, Ц is the transmission rate, K is the packet size and R is the 
data rate. As the speed of a MN increases, the rate of RSS decay increases. Also, the path loss 
increases as the distance between the MN and PoA increases [111]. In such a case, the 
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probability of a successful handover is greatly reduced. The average handover latency increases 
accordingly and is given in [111] as: 
HLF = (T*  Hsucc) + (t*(1- Hsucc))+(dist/vel)                                   (37) 
 Where Hsucc is the probability of a successful handover, T is the time taken for successful 
handover and t is time taken for an unsuccessful handover.  
Packet drop 
The latencies caused by packet processing, queuing delays, etc, restrict ARs from allowing all 
the packets to pass through. As a result, some packets destined to various MNs/MRs are dropped. 
The average traffic load at an AR is given by:         a = m. λ.T                (38) 
where, λ  is the average packet arrival rate , T is the time unit  required to transmit the complete 
packet and m is the total number of MNs. A packet is queued when all the outgoing routes (i.e. 
channels) are busy and dropped if the queue is full. Therefore, the packet dropping probability is 
provided in [108] and is expressed as:     
 P(S) =                       (39) 
Where, S is the maximum number of outgoing channels for all i = 0, 1,.....S. An increase in 
packet loss will inherently mean an increase in the packet re-transmission rate. As a result, the 
queuing length at the ARs will also increase, leading to queuing and transmission delays, 
eventually causing an increase in the overall handover latency.  
4.5.2 Analysis of Simulation Results  
To evaluate the proposed mechanism, simulations were performed using the mobility package 
provided by the NIST Seamless and Secure Mobility project [25]. The mobility package is 
developed for an NS2 utility with 802.16 and 802.21 extensions. Initially, the FMIPv6 protocol 
was implemented according to RFC 4068 [7]. The handover procedure of FMIPv6 was then 
extended with the help of the IEEE802.21 MIH services provided by the NIST mobility package. 
To simulate the basic NEMO protocol, the simulation package developed by Wuhan University 
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[26] which is based on the NS2 utility patched with Mobiwan extensions has been used. The 
results obtained in this section are benchmarked with other well known models from both 
industry and academia for the purpose of getting a clear analysis of the handover process. The 
network scenario simulated is shown in Figure 4.15. The network scenario consists of an area of 
2000 meters by 2000 meters in which one WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) cell and one IEEE802.11b 
WLAN Basic Service Set (BSS) are located. The WiMAX cell has a radius of 1000 meters, 
whilst the coverage area of the WLAN has a radius of 50 meters. The WLAN BSS is inside the 
WiMAX cell. It is assumed that the WiMAX cell and the WLAN BSS are managed by one 
mobility service provider. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Network Simulation Topology 
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Parameters Variable Used 
                                      Network Topology 
WLAN cell coverage Disk with radius = 50 meters 
WiMax cell coverage Disk with radius = 1000 meters 
                               802.11 MAC Sublayer Configuration 
Data rate(Mb/s) 11 
Default propagation model TwoRayGround 
Packet loss 0-40% 
                               802.16 MAC Sublayer Configuration 
Default Scanning mode Active 
                                                                  Links 
Speed(Mb/s) 100 
Delay(s) 0.01 
                                               Traffic 
Video Packet 4960 bytes 
Audio Packet 320 bytes  
Video packet rate 100 packets/s 
Audio packet rate  200 packets/s 
                                         Mobility Model 
Velocity(m/s) 5m/s-25m/s 
Path Random 
Figure 4.16: Simulation Parameters 
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The WiMAX network is the home domain where the HA is located. Each domain has one PoA 
which is connected to the core network through a 100Mbps connection. A correspondent node 
(CN) is connected to the core network through 100Mbps Ethernet. A WiMAX/WLAN dual 
mode MN/MR is communicating with a CN while moving in the above area at a random speed 
between 5 meter/s and 25 meter/s. Each time it enters and leaves the WLAN area handover 
procedures will be initiated.  
Based on the FMIPv6 package and 802.21 along with the 802.16 NS2 extension developed by 
NIST [25], simulations were carried out in NS2. The simulations focused on evaluating the 
handover performance in terms of handover latency, packet loss and handover signalling. 
Two types of traffic flows are transmitted between the MN and the CN. One is a video stream 
with a packet size of 4960 bytes and a packet rate of 100 packets/s. The other is an audio flow 
with a packet size of 320 bytes and a packet rate of 200 packets/s. The simulation time is set at 
200s. For each mean speed simulated, the results given are the average of 10 simulations. 
Handover Latency 
The handover latency is defined as the time interval elapsed between the departure of data from 
the source to its arrival at the destination. In other words, it is the time when the MR looses 
connectivity with its attached PoA till the time it receives a data packet from the newly attached 
PoA.  
The overall handover latency for the basic NEMO protocol is shown in Figure 4.17. It can be 
seen that, the average overall handover latency for the basic NEMO is 2.5sec/2500ms. Such a 
handover delay indicates that NEMO is unsuitable for handling real-time or multimedia traffic 
and providing seamless mobility.  
The results shown in figure 4.17 reflect the nature of the results in [111], where an increase in 
MR/MN speed means that the distance from the attached PoA increases which leads to a 
decrease in the RSS level. At the same time the path loss increases, which leads to channel 
interference, low SNR and throughput. As a result, the transmission delay along with packet re-
transmissions will increase, leading to lower probability of a successful handover as shown in 
equation (37). Moreover, the long handover latency is due to the fact that NEMO incurs very 
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time consuming L3 handover delays due to movement detection and CoA configuration as 
shown in equation (5).  
 Velocity 
 5m/s 
Velocity 
10m/s 
Velocity 
15m/s 
Velocity 
20m/s 
Velocity 
25m/s 
Handover 
Latency 
1.1sec 2.2sec 2.5sec 2.8sec 3.0sec 
     Figure 4.17: NEMO Handover Latency 
From the simulation results presented in Figure 4.18, it is obvious that the handover process of 
FMIPv6 can be significantly improved by using the IEEE 802.21 MIH services. The average 
handover latencies for the audio and video traffic using the proposed mechanism are 0.31 
sec/310ms and 0.33sec/330ms respectively. 
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 Figure 4.18: Average Handover latency 
On the other hand, the average overall handover latencies for audio and video traffic of the 
original FMIPv6 are 0.45sec/450ms and 0.46sec/460ms. The results in Figure 4.18 suggest that 
the overall handover latency is roughly reduced by 140ms by using the proposed mechanism. 
This is due to the fact that the proposed mechanism eliminates the scanning phase from the L2 
handover which drastically reduces the overall handover latency. Unsurprisingly, the handover 
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latency increases in NEMO (Figure 4.17), the original FMIPv6, and the proposed mechanism 
(i.e. IEEE 802.21 assisted FMIPv6) as the speed of the MN/MR increases. 
The results shown in [113] are very similar to the simulation results presented in this chapter. 
The simulation tool used in [113] is different to the one used in this thesis. However, the models 
and scenarios considered in [113] are very similar to the one discussed in this chapter. Under 
similar conditions, the overall handover latency for the IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 handover 
with respect to various MN/MR speeds outperforms the handover latency presented in [113] by 
230ms on an average. Moreover, [113] does not consider vehicular environments. The proposed 
IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 in this chapter greatly reduces the overall handover latency 
compared to [113] at similar velocities (i.e. lower/nomadic speed). The reason for such a 
reduction in the overall handover latency in Figure 4.18 when compared to [113] is due to the 
fact that the scanning time has been eliminated as shown in equation (20). 
As shown in Figure 4.18, the overall handover latency increases with speed. With an increase in 
speed, the MR/MN moves further away from the PoA. As a result, the received signal strength 
(RSS) deteriorates more quickly resulting in lower throughput, which would eventually lead to 
an increase in transmission delay. This is highlighted in equations (34) and (35). The results 
shown in Figure 4.18 highlight the results obtained in [111]. In [111], it is shown that as the MN 
moves further away from its attached PoA, there is a decrease in RSS and at the same time the 
path loss decreases. As a result the network will suffer from channel interference, low SNR and 
throughput, all of which would lead to an increase in the overall handover latency. The results 
presented in Figure 4.18 hold true to the concept presented in [111], and show that as the speed 
of the MR/MNs increases and the MR/MNs move further away from the attached PoA, the RSS 
and path loss of the channel increases. This would cause transmission delays and if there is a 
sudden surge of packet arrivals at the ARs then there will be queuing and processing delays. 
When the MR/MN is far away from the attached PoA then the probability of a successful 
handover is minimized which will lead to a reduction in the average handover delay as shown in 
equation (37).  
The results in Figure 4.18 support the FMIPv6 handover analysis in [117]. Using mathematical 
modelling, the results derived in [117] show that as the L2 handover increases (i.e. Link 
switching delay) the overall handover delay drastically increases. However, the model used in 
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[117] does not take into consideration the L2 scanning time, which is a fundamental component 
of the overall handover latency. In [117], when the link switching delay is increased to 1 second 
(i.e. a much more realistic value for L2 handover), even with the exclusion of the scanning time, 
the overall handover greatly increases. In Figure 4.18, the results obtained for the original 
FMIPv6 include the scanning time in the overall handover, whereas the proposed IEEE802.21 
assisted FMIPv6 eliminates the scanning phase. As a result, the overall handover latency for the 
proposed mechanism of this chapter (see Figure 4.18) is greatly reduced due to a lower L2 
handover delay which is coherent with the findings of [117]. However, the increase in the overall 
handover latency shown in [117] with respect to the L2 switching time is of order of the seconds, 
which is a lot higher than the results obtained in this chapter. The variations in results for the 
overall handover latency in Figure 4.18 and in [117] are due to the fact that [117] it takes the 
delays associated with the NCoA configuration time into account (i.e. The THII shown in 
equation (8) in this chapter), even in the case of a predictive handover. Moreover, some of the 
parameters considered in the mathematical analysis in [117], such as ‘ζ’ (i.e. the weighting factor 
of packet tunnelling between the pAR and nAR which adds a delay of 1.2 seconds) and the 
buffered packets forwarding delay from the pAR to the nAR , have not been considered in the 
simulation due to its limitations in mimicking all the aspects of real world situations. However, 
considering delays such as THII in the simulations would not be realistic since the predictive 
handover in FMIPv6 does not include the THII times in the overall handover latency. In this 
respect, the results shown in Figure 4.18 present a much more realistic and reasonable set of 
results.  
In Figure 4.19, the L2 handover/setup times for the three solutions are shown against the overall 
handover latency values. As expected the overall handover latency increases with the L2 
handover delay. As can be seen, the L2 handover/setup time has very little effect on the overall 
handover latency of the proposed mechanism when compared with NEMO and the original 
FMIPv6 protocol. This is because the scanning phase has been eliminated from the L2 handover 
time in the proposed mechanism.  
The results in Figure 4.19 correspond to the numerical analysis presented in section 4.5 and the 
empirical values presented in [57] which suggests that the scanning phase comprises 90% of the 
overall L2 handover delay. The results in Figure 4.19 support the results in [117] which 
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demonstrate that the L2 handover time plays a very fundamental role in increasing the overall 
handover.  
 
Figure 4.19: The L2 handover/setup times for three solutions 
 
Packet Loss  
Packet loss mainly refers to the amount of data that did not make it to the destination (i.e. MR) in 
a specified period. Packet loss is directly proportional to the QoS applicable.  
Figure 4.20 shows that 802.21 assisted FMIPv6 looses less packets than the original FMIPv6 
when speed increases. When the MN/MR moves at high speed, the FMIPv6 handover process 
might not be completed at the pAR’s link, hence packets received by the pAR could be dropped. 
Also, as the distance from the PoA increases, the throughput of the link degrades causing further 
packet losses. When the MN moves further away from the attached PoA, the received RSS and 
the SNR decrease. 
 Based on research results in [111], the average packet loss increases with a smaller SNR. This is 
due to the fact that when the SNR is smaller, the channel interference increases, which leads to 
corrupted packets and hence packet loss. In [113], under a similar simulation condition compared 
to the one presented in this chapter, it is seen that the packet loss increases with the speed of the 
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MN. The results presented in figure 4.20 have a 27% lower packet loss rate in comparison to the 
results presented in [113]. Moreover, [113] does not consider vehicular environments. However, 
the results in Figure 4.20 are coherent with the findings of both [111] and [113], where packet 
loss increases with node speed.  
 The original FMIPv6 mechanisms incur on average a 79% increase in packet loss for both audio 
and video multimedia traffic compared to the proposed mechanism. Such packet loss is clearly 
undesirable and will cause service interruptions.  
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Figure 4.20: Average Packet Loss  
 
 
Signalling Overhead 
The overall signalling overhead here is the average signalling overhead (in bits) at the network 
layer and above during each handover interval. Figure 4.21 shows that the 802.21 assisted 
FMIPv6 has about 50% less signalling overhead than the original FMIPv6. This is aligned with 
the analysis of the proposed mechanism in section 4.5. The IEEE802.21 assisted FMIPv6 
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presented in this chapter increases the likelihood of a predictive handover in comparison with the 
basic FMIPv6. In Figure 4.21, as the speed increases, the probability of reactive handover 
increases. As a result, FMIPv6 signalling across the network also increases. When there are 
many MR/MNs present, then the probability of predictive handover decreases which causes the 
signalling load to drastically increase due to re-transmissions (see equation (32)). The results 
shown in Figure 4.21 support the findings in [79], where an increase in the number of MNs leads 
to more frequent handovers causing a linear increase in signalling load. 
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Figure 4.21: Overall Signalling Load 
 
4. 6 Summary 
In this chapter, a mechanism has been proposed which optimizes the FMIPv6 handover 
procedure with the assistance of IEEE802.21 MIH services for vehicular networking. To do so, 
MIH services have been exploited. Most notably, the 802.21 MIIS has been utilised and L3 
information on neighbouring access networks in the MIIS service has been taken into account. A 
new Information Report, the ‘HNI Container/Report’, has been defined to contain L2 and L3 
information of neighbouring access networks which can help the FMIPv6 protocol tackle issues 
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such as radio access discovery and candidate AR discovery. Moreover, it is proposed to store the 
contents of the HNI Container/Report in the NNR cache which can be maintained in the volatile 
memory of the MN. This eliminates the need to send RtSolPr/PrRtAdv messages which in turn 
reduces signalling overheads and the long anticipation time imposed by FMIPv6. It is shown 
analytically and through simulation results that when the proposed mechanism is applied to 
FMIPv6, it increases the probability of the predictive mode of operation and reduces the overall 
handover latency by reducing both the L2 and the L3 handover latency. The proposed 
mechanism outperforms the original FMIPv6 protocol and NEMO basic support.  
The handover decision is made by a policy engine where a cross-layer mechanism is adopted. 
New MIH service primitives are defined to support intelligent handover decision making. The 
cross-layer mechanism takes into account QoS parameter requirements from the applications and 
compares them with the dynamic parameters of the available access networks. The parameters 
are then matched with pre-defined policies to optimize the handover decision.   
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Chapter 5 Experimental Evaluation of Secured FMIPv6 over a 
Generic Authorization and Bootstrapping Architecture 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to successfully provide the “anywhere-anytime” type of services for NGNs, it is 
necessary for mobile and wireless operators to provide solutions which fulfil the mobility 
requirements of both the customers and operators. While roaming between heterogeneous access 
networks belonging to multiple administrative domains, users are demanding uninterrupted (i.e. 
session continuation at the least) usage of popular services like VoIP, video-conferencing, on-
demand download, multimedia streaming, etc. It is becoming clear to operators that mobility (i.e. 
MIPv6) will become an inherent part of next-generation networks and a big proportion of the 
revenues will come from providing it as a service. This also comprises the enrichment of basic 
mobility service provided by MIPv6 with a set of additional features by enabling auto 
configuration and activation of specific “premium” services (e.g. multihoming, FMIPv6, etc.) 
based on policies and customer profiles maintained by the operators.   
In the classical sense, strong inter-domain security mechanisms that allow roaming users to 
establish a security context between the end host and some device in the access network (e.g. 
APs, BSs etc), are provided by the network access authentication procedures [122]. The 
protocols which execute after the network access authentication also require security contexts to 
be established since the communicating end-points are different [122]. Furthermore, usage of 
different protocols may require different authorization decisions. For example, a user wishing to 
use MIPv6 services in a visiting domain would need an additional authorization statement from 
its home domain to ensure that the user is authorized to utilize MIPv6 functionalities and start the 
appropriate credit control and accounting [122].  
The fear of becoming just a “bit-pipe” is driving operators to introduce additional services in 
their network [122]. As more and more services are introduced, the pressure to market the 
product faster, and at the same time reduce operational costs prevents operators from making 
static configurations per service for individual end hosts [122]. Also, from an operational point 
of view, static configuration is not feasible for an operator which may have millions of 
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subscribers. Hence the goal is to develop solutions which would allow end hosts to dynamically 
and securely obtain information for accessing services, based on long-term credentials. The long-
term credential is typically a shared secret, a password or a X.509 certificate, which enables a 
client to carry out a “bootstrapping” process that distributes necessary information for service 
access [122]. Bootstrapping refers to the “process of creating state (typically security 
associations (SA), configuration and authorization) information between two or more entities 
based on a trust relationship between a trusted third party and two or more entities” [31].  
The issue with bootstrapping is twofold. Firstly, the key distribution problem to ensure secure 
access to services (i.e. creating a SA between client and service) is challenging [122]. Secondly, 
there is a great need to define an efficient service authorization framework for real world 
deployments. As a result, the authentication and authorization must be decoupled. Allowing for 
authorization to be decoupled from authentication allows network administrators and service 
providers to enforce policy rules which meet the unique needs of a particular operational 
environment. The simplistic approach of performing authorization based on initial network 
authentication is no longer considered valid in terms of providing resilient security mechanisms. 
That is, even if the client possesses credentials to authenticate itself correctly, it is still necessary 
to verify whether the client is authorized to access a particular service. For example, if FMIPv6 
is considered as a mobility service, then it is necessary for the MN and ARs (i.e.pAR and nAR) 
to share a secret (i.e. key) in order to setup SAs. This is necessary to protect the FMIPv6 
signalling messages. However, simply possessing the shared secret does not imply that the MN is 
authorized to access the FMIPv6 service. In addition to the key distribution problem, the MN 
needs to be provisioned with a set of parameters [122]. The bootstrapping process allows the MN 
to obtain the necessary information to successfully and securely utilize FMIPv6 with the ARs.  
 The MIPv6 and DiME WGs have already published numerous IETF documents which provide 
solutions to the bootstrapping particularities in the context of MIPv6 only. The solutions 
provided by the IETF, such as references [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], and [33], utilize the AAA 
infrastructure (i.e. RADIUS or Diameter) along with the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) [34] for bootstrapping MIPv6. Besides the IETF, other standards organizations like the 
3GPP are currently investigating bootstrapping solutions with their Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA) [35].  
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 However, at the moment there is lack of a clearly defined generic service bootstrapping and 
authorization framework for integrated heterogeneous access networks. Moreover, FMIPv6 
service bootstrapping is completely neglected. Even though FMIPv6 has been widely studied and 
accepted in research and standards bodies, there has been no work done on FMIPv6 
bootstrapping; i.e. dynamic key SA establishment and authorization.  
The ongoing work has led the EU-IST funded project ENABLE (Enabling Efficient and 
Operational Mobility in Large Scale Heterogeneous IPv6 Networks) to define successful 
solutions to enable efficient and operational mobility in large heterogeneous IP networks. As 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, this thesis has been partly affiliated with the ENABLE project 
and has contributed to define mechanisms which enrich the basic mobility service provided by 
MIPv6 with a set of additional features by enabling on-demand activation and auto-configuration 
of specific “premium” network services (e.g. FMIPv6 in our case, HMIPv6, multi-homing, 
IEEE802.21 MIH Services, etc). As a result, a Generic Authorization and Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GSABA), particularly for mobility services, has been defined [50].  
In this chapter, a novel FMIPv6 bootstrapping and authorization architecture is presented in 
order to provide the MN with necessary configuration parameters and distributed keying 
materials to secure FMIPv6 messages in terms of authentication and authorization. In this 
respect, a practical Linux operating system based FMIPv6 bootstrapping and authorization test-
bed has been implemented to provide experimental analysis. The purpose of the experiments is 
to investigate the handover performance of the secured FMIPv6 mechanism compared to plain 
FMIPv6 and MIPv6 by providing quantitative measurements and results on the quality of 
experience perceived by the users of IPv6 multimedia applications. Also, a security analysis of 
the secured FMIPv6 along with the newly defined protocol/interfaces of the GSABA architecture 
has been done, using the AVISA tool [36].   
5.2 Problem Statement  
As mentioned earlier, the problem with FMIPv6 bootstrapping lies with its inability to efficiently 
provide service authentication and authorization.  
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5.2.1 Insecure FMIPv6 Signalling 
The MNs and ARs (i.e. pAR and nAR), must share credentials and cryptographic material 
needed for protecting the FMIPv6 signalling.  The reception of a FBU triggers the pAR and 
nAR, with the assistance of the HI/HAcK messages to establish a tunnel for fast traffic 
redirection during handovers. Without proper security mechanisms in place, a malicious node 
may steal or redirect a victim node’s traffic at will. To avoid such attacks, the pAR must ensure 
that the FBU packet arrived from a node that legitimately owns the PCoA. In other words, the 
FBU must be successfully authenticated by the pAR. Also, when the MN moves to nAR's link, it 
sends an UNA message. The UNA must also be authenticated by the nAR since the UNA could 
be faked and redirected to a malicious node. In order to tackle the issue, the current FMIPv6 
specification [7] specifies a companion protocol SEND [37] to be applied to secure the FMIPv6 
signalling procedure.  
FMIPv6 uses the SEND protocol to exchange an encrypted shared handover key between the 
MN and pAR. The exchange of the handover key is done using the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv 
messages which are secured using the SEND protocol. Firstly, in order for the MN to utilise 
SEND, the relevant key pairs and CGA addresses are generated by the MN [129]. Utilising the 
same public key algorithm as used for SEND, a public/private key pair is then generated for 
protecting the shared handover key [129].  A RtSolPr is sent by the MN which contains the 
public key to encrypt the handover key. The RtSolPr also contains the source address of the 
MN’s care-of CGA, which is signed with the CGA key of the MN.  The RtSolPr is verified by  
the pAR by using SEND. The public key is used to encrypt the handover key which is then sent 
via the PrRtAdv message. The shared handover key is then decrypted by the MN to produce an 
authorization MAC [129]. However, it must be noted that SEND fails to specify mechanisms for 
protecting the UNA message.   
SEND is sufficient for advancing FMIPv6 as a proposed standard. However, it is unknown 
whether SEND will always be available on access networks where FMIPv6 is likely to be 
deployed. Moreover, SEND makes no provision for protecting the UNA message. At the same 
time, it must be noted that IKEv2 has been ruled out as a solution for providing dynamic SA 
associations in FMIPv6, since it is not practical to run IKEv2 with every AR to create IPsec SAs, 
given that the AR changes may occur frequently. It is more likely that FMIPv6 will be used in 
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deployments (e.g. WiFi, WiMAX) where an AAA infrastructure will be used. So it would be 
good to develop a mechanism that leverages the AAA infrastructure in place and sets up SAs 
between the MN and the ARs dynamically [123]. As a result, the IETF has proposed the 
Handover Key (HOKEY) [38] protocol to secure FMIPv6 signalling. The HOKEY protocol is a 
key management protocol to establish a handover key between a MN and an AR for the purpose 
of securing FMIPv6 signalling messages [123]. This key can be used to protect the signalling 
message between the MN and the serving AR [123]. However, this handover key cannot be used 
to protect signalling messages sent by the MN to a new AR. As a result, if the UNA is left 
unsecured it is vulnerable to security threats, e.g. the UNA message sent to the nAR may be 
faked and then the packets could be redirected to the wrong MN [123].   However, the HOKEY 
protocol can be easily extended to provide mechanisms to protect the UNA message. Detailed 
explanation of HOKEY is provided in section 5.5.4.  
5.2.2 Need for a Service Authorization Framework 
As mentioned earlier, the second issue associated with FMIPv6 bootstrapping is authorization. 
Service authorization is, often, a neglected problem. In an ideal scenario, a MN has to be both 
successfully authenticated and authorized for a mobility service (i.e. FMIPv6). However, 
existing bootstrapping architectures focus on establishing security associations between involved 
parties. It is not clear, whether a MN that is able to authenticate for a mobility service, should 
automatically be authorized to use that service. In essence, there is a great need to define a 
framework that will inherently decouple service authentication and authorization.  
5.3 Initial Architectural Overview 
Before delving into the detailed specification of the GSABA architecture, it essential to 
understand the fundamental components upon which the GSABA architecture is built. A high 
level depiction of the initial architecture is presented in Figure 5.1. The most relevant interfaces 
between the nodes of the identified business entities, i.e., ASA, ASP, MSA and MSP (refer to 
chapter 2 section 2.2), along with the components of the GSABA framework are represented in 
Figure 5.3. The nodes that have been identified in this high level architecture are:  
• DHCP/Relay Agents: Most of today's IP network deploys DHCP servers to configure 
network access for users. In the GSABA architecture, DHCPv6 is leveraged to deliver 
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HA information and discover service authorization servers.  
• Network Access Server (NASes): New clients arriving at a network are authenticated by 
the NASes with the help of an AAA server. The NASs may be Layer 2 APs controlling 
the access of wireless clients, or an AR capable of performing IP-based admission control 
[49].  
• AAA: The AAA nodes are used to authenticate the credentials provided by the clients, as 
well as to authorize access to network, mobility and other services, based on the user’s 
profile. The AAA nodes also offer accounting facilities, allowing the business entities to 
charge according to service usage. AAA nodes may be redirect, relay, proxy or backend 
servers [49].   
• Databases: The AAA backend servers usually interact with an external directory or 
database that maintains user's profiles and accounting data [49]. 
• HAs/ARs: The HAs/ARs are responsible for providing the mobility service (e.g. MIPv6, 
FMIPv6) to the MNs. The HA’s/ARs are responsible for authenticating the MNs for 
mobility services in order to establish a secure tunnel for traffic forwarding.  
It must be noted that the AAA infrastructure plays a fundamental role in the GSABA 
architecture. The next section provides an overview of the AAA infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Network Architecture (Integrated Scenario) 
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5.3.1 Overview of the AAA infrastructure 
AAA is an architectural framework used by operators to utilize three independent security 
functions in a modular manner which allows configuration of access control on network devices, 
such as routers and switches. The three security functions are: 
Authentication provides mechanisms to identify subscribers before allowing them to use the 
network services. Authentication techniques used include login, password, challenge and 
response, message support and encryption.  
Authorization provides mechanisms for remote access-control and authorization of services 
(e.g. MIPv6, FMIPv6, multihoming, etc.) based on user profiles and credentials.  
Accounting provides methods for collecting and sending security server information such as 
user identities, start and stop times of services, executed protocols, numbers of packet and bytes 
exchanged, etc. Such information is used for billing, auditing and reporting purposes.  
The AAA consists of three main components. They are: 
 The AAA Protocol is used in the core network and runs between NAS and AAA server. 
Examples of AAA protocols are RADIUS [38], TACACS [39], Diameter [40], etc. 
However, the most widely used AAA protocol is RADIUS.  
 The Access Network Protocol (ANP) is used between the NAS and the IP client. 
Examples of ANPs include 802.1X, PANA and PPP.  
 The Authentication Method is the algorithm that the IP client and the AAA servers 
utilize for authentication purposes. It is typically based on a shared secret (e.g. login, 
password) between the client and its home operator. Many of the authentication methods 
support mutual authentication. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) defined in 
[34] is an authentication framework which supports many authentication methods. EAP is 
discussed in detail in the next section.  
The three major components of the AAA architecture are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The MN 
roams into a visiting domain and requests access to the NAS using the ANP. The request is 
forwarded by the NAS to the AAA server located in the visiting (i.e. local) domain (shown as 
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AAAL in Figure 5.2). Based on the user/MN's identity, the AAAL forwards the request via the 
AAA protocol to the home AAA (AAAH) server located in the home domain. The authentication 
method is implemented only in the MN and AAAH, while the NAS simply acts a kind of 
gatekeeper, which is realized using an IEEE802.1X device The AAA protocol and ANP carry 
authentication data during the authentication phase. Based on the user's profile, the AAAH grants 
or denies access to the MN and may configure some services such as QoS, MIPv6 etc.  
5.3.2 Overview of EAP 
EAP, defined in [34], is a universal authentication framework typically used in PPP connection 
and wireless networks.  EAP can be used for wired LAN and is not limited only to WLANs. The 
EAP peer is located in the client; the NAS contains the EAP authenticator and EAP server is 
located in a back-end AAA server. IEEE 802.1X defines a protocol called EAP over LAN to 
pass EAP messages between the authenticator and the client. IEEE 802.1X provides the 
description for EAPOL only and does not describe the frame formats for the technology specific 
lower layer. For example, in 802.11, the EAPOL frames are encapsulated in IEEE 802.11 
frames.  Packets are exchanged via the AAA protocols between the EAP authenticator and EAP 
server.  The EAP authenticator acts a pass-through device and does not know about the 
authentication methods.  
Currently, there are many different EAP methods. Methods defined as IETF RFCs include EAP-
MD5 [41], EAP-TLS [42], EAP-TTLS [43], PEAPv2 [44], EAP-IKEv2 [45], EAP-SIM [46], etc. 
The IEFT have defined an EAP Key Management Framework [47] for the generation and 
management of service keys within EAP architecture. Handover Keys to protect the signalling of 
mobility management protocols such as MIPv6 and FMIPv6 can be derived from such service 
specific keys. 
The authentication framework selected for the proposed GSABA architecture is EAP. Since EAP 
enables different authentication methods to be used that run over multiple access technologies 
(or work over IP using PANA [48]), it is ideal for NGNs which are essentially an integration of 
heterogeneous access networks. Also, due to the extensible and flexible nature of EAP, it can be 
easily extended to piggyback service bootstrapping configuration parameters (HA address, Home 
address, authorization information) within an EAP exchange [49]. Moreover, EAP authentication 
can leverage the EAP Key Management to derive various service specific keys (e.g. keys to 
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protect FMIPv6 and service authorization signalling as is seen later in this chapter). EAP based 
solutions can be easily extended to become a generic service bootstrapping framework to provide 
configuration parameters and keys to establish SAs between end-points for secure 
communications [49].  
 
 
 
     Figure 5.2: AAA Architecture 
 
5.4 Network Scenario 
In order to appreciate the specifics of the GSABA architecture, it is essential to understand the 
network scenarios under which GSABA will be deployed.   
The most relevant entities to be taken into account in the proposed network scenarios are 
described below: 
•   ASA (Access Service Authorizer): a network operator that authenticates a MN to 
establish its authorization right to receive IP service. AAA servers (ASA-AAA) are used 
to manage the authentication and authorization of the domain. The ASA maintains a local 
database, which stores the user's profile with specific access rights and policies.  
•  ASP (Access Service Provider): a network operator that provides direct IP packet 
forwarding and receiving from the end host. Before the MN can be granted access, the 
ASP must receive authorization from the user’s ASA. After the MN has been granted 
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access, the ASP may apply its own policies, along with service policies of ASA. The 
policies applied by the ASP must not conflict with the policies of the ASA. For example, 
ASP should not provide a MN with access to a service when it has been explicitly 
forbidden by the ASA.   
• MSA (Mobility Service Authorizer): a service provider that authorizes mobility 
(i.e.MIPv6) service. AAA servers (MSA-AAA) are used to manage the authentication 
and authorization of the MSA domain. The MSA maintains a local database, which stores 
the user's profile with specific mobility access rights and policies.  
•  MSP (Mobility Service Provider): a service provider that provides MIPv6 service (i.e. 
HAs). In order to use the mobility service, the MN must be authenticated and must obtain 
an explicit authorization. For that reason, the MSP communicates with the user’s MSA 
via the AAA infrastructure. 
In order to authenticate and authorize a user's services, all of the entities (i.e. ASA, ASP, MSA 
and MSP) must communicate and trust each other. For this purpose, it is assumed that roaming 
agreements are in place. Based on the relationship of the MSA, MSP, ASA and ASP, two 
scenarios can be classified: 
Split Scenario: When the Access Service Authorizer (ASA) is in a different administrative 
domain from the Mobility service Authorizer (MSA), it is called a 'split' scenario. An example of 
a typical split scenario is a MN that gets an opportunistic connectivity from a hotspot (e.g. coffee 
shop, conference), but depends on a third party (e.g. its home network) for global mobility. 
Different sub-scenarios can be considered based on the relationship between the MSA and MSP. 
They are: 
 MSA and MSP are the same entity. 
 MSP is a third party entity (separated from the MSA). 
Integrated Scenario: When the ASA and the MSA belong to the same administrative domain, 
this is known as the 'Integrated' scenario.  That is to say that the ASA and the MSA are the same 
entity, known as the MASA (Mobility and Access Service Authorizer). An example of an 
integrated scenario would be when a user has a subscription with an operator that typically 
provides both network access and mobility service. The AAA server authorizing mobility service 
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may or may not be co-located with the AAA server that authorizes network access. Based on the 
relationships between the ASP, the MSP and the MASA, various sub-scenarios can be classified: 
 The ASP is the MSP and the MASA is a separate entity:  In this case, the ASP and the 
MSP belong to the same domain and the MN is allocated a local HA in the ASP network.  
 The MASA is the MSP, while the ASP is a separate entity: In this case, the MASA 
allocates the HA (i.e. in the home domain) and delivers the mobility service through the 
MSP. 
 The MASA, MSP and ASP are separate entities: This scenario will occur when the ASP 
cannot provide MIPv6 service (e.g. the ASP does not own a HA) and, the MASA decides 
to redirect the MN to a third party MSP which is closer to the ASP network. 
 The MASA is the MSP and the ASP: In this case, the MN is connected to the network of 
its own access provider which also provides mobility service.     
Further variations of the two bootstrapping scenarios (i.e. Integrated and Split) can be derived 
based on whether EAP is being used. Detailed descriptions of the 'split' and 'integrated' 
bootstrapping scenarios can be found in [49] and [50] respectively. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to consider both the scenarios along with their sub-scenarios.  
For simplicity reasons, this chapter considers the integrated scenario with EAP-capable access 
networks. Figure 5.1 shows an 'integrated' network scenario with EAP available. Here the Access 
Service Provider (ASP) and the Mobility Service Provider (MSP) are responsible for network 
(i.e. IP connectivity) and mobile services (MIPv6) respectively.  
5.5 Detailed Architectural Overview 
The logical components involved in our architecture are illustrated in Figure 5.3. The GSABA 
architecture is instantiated to fit the needs and requirements defined by the IETF MIPv6 WG. As 
a result the GSABA architecture is designed to accommodate the complex network scenarios 
envisaged by the MIPv6 WG which may require sophisticated business relationships among the 
network entities defined in section 5.2. Crucial to the architecture are components whose 
functionalities are described below:  
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                                              Figure 5.3: Architectural components [50] 
• The Bootstrapping Configuration Agent (BCA) provides the required bootstrapping 
configuration information to the MN. For FMIPv6, this would imply the IP address of the 
pAR and SA parameters.  
• The Bootstrapping Authorization Agent (BAA) is responsible for asserting the 
authorization statements. Based on the available profiles for the MNs, the authorization 
statements and parameters are produced by the BAA that are conveyed to the MN. 
Additionally, the BAA is required to authenticate the MN.  
• The Bootstrapping Target (BT) is known as the ‘service providing’ entity. The BT is 
responsible for providing the service requested by the MN. The BT could be considered 
as the ARs (i.e. pAR and nAR) providing the FMIPv6 service to the MN.  
• The BAA Proxy is required in the roaming case, where its function is to provide 
forwarding of service requests and maybe modification of the policies asserted by the 
BAA.  
5.5.1 Interface Description 
The Bootstrapping Target Protocol (Tp-p): This interface is used between the BTs and the 
BCA in the GSABA Proxy/GSABA Server for exchanging information which are relevant for 
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FMIPv6 signalling, and authorizing the BT to provide the MN with access to FMIPv6 service. 
Such information may be provided as Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) or XML. 
The Bootstrapping Protocol (BCA-p): This interface is used for the communication between 
the MN and the GSABA proxy. The MN is informed of the authorization decision taken by the 
BAA and BAA proxy via the BCA-p interface. This information may be provided as AVPs or 
XML. The Candidate transport protocols for the BCA-p include EAP/PANA, DHCP, HTTP, and 
TLS. 
The Bootstrapping Agent Protocol (BA-p): This interface is used for communication between 
the BAA Proxy and the BAA. The BA-p allows information exchange between the BAA entities 
for decision-making purposes and delivers the decisions to the BCA. The information may be 
provided as AVPs or XML.  
The Service Related Protocol (SP): This interface is utilised between the MN and BT (i.e. the 
pAR and nAR). Ideally, this is a service specific protocol (i.e. FMIPv6 signalling in this case) 
and should be left largely unmodified. The interface is therefore indicated by a dashed line in 
Figure 5.4 
5.5.2 AAA Integration  
Most of today’s telecommunication and ISPs utilize the AAA infrastructure for their services. In 
order to provide users the facility to roam between access networks, AAA broker services are in 
place to support the peering between different providers. Established business relations are in 
place which has an effect on routing AAA messages. In this chapter, the defined architecture 
utilizes and integrates with the AAA infrastructures to reduce the deployment and operational 
costs.  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the integration of the GSABA architecture with the AAA infrastructure. 
The BCA and BAA are co-located in an AAA proxy (i.e. GSABA proxy). The BAA is located in 
an AAA server (i.e.GSABA server). Only the extensions which are in the scope of AAA 
infrastructures will be applied to the GSABA architecture. The authorization decisions are taken 
by the GSABA server and are relayed to the GSABA proxy in the ASP domain. The proposed 
GSABA architecture is based on the following assumptions: 
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 Figure 5.4: GSABA Architecture with AAA infrastructure [50] 
 The GSABA proxy and the BT are located in the same domain. 
 If the service provider is not the service authorizer, then the GSABA proxy can modify the 
authorization statements provided by GSABA server before delivering them to the BT.  
 The ASA is assumed to be the home domain. In general, the ASA may or may not be the 
same entity which is responsible for authorizing the service to be bootstrapped [50].  
However, this thesis considers only the Integrated scenario (i.e. ASA = MSA)  
 The GSABA is intended to be used with a wide variety of services (e.g. MIPv6, HMIPv6, 
PMIPv6, multi-homing, etc). However, as mentioned earlier this thesis only considers 
FMIPv6. 
Taking these assumptions into account, the entities of the GSABA architecture are presented: 
The GSABA Proxy:  The authorization statement is acquired from the GSABA server by 
GSABA Proxy for the utilization of FMIPv6 service. The authorization statements together with 
the needed configuration parameters are eventually delivered to the MN and the BTs. 
Essentially, the GSABA Proxy is an AAA server in which the BCA and BAA Proxy components 
are collocated. The GSABA proxy will reside in service providing domain. The authorization 
statements are gathered by the GSABA proxy from the GSABA server for providing the FMIPv6 
service using the BA-p interface and utilising the AAA Proxy functionalities, which is similar in 
nature to that of an AAA server without little or no modification. 
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The GSABA server is responsible for providing the utmost decision of authorizing the 
requested mobility service. The GSABA server will reside in the domain that authorizes the 
service. In order to increase efficiency, the GSABA could optionally deliver the MN profile to 
the GSABA proxy instead of the authorization statement. This would allow the GSABA proxy to 
make authorization statements directly instead of contacting the GSABA server in the home 
domain every single time a service request arrives from the MN. 
ARs (i.e. The BT) are the service providing servers (i.e. the pAR and nAR) that provide the 
FMIPv6 service to authorized users. The BT consists of a Service Target component and the 
Bootstrapping Target component. The Service Target component is responsible for providing the 
actual service to the MN. On the other hand, the Bootstrapping Target component is connected to 
the GSABA-enabled AAA proxy/severs through TP-p to acquire FMIPv6 authorization and 
configuration information regarding specific MNs.    
 The MN consumes the service (i.e. FMIPv6) provided by the BTs after obtaining the service 
configuration parameters and authorization statements from the GSABA proxy/servers.   
5.5.3 High Level Message Flow 
In this section, the overall message flow of the GSABA architecture is presented to explain the 
interaction between different entities to provide the FMIPv6 service bootstrapping. In the 
message flow provided in Figure 5.5, the following assumptions are made: 
• The GSABA Proxy and the GSABA server are located in the same domain. 
• The GSABA server resides in the domain that authorises service utilisation. The 
authorisation decisions are made locally. It is assumed to be in the “home” domain, i.e. the 
domain with which the MN has a relationship (i.e. a subscription based on a contract). 
The overall message flow is illustrated in Figure 5.5 below which shows: 
Step 1: The MN discovers the GSABA Proxy located in the ASP domain, e.g. using DHCP or 
the address could be discovered using a DNS query by using the SRV records.  
Step 2: After discovering the GSABA Proxy, the MN needs to be authenticated by the GSABA 
Proxy. This is could be achieved in two ways. 
 Directly by using full EAP based authentication with the GSABA proxy as the authenticator 
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and the GSABA server as the back-end authentication server, and the MN as the supplicant.  
 Utilizing the initial network access so that the MN can be indirectly authenticated by the 
GSABA proxy. For this to be possible, the GSABA AAA proxy needs to be located in the 
ASP.  
In either case, a new key known as the GSABA key is generated by the MN and the GSABA 
server. After a successful EAP method authentication, the GSABA key may be derived from the 
EMSK [51] generated, which is then delivered to the GSABA proxy. The GSABA key along 
with the MN’s profile is delivered to the GSABA proxy. With the MN’s profile the GSABA 
Proxy is able to generate authorization decisions locally and does not need to contact the 
GSABA server.  
[Protected by AAA]
[Protected by BCA key]
[Protected by SPS-AAA SA]
GSABA proxyBT 
(Service providing server)
GSABA serverMN
Step 2. EAP authentication with GSABA proxy
Step 4 a)Authorization and Bootstrapping Information Request (ABIREQ)
[BCID, SRID, …]
Step 4 b)  Authorization Statement and Bootstrapping Information Response (ABIRES) 
[address of service providing server, …]
Step 5a. Service Information Request 
(SIREQ)
[service ID, SP ID, …]
Step 5b.Service Information Response (SIRES)
[service key, …]
Step 1. GSABA proxy discovery via DHCP (fallback DNS SRV)
Step 5. Service Protocol (unchanged)
Handover Key Request/Reply
Authentication is based on SK
Step 3. Success: gsaba key derived and delivered with MN’s Profile 
Figure 5.5: Message flow of the GSABA mechanism [50] 
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Step 3: Both the GSABA proxy and the MN have the new GSABA key at the end of a 
successful authentication. Other keys which are used to the protect the communication channel to 
the MN (i.e. the BCA key for the BCA interface between the GSABA Proxy and the MN, and 
the Service Key for the SP interface between the BT and the MN)  are derived from the GSABA 
key [50]. Additionally, the GSABA Proxy and the MN generate a unique identifier (called the 
“bootstrapping client identifier” (BCID)) by which the GSABA key is identified [50]. The BCID 
aides in maintaining privacy by preventing the real user identifier, e.g. the NAI, from being 
transmitted in clear over the air interface. 
The customer profile, which contains the service authorization information for all authorized 
services, is delivered to the GSABA proxy. Once the MN's profile is available to the GSABA 
Proxy, it is able to generate the authorization decision locally and does not need to contact the 
backend AAA server for each service request. After successful authentication the MN and the 
GSABA AAA proxy have the new GSABA key. The communication channel between the MN 
and the GSABA Proxy (i.e. the BCA-p interface) is protected using the GSABA key. 
Additionally, the BCID is generated by the MN and the GSABA Proxy with which the GSABA 
key, and as a result the MN as well, are identified [50].  
Step 4a: To successfully bootstrap a service (e.g. FMIPv6), the MN sends an Authorization and 
Bootstrapping Information Request (ABIREQ) message to the GSABA Proxy. In order to 
identify the ABIREQ message, the BCID is used.   
The ABIREQ message will contain the following set of information. 
• The BCID 
• The identifier of the service the MN wishes to use (i.e. the Service Request Identifier – 
SRID) [50] 
•  Service Identifier (Service ID-SID) to be used on the SP interface 
• Additional service specific information such as capabilities and service preferences 
Step 4b: Upon receiving an ABIREQ, the GSABA Proxy replies back with an Authorization and 
Bootstrapping Information Response (ABIRES) message which contains the required parameters 
to the MN [50]. 
 The ABIRES message will contain the following set of parameters: 
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a) Authorization statement: “success”, “not available”, “not allowed” 
b) Address of the service providing server (i.e. BT), which can be, for example, a Fully 
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or an IP routable address. 
c)  A key and an identifier (i.e. SID) used for accessing the service 
d) Additional service specific information 
 
Step 5: Once the MN has obtained all the necessary information for accessing the service (i.e. 
FMIPv6), it can start to setup a SA with the service providing server (i.e.BT). As soon as the BT 
gets the service request and cannot match the SID used in the request sent by the MN to any of 
the locally present SIDs, it contacts the GSABA proxy and queries regarding the received SID 
via a Service Request (SIREQ) message (step 5a). The minimum information contained in the 
SIREQ is the BT ID and the SID. Upon receiving the SIREQ, the GSABA proxy replies with a 
Service Information Response (SIRES) message (step 5b), which contains a handover key (HK) 
to be used for the verification (i.e. authentication) of the service protocol (i.e.FMIPv6 signalling).  
The HK is derived from the GSABA key and is shared by the MN and the GSABA proxy [50].   
The entire process of obtaining the HK by utilizing the MN’s request/response and 
SIREQ/SIRES is achieved through the HOKEY process. The next section discusses the HOKEY 
process in detail.  
5.5.4 Securing FMIPv6 Signalling with HOKEY 
A draft [38] describes the HOKEY protocol used to establish a handover key between a MN and 
an AR for the purpose of securing FMIPv6 signalling messages. This key can be used to protect 
the signalling message between the MN and the pAR.  This handover key cannot be used to 
protect signalling messages sent by a MN to a nAR, e.g. the UNA message sent to the new AR 
may be faked and then the packets are redirected to the wrong MN.  
 However, the HOKEY protocol can be easily extended to provide mechanisms to protect the 
UNA message. Details of such extensions are provided in 5.5.4. 
The goals for the deployment of HOKEY are provided in [50]. 
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5.5.4.1 Overview of HOKEY 
In [38], it is assumed that the MN shares a key, called the Handover Master Key (HMK), with 
the Handover Key Server (HKS) [123].  The HMK can be thought as a GSABA key or a Usage 
Specific Root Key (USRK) and the Handover Key Server may be a GSABA proxy or a GSABA 
server [123]. A Handover Integrity Key (HIK) is derived from HMK at the MN and the GSABA 
proxy [123].  
The HIK is used to provide integrity protection for messages exchanged between the MN and the 
GSABA Proxy [50]. Using the ABIRES/ABIREQ messages, the HIK is used to protect the data 
exchanged between the MN and the GSABA proxy through the BCA-p interface and can be 
thought as the BCA Key. Also, the actual Handover Key (HK), which is used to protect the 
signalling exchange between the MN and the AR is also derived from the HMK.  
The derivation of these keys (i.e. HIK and HK) is described in detail in [38]. During the 
handover message exchange, the HKS should deliver the HK to the AR. Figure 5.6 illustrates the 
detailed message flow of the HOKEY procedure. As described in [38], the HKReq and HKRsp 
are realized via new Mobility Header types. The messages SIREQ and SIRES could be realized 
via an AAA protocol. 
 
` 
Figure 5.6: Message exchange in the HOKEY protocol 
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In Figure 5.6, the fields shown in “[]” are optional fields. The following parameters are given in 
the messages exchanged: 
 MSGID represents the message ID which the MN selects in the Handover Key Request 
(HKReq).  
 The algorithm chosen by the MN is denoted by the PRF.  
 CoA is the care-of-address of the MN which is carried in the HKReq message.  
 N1 and N2 are sent by the MN as nonces to the GSABA Proxy.  
 The authentication data in the HKReq and HKResp messages are carried by the MN-
HKS_MAC and MN-AR_MAC respectively.  
 The optional timestamp used for replay protection is denoted by T.   
 The SPI in the HKResp together with the AR IP address uniquely identifies the security 
association.  
 The NAI of the MN is indicated in the ID field. 
 The status code is indicated by the code field. 
 
The following steps are required in the HOKEY process: 
 Step 1: In order to start the HOKEY process, the MN sends the HKReq message. 
 Step 2: The AR forwards the HKReq message via the SIREQ message to the GSABA 
Proxy, as only the GSABA Proxy can verify the MAC and generate a new HK. 
 Step 3: The GSABA Proxy authenticates the MN via the MN-HKS_MAC option and 
checks whether the MN is authorized for fast handover. If so, the GSABA Proxy derives 
the HK via the following process: 
HK = gprf+(HMK, N1 | N2 | MN ID | AR ID | "Handover Key") [123] 
where “|” indicates concatenation and gprf+ is the key derivation function defined in [38]. 
The gprf+ is used to derive the HK (), which is an ASCII string with 12-characters and no 
null termination [50].  
 Step 4: The GSABA Proxy replies with a SIRES message, containing the Handover Key 
(HK) and the AAA nonce N2 as well as the HK lifetime and the chosen PRF. The AR 
and the HKS share a SA protecting the AAA messages. 
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 Step 5: After the AR obtains the HK, the AR sends an HKResp message to the MN, 
which contains besides other parameters, N2 and MN-AR_MAC, which are protected 
using the HK.  
 Step 6: The MN derives the HK using the same process as the GSABA Proxy. Now the 
MN and the AR share the same key (HK) for protecting the FMIPv6 signalling messages. 
More detailed information on the protocol can be found in [38]. Figure 5.5 is based on the 
following assumptions: 
 The FMIPv6 service is requested only after the MIPv6 service has been bootstrapped. 
 The GSABA proxy downloads the user profile. 
 The Handover key is derived before the handover procedures begin. 
 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate the message exchange during the FMIPv6 service bootstrapping in 
the predictive mode of operation. In this proposed scenario, MIPv6 is not important so the HA is 
not shown. 
 
 
      Figure 5.7:  Message exchange during the FMIPv6 service bootstrapping (a) [50] 
BAA  
 
BCA 
ASP AAA 
MN 
2.ABIREQ(BCID, FMIPv6 service preferences)  
GSABA Proxy 
pAR nAR 
3. ABIRES(result, FMIPv6 authorization state) 
4. Decide to set up security  
   
5.HKREQ(GSABA Proxy Addr) 
8.HKRES  
6.SIREQ  
7.SIRES (HK) 
1. Authentication phase (GSABA proxy obtains user profile) 
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Figure 5.8: Message exchange during the FMIPv6 service bootstrapping (b) [50] 
 
As mentioned earlier, the user profile is downloaded on the GSABA Proxy during the network 
access. After the GSABA Proxy has been discovered, the MN requests FMIPv6 services by 
sending an ABIREQ to the GSABA Proxy (i.e. The ASP AAA in this case) [50]. In the message, 
the MN must specify its identifier (i.e. BCID), and must indicate its interest in using the FMIPv6 
service [50]. The GSABA Proxy checks the downloaded user profile and sends an authorization 
statement using the ABIRES message.  
After successful authorization, the MN starts the process of establishing SAs with the ARs by 
sending the HKReq to the pAR. Upon receiving the HKReq, the pAR sends a SIREQ message to 
the GSABA Proxy. The GSABA Proxy checks the authorization state and generates a new 
Handover Key (HK) and sends it via the SIRES message. After receiving the MN's authorization 
state and the HK, the pAR responds to the MN with a HKRES message. 
Besides the field specified in HOKEY, the HKReq message introduces new fields: the GSABA 
Proxy address field to allow the nAR to be informed on how to get the handover key and a pre-
keying flag (P) [123]. The pre-keying flag (P) notifies the AR that the HOKEY procedure occurs 
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in pre-keying mode, not during the initial bootstrapping, and that the nAR should perform 
verification on the uniqueness of the NCoA for the MN [123]. After receiving the HKReq, the 
nAR sends a SIREQ message to the GSABA Proxy. The GSABA Proxy checks the authorization 
state and generates a new Handover Key (HK’) and sends it via an SIRES message to the MN.  
Through the process of HOKEY, the MN acquires the handover keys to be used to protect the 
FMIPv6 signalling (i.e. FBU and UNA messages) with both the pAR and nAR before the fast 
handover procedure begins. There are many advantages in setting up a security association 
between the MN and the AR before fast handover: 
 
  “It allows the leveraging of the AAA infrastructure that is already in place to establish 
session keys for securing FMIPv6 signalling messages” [50].  
 “The handover key derivation does not impact handoff latency” [50]. 
 “The compromise of one AR or a particular handover key does not lead to the 
compromise of the keys shared between the MN with any other AR” [50]. 
 
The MN sends a FBU to the pAR when it is willing to handover to the nAR. The FBU includes a 
message authentication code (MAC), which is generated using the HK. The MAC may be carried 
re-using the Authentication Option specified in [38]. After moving to the nAR's link, the MN 
sends the UNA message which includes a MAC, generated using the HK'.  
 
5.6 Experimentation Analysis and Results 
In this section, experimentation results are presented. Two separate cases of tests were 
performed. The first case is a security analysis of the HOKEY protocol, which is an integral part 
of the GSABA architecture. The security analysis has been performed using the AVISPA tool 
which provides industrial-strength technology for the analysis of the security 
strengths/weaknesses of large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols. The second is to 
develop a GSABA testbed providing FMIPv6 services. The reason for this testbed is:  
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The GSABA architecture is a novel concept in its own right; in terms of providing mechanisms 
to securely bootstrap and authorize mobility services (i.e. FMIPv6 in this case) through newly 
defined protocols such as the BCA-p and HOKEY protocol. Such a concept needed to come to 
life for feasibility and proof of concept for the purpose of contributing to the relevant standard 
bodies and research community. 
The GSABA architecture brings with it additional components, messages and signalling (e.g 
ABIRES/ABIREQ, HKReq/HKResp). With the incursion of such complexities, the effect on 
handover latencies (i.e. if any) needed to be investigated in comparison with FMIPv6 (without 
GSABA) and MIPv6.  
 
5.6.1 Security Verification of HOKEY using AVISPA 
In order to analyze the security of HOKEY, the Automatic Validation of Internet Protocols and 
Applications (AVISPA) tool has been used. AVISPA is a push-button tool which analyzes and 
validates security-sensitive protocols. AVISPA uses High Level Protocol Specification Language 
(HLPSL) [36], which an expressive, modular, role-based, formal language that allows for 
specification of protocols and their associated security properties [36].   
The AVISPA tool interprets a user-defined security problem into an equivalent translation 
known as Intermediate Format (IF). For analysis, IF specifications can be provided as inputs to 
different back-end automation tools [124]. For formal analysis, On-the-fly-Model-Checker 
OFMC [36] and Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher CL-AtSe[36] are used, which are two 
matured back-ends for the tool, and are capable of performing protocol falsification and bounded 
verification via infinite numbers of sessions.  
 
5.6.1.1 Security Requirements 
In order for HOKEY to be considered secured, a handover procedure must satisfy the following 
fundamental security requirements: 
• Authentication: MN and the ARs (i.e. pAR and nAR) must mutually authenticate each 
other via HIK and HK/HK’. Moreover, the MN must be authenticated by the AR to use 
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the FMIPv6 service.  
• Confidentiality: The contents of the HKReq and HKResp exchanged between the MN 
and ARs (pAR and nAR) must be kept secret from malicious attacks. The handovers keys 
(i.e. HK and HK’) must only be shared between the MN and ARs.  Other adversary nodes 
must not be able to derive the handover keys.  
•  Integrity: Any malicious node must not be able to alter the contents of the HKReq, 
HKResp and FBU. 
 
5.6.1.2 HLPSL Specification 
HLPSL is a role-based language, which means the actions of each participant must be specified 
in a module. The protocol steps are modelled as transitions in a role by HLPSL. After that, the 
desired security properties of the protocol are modelled. In this section, various important 
elements of the proposed model are highlighted. 
For the specification of the scheme, the details of the implemented model (i.e. HOKEY to secure 
FBU and UNA messages) have been abstracted as shown in Figure 5.9. 
In the HLPSL specification, each role is enacted by participants/agents. The numbers of 
concurrent sessions of the protocol that must run are also specified by HLPSL. The following 
goals of HOKEY have been specified: 
 Confidentiality/secrecy of HIK, HK, and HK' between the MN, paR and nAR respectively 
 Authentication and Integrity protection must be provided to the messages between the MN 
and ARs (i.e. HKReq, HKResp, FBU and UNA). 
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Msg1.  MN->pAR: HKReq[MN_HKS_MAC.{MSGID.PRF, CoA, NMN}_HIK] 
            %where MN_HKS_MAC = H( MSGID.PRF, CoA, NMN)  
    
Msg2. pAR->MN:HKResp[MN_AR_MAC{MSGID.PRF, CoA, NpAR}_HK] 
           %where MN_AR_MAC = H(  MSGID.PRF, CoA, NpAR) 
 
Msg3.  MN->nAR: HKReq[MN_HKS_MAC.{MSGID. PRF. CoA. N'MN}_HIK] 
            %where MN_HKS_MAC =   H( MSGID.PRF, CoA. N'MN)   
  
Msg4. nAR->MN:HKResp[MN_AR_MAC.{MSGID.PRF. CoA. NnAR. MN_HKS_MAC.{}_HK'] 
           %where MN_AR_MAC =  H(  MSGID.PRF, CoA.NnAR)  
 
Msg5: MN->pAR: FBU, FBU_MAC 
 %where FBU_MAC = PRF(HK, NCoA,  NpAR)  
 
Msg6: MN->pAR: UNA, FBU_MAC  
 %where UNA_MAC = PRF(HK', NCoA,  NnAR) 
 
    Figure 5.9: HLPSL specification of the secured FMIPv6 
 
For secrecy, the specified goals indicate which values should be kept secret between participants. 
The HLPSL specification of the goals is shown in Figure 5.10. 
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goal 
% the HIK(sec_hik_mn and sec_hik_ar) is secret 
% between the MN and the pAR/nAR 
secrecy_of sec_hik_MN, sec_hik_ar 
% the HK(sec_hk_mn and sec_hk_ar) is secret 
% between the MN and the pAR 
secrecy_of sec_hk_MN, sec_hk_ar 
% the HK’(sec_hk_mn and sec_hk_ar) is secret 
% between the MN and the nAR 
secrecy_of sec_hk_MN, sec_hk_ar 
% authentication and integrity of the MN_HKS_MAC1 
authentication_on pAR 
% authentication and integrity of the MN_HKS_MAC2 
authentication_on nAR 
% authentication and integrity of the MN_AR_MAC  
authentication_on mn 
end goal 
Figure 5.10: Goals for the HLPSL specification 
The second goal of the security analysis is to make sure that the HK (i.e. sec_hk_mn and 
sec_hk_par) is kept as a shared secret between the MN and pAR. 
The third goal of the security analysis is to make sure that the HK' (i.e. sec_hk_mn and 
sec_hk_nar) is kept as a shared secret between the MN and nAR. 
The remaining goals are to authenticate and check for integrity protection of MN_HKS_MAC, 
MN_AR_MAC by checking a participant correctly believes that its intended peer belongs in the 
current session, has reached a particular state, and agrees on a value, which is typically fresh. 
Chapter 5 
130 
 
5.6.1.3 Verification of Results  
As mentioned earlier, OFMC and CL-AtSe have been used as the two back-ends for the 
implemented HLPSL specification. For a comprehensive automated analysis, OFMC builds an 
infinite tree in a driven manner which is defined by the protocol analysis problem [125]. It 
implements efficient protocol falsification and also employs session verification without 
bounding the messages the intruder can generate [125]. CL-AtSe provides translated sets of 
constraints and states from the HLPSL specification to find attacks on the protocols [125]. Both 
these tools (i.e. OFMC and CL-AtSe) utilize the Dolve-Yao intruder model. 
The results of the OFMC and CL-AtSe are shown in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 respectively.  
The results illustrate that protocol is safe, which means that no attack was successful in breaking 
security requirements and goals set by the protocol specification.     
  % OFMC 
% Version of 2006/02/13 
SUMMARY 
 SAFE 
DETAILS 
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
PROTOCOL 
  /home/avispa/web-interface-computation/./tempdir/hokey_fmipv6.if 
GOAL 
  as_specified 
BACKEND 
  OFMC 
COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
  parseTime: 0.00s 
  searchTime: 0.26s 
  visitedNodes: 8 nodes 
  depth: 3 plies 
Figure 5.11: OFMC Result 
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   SUMMARY 
   SAFE 
                 DETAILS 
                     BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
                 TYPED_MODEL 
                 PROTOCOL 
  /home/avispa/web-interface-computation/./tempdir/hokey_fmipv6.if 
                 GOAL 
   As Specified 
                 BACKEND 
  CL-AtSe 
 STATISTICS 
    Analysed: 16 states 
   Reachable: 4 states 
   Translation: 0.03 seconds 
   Computation: 0.00 seconds 
 
Figure 5.12:  CL-AtSe Result 
 
5.6.2 Implemented Software Modules 
This thesis has undertaken the software implementation of a system prototype of the functional 
components of FMIPv6 (fully compliant with RFC4068) integrated with the GSABA 
architecture. The goals of this system prototype are to provide the network integration validation 
and verification of the handover latency of the FMIPv6 in a GSABA service environment. Figure 
5.13 shows the software reference architecture along with the required modules and interfaces. 
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Figure 5.13:  Modules and interfaces for FMIPv6 integrated with GSABA 
 
The software architecture of the FMIPv6 / GSABA prototype contains the following 
components:- 
• PAR 
• NAR 
• MN 
• HA 
• CN  
The rectangles represent the software modules, namely FMIPv6, HOKEY, SAM, and 
FreeRadius. Meanwhile the main interfaces are represented with black connectors. For simplicity 
reasons the GSABA server and GSABA proxy have been co-located in the testbed development. 
Both software modules and interfaces are described in the following subsections. 
5.6.2.1 MN 
5.6.2.1.1 Service Authorization Module (SAM) 
The SAM software module has been implemented using C programming language in Linux 
‘Ubuntu’ distribution with kernel version 2.6.1. The result of implementing the SAM module at 
the MN side leads to the following interface: 
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BCA-p 
The BCA-p interface is used for the communication between a MN and a GSABA proxy. This 
interface is intended to serve two purposes. Firstly, the configuration parameters needed for a 
specific service can be requested from the MN. Secondly, the authorization decision taken by the 
network is conveyed to the MN.  
 
MN GSABA Proxy
1.ABIREQ(BCID, SRID, HMAC)
2. ABIRES(FMIPv6 auth state,HMAC)
 
Figure 5.14: Message flows for FMIPv6 service Authorisation 
 
After the GSABA key has been established, the MN and the GSABA proxy can exchange 
service configuration and authorisation information carried out by the ABIREQ and ABIRES 
messages via the BCA-p interface.  
HTTP/TLS has been used to realise the functionality of the BCA interface. For this purpose 
Openssl-0.9.8e is installed and configured at both the MN side and the GSABA Proxy side.  
Apache-2.2.4 server is installed and configured at GSABA Proxy side. 
Mb  
Mb is an internal interface between the SAM and the FMIPv6 module. The SAM module uses 
the Mb interface to pass authorization values (i.e. success/failure) to the FMIPv6 module.   
5.6.2.1.2 HOKEY (MN) 
The HOKEY software module at has been implemented using C programming language in 
Linux ‘Ubuntu’ distribution with kernel version 2.6.23-rc3. This software module is in 
complete compliance with the [38]. The result of HOKEY module implementation is the creation 
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of the HK-p interface and Ma internal interface. Given below is the description of each of these 
interfaces. 
HK-p 
The HK-p is an external/network interface between the MN and AR. The HK-p is bidirectional 
in nature and through this interface the MN can retrieve the Handover Key (HK/HK’) to protect 
the handover messages between the MN and the AR. With respect to the FMIPv6 application, 
the HK-p interface includes two aspects: one is the interface between the MN and pAR. The 
other is the interface between the MN and nAR. 
MN AR GSABA proxy
1.HKReq
4.HKRsp
2.SIReq
3.SIRsp
 
Figure 5.15: Message Flow for HOKEY 
After bootstrapping and service authorization, the MN sends the Handover Key Request 
(HKReq) message to the serving access router (pAR). The HKReq message is created by the MN 
which contains the CoA, Network Access Identifier, message ID and the desired PRF algorithm. 
The HKReq also contains a MAC composed from the message fields which is included in a MN-
AAA MAC Mobility sub-option. A timestamp mobility option should be included in the HKReq 
message for replay protection. Upon successful delivery of the HKReq, the HOKEY module 
waits for the HKResp message from the pAR. 
On receiving a successful HKResp message, the MN checks to ensure that the MN-AR MAC 
mobility option exists [38]. The message will be silently discarded if it does not contain the MN-
AR MAC mobility option [38]. If there is a mismatch between Message ID with that of the 
corresponding HKReq, the MN must also discard the packet [38]. Using the keying material 
existing in the HKResp message, the MN computes the handover key. The AUTH Value in the 
MN-AR MAC mobility option must be verified using the derived HK [38]. The HKResp 
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contains a MAC algorithm in the MN-AR mobility sub-option which must be supported by the 
MN, or else it must discard the message [38]. In the event of an AUTH Value verification 
failure, the MN will discard the message [38]. 
Once the HKResp has been successfully processed and a valid HK is derived, the MN stores the 
SPI and the associated key lifetime received from HKResp message [38]. Figure 5.16 and 5.17 
illustrates the format of the HKReq and HKResp respectively. 
0                8                   16                 24      31
Message ID
Mobility option(variable)
VPRFP Reserved
Key care of address
 
Figure 5.16:  HKReq mobility header 
 
0                8                   16                 24      31
Message ID
Mobility option(variable)
VPRFP Reserved
Status Code Lifetime
SPI
 
Figure 5.17:  HKResp mobility header 
Ma 
After the HK processing with pAR, the MN will store the HK (between MN and pAR) and the 
related parameters (such as SPI and lifetime).  
After the MN finishes the scanning, and before handover processing starts, the MN will do the 
HK’ processing with the recommend nAR and store the HK’ (between the MN and nAR) and the 
related parameters (such as SPI and lifetime). 
So, at least 2 sets of HK parameters exist sometimes in the MN. For this purpose a structure to 
store the HK related parameters has been defined. The structure is: 
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                                  struct hk_para{ 
                                   uint16_t liftime; 
uint32_t spi; 
uint8_t  hk[12];      /*96 bits*/ 
struct in6_addr *ar_addr;  /*to distinguish which AR the HK belong to*/ 
}; 
Then a global variable is defined:    struct hk_para ar_hk_para;  
After the MN handles the received successful HKResp message from the pAR, the MN will store 
the HK parameters in the ar_hk_para structure. 
After the MN handles the received successful HKResp message from the nAR, the MN will store 
the HK parameters in the ar_hk_para structure. 
There are 2 other global variables defined:   
struct hk_para mn_par_hk_para;   
struct hk_para mn_nar_hk_para; 
While the MN does the scanning procedure, the ar_hk_para variable is copied to 
mn_par_hk_para and during the MN handover procedure the ar_hk_para is copied to the 
mn_nar_hk_para. 
Now the FMIPv6 module can get the HK (between the MN and the pAR) from the 
mn_par_hk_para variable to protect the FBU/FBack message, and can get the HK’ (between the 
MN and the nAR) from the mn_nar_hk_para variable to protect the UNA message. 
Note: the code for more than one nAR is for future work. 
5.6.2.1.3 FMIPv6 (MN) 
The FMIPv6 module in the MN uses the open source code developed by [52]. Brunel University 
has modified the source code in a Linux ‘Ubuntu’ distribution under the 2.6.23-rc3 kernel 
version.  The FMIPv6 at the MN is used for all the FMIPv6 signalling which is compliant with 
[7]. The modifications/extensions made by Brunel contribute to the creation of the SP interface. 
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SP 
The SP interface is service specific and is the interface between the MN and ARs.  The protocol 
used to implement this interface is [7] which is available as open source and distributed under the 
GNU General Public License.  
It is very important to note here that source code in the MN needs to be modified to have a new 
mobility authentication option. This allows the Fast Binding Update (FBU) to be securely sent 
(i.e. in terms of integrity of the message, and authentication) from the MN to the pAR. The Fast 
Binding Acknowledgement (FBack) sent by the pAR in response to the FBU needs to be secured 
in the same way. Also, the UNA sent by the MN to the nAR needs to be secured using the 
mobility authentication option as well.  
The new mobility authentication option should be in the form of a Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) and is described in [104]. A MAC is a “short piece of information used to authenticate a 
message. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message to be 
authenticated, and outputs a MAC (sometimes known as a tag). The MAC value protects both a 
message's integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret 
key) to detect any changes to the message content” [126]. 
The format of the MN-pAR and MN-nAR (i.e.FBU, FBack and UNA) mobility message 
authentication option is illustrated in Figure 5.18. The FBU and FBack messages are 
authenticated using the MN-pAR message authentication option [104]. In a similar manner, the 
UNA message is authenticated using the MN-nAR mobility option. There is an existing SA 
which consists of a key, authentication algorithm, mobility SPI and a replay protection process, 
between the MN and the pAR/nAR based on shared-key principles [104].  The key has an 
arbitrary length of 16 octets, and HMAC_SHA1 is used as the authentication algorithm [104]. As 
specified in [104] a sequence number or a Timestamp option may be used for providing a replay 
protection mechanism. The last option in the FBU and FBack message is the mobility message 
authentication option. 
The encryption algorithms for HMAC available in Linux (Ubuntu distribution, kernel 2.6.23-
rc3) are available in a package called libdigest-hmac-perl (1.01-1). The encryption algorithms 
included in the package are MD5 and SH1. 
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The shared secret key (in this case, the HK key) is derived from the Handover Master Key 
(HMK).   
The details of the format of the MN-pAR and MN-nAR mobility message authentication option 
are presented in [104]. 
 
 
Figure 5.18 MAC mobility option 
 
5.6.2.2 ARs (pAR & nAR) 
The ARs also use the open source code developed by [7]. Brunel University has modified the 
source code in [7] in a Linux ‘Ubuntu’ distribution under the 2.6.23-rc3 kernel version. The 
FMIPv6 at the AR is used for all the FMIPv6 signalling which is compliant with [7]. With the 
GSABA architecture requiring secure FMIPv6 handover, the following interfaces were created: 
5.6.2.2.1 Free Radius  
The Free Radius software module at the AR is implemented in Linux ‘Ubuntu’ distribution with 
kernel version 2.6.23-rc3. The result for implementing Free Radius module at the MN side leads 
to the following interface: 
Hokey/Tp-p 
The Tp interface is used for communication between the AR and the GSABA Proxy/Server. Free 
Radius module functionality is implemented using [27] which is the premier open source 
RADIUS server (released under the GNU General Public License). SIREQ and SIRES messages 
are exchanged on this interface to transport the handover keys (i.e. HK and HK') from the 
GSABA Proxy to the ARs (i.e. pAR and nAR). The SIREQ message contains CoA, MN ID, 
message ID, life time and SPI. There are no existing AVPs for sending all the parameters. So, 
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two different protocols for this purpose have been used. The MN ID is sent via standard radius 
protocol and the remaining parameters are sent via standard SQL query which directly updates 
the user Database. SQL updates are only allowed from specified IP addresses of ARs on the 
database server to prevent un-authorized access. The RADIUS packet format is shown in Figure 
5.19. 
 
Figure 5.19:  Tp Interface Message format 
• Code: specifies type of RADIUS packet 
• Identifier: specifies the RADIUS response with the correct outstanding request 
• Length: specifies the length of the packet 
• Authenticator: sixteen octets long and contains the information that the RADIUS client and 
server use to authenticate each other 
• Attributes: is a section where an arbitrary number of attributes are stored. 
The attribute section of the packet is used to send the MN ID to GSABA server, if it is verified 
correctly the GSABA would reply with an AAA-Nonce, GSABA time-stamp and handover keys.  
My  
My is the internal interface through which the Free Radius Module passes the handover keys 
(HK and HK') to the HOKEY module of the ARs. This interface has been implemented using C 
Programming language.   
Mx 
Upon receipt of a successful AAA response (i.e. SIREQ) from the GSABA Proxy, the AR must 
store the received handover key along with the CoA and MN ID [38].  
The HKResp message sent by the AR to MN must contain parameters received in the RADIUS 
message which are the SPI, lifetime and AAA nonce [38]. The HKResp also contains a MAC of 
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the message created using the HK which is received in the MN-AR MAC Mobility Sub-Option 
[38]. 
When the AR sends the HKResp message to the MN, it should use the handover keys (HK/HK’) 
to calculate the MAC to protect the HKResp message; and during the handover procedure, the 
AR should use the HK to protect the FBack message. 
So the Mx interface functionality is how the HOKEY module gets the HK for calculating the 
MAC to protect the HKResp message. Also, the Mx module is used by the HOKEY module to 
the pass the handover keys (HK and HK') to the FMIPv6 module for protecting the FBack and 
UNA messages.  
So a global structure variable is defined to store the received handover keys (HK/HK’) from the 
GSABA at the AR side. The structure is: 
struct hokey_para{ 
 uint32_t spi; 
 uint8_t  hk[12];      /*96 bits*/ 
 struct in6_addr *coa;   
struct in6_addr *mn_id; 
uint16_t status_code,  
uint16_t lifetime,   
uint8_t ho_nonce[16]  
uint8_t timestamp[8] 
}; 
Then a global variable is defined:     struct hokey_para mn_ar_hokey_para 
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After receiving a successful AAA response (SIResp), the AR stores the HK/HK’ parameters to 
the mn_ar_hokey_para global variable, and when the HK/HK’ are needed at the AR side, it is 
from this variable that they are constructed. The following parameters: 
uint16_t status_code,  
uint16_t lifetime,   
uint32_t spi,  
uint8_t ho_nonce[16]  
uint8_t timestamp[8] 
will be sent to the MN using the hokey_ar_send_hkrsp( ) function. They can be read from the 
global structure variable: mn_ar_hokey_para. 
5.6.2.2.2 HOKEY (AR) 
The HOKEY software module at the AR has been implemented using C programming 
language in Linux ‘Ubuntu’ distribution with kernel version 2.6.23-rc3. This software module 
is in complete compliance with [38]. The HOKEY module at the AR leads to the following 
interfaces: 
The HK-p 
As mentioned earlier in 5.6.1.2 and 5.6.2.2, the HOKEY modules at the MN and the ARs are 
connected through the HK-p interface. The HK-p interface is bidirectional in nature and the AR 
side of it is used to transmit parameters through which the handover keys (i.e. HK and HK') at 
the MN could be retrieved.  On receiving a successful HKReq message, the AR checks to ensure 
whether or not any pending request exists with same Message ID [38]. If there is a match, and an 
AAA response corresponding to the Message ID is present, then AR retransmits the HKResp 
[38]. For further information on retransmissions, replay protection and message uniqueness 
validation, please refer to [38]. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, on receipt of a successful AAA response from the GSABA 
Proxy, the AR stores the received handover key along with other parameters such as CoA and 
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MN ID. The HKResp must contain a MAC of the message created using the HK/HK’ which is 
received in the MN-AR MAC Mobility Sub-Option [38]. 
5.6.2.2.3 FMIPv6 (AR) 
The FMIPv6 module in the pAR and nAR uses the open source code of [52]. Like the FMIPv6 
module at the MN, the FMIPv6 in the ARs (both the pAR and nAR) has been modified/extended 
by Brunel University. The FMIPv6 protocol at the pAR is responsible for sending the FBack 
upon receipt of the FBU from the MN. The following interfaces are created and used by the 
FMIPv6 module at ARs (i.e. pAR and NAR).  
SP 
The pAR and nAR will use the SP interface to securely send the FBACK to the MN. Also, the 
UNA message is sent securely from the MN to the nAR via the SP interface. For this reason, the 
‘fmipv6.org’ source code [52] in the ARs has been modified to have a new mobility 
authentication option as described in section 5.6.2.1.3 of this thesis.   
The new authentication option should be in the form of a MAC described in [104]. The MAC for 
the FBack is calculated using the shared secret between the MN and the pAR (i.e. HK) and the 
MAC for the UNA is calculated using the shared secret between the MN and the nAR (i.e. HK').  
5.6.2.3 GSABA Server 
Apache-2.2.4 server is installed and configured at the GSABA Proxy side to run in a Linux 
‘Ubuntu’ distribution environment with kernel version 2.6.1. The Apache server (i.e. GSABA 
Proxy) hosts the Free Radius and the User DB modules. Free Radius module functionality at the 
GSABA Proxy is implemented using [27].  
Bb/Aa 
Bb/Aa is an internal interface of the GSABA server which is used between the user database and 
FreeRadius. FreeRadius supports different database servers including MySQL which is used in 
this case. Simple SQL queries are run over this interface.  
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5.6.3 The Test-bed  
The software components for the FMIPv6 integrated with the GSABA architecture is illustrated 
in Figure 5.13. The actual layout of the FMIPv6 integrated with the GSABA architectural 
components is shown in Figure 5.20.  
5.6.3.1 Requirements  
In this section, the hardware and software requirements for the test-bed are outlined.   
5.6.3.1.1 ARs (pAR & nAR):   
The hardware and software requirements for the ARs are: 
                  
 
Figure 5.20: Layout of the Test-bed 
 
 
Hardware Requirements:  
 The ARs are optimized Linux boxes (i.e. PCs).  
  Wireless cards based on an Atheros chipset with a Madwifi driver were used to provide 
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router functionalities. 
Software Requirements:  
 The operating system (OS) system used was Linux (Ubuntu distribution). 
 Universal Mobile IP (UMIP) package was used for Mobile IPv6.  
 The Quagga Routing Suite was used for providing routing functionality. RIPv3 was the 
routing protocol used. 
 The ARs hosted the fmip-ar daemon implementation which is originally developed by 
fmipv6.org [52], but later modified and extended by Brunel University (UK) and Huawei 
Technologies (China).  
 For router advertisement (RAs), Radvd was used. 
 
5.6.3.1.2 MN:  
The hardware and software requirements for the MN are: 
Hardware Requirements:  
 The MN was a linux based machine (i.e. PC) with a wireless card based on an Atheros 
chipset. 
Software Requirements:  
 Again, the operating system (OS) system used was Linux (Ubuntu distribution). 
 The MN was also running UMIP and with a modified implementation of the fmip-mn 
daemon (original source code from fmipv6.org). 
 
5.6.3.1.3 HA:   
The hardware and software requirements for the HA are: 
Hardware Requirements:  
 The HA used was linux based box with an Ethernet card.  
Software Requirements: 
 As with other nodes in the testbed, Linux kernel version 2.6.23-rc3 with UMIP was used as 
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the OS core.  
 Radvd was used for routing advertisements. 
 The Quagga Routing Suite was used for providing routing functionality. RIPv3 was the 
routing protocol used. 
5.6.3.1.4 GSABA Proxy/Server (AAA Server):  
The hardware and software requirements for the GSABA Server/Proxy are: 
Hardware Requirements:  
 The GSABA Proxy/Server server was a Linux machine (Ubuntu Distribution) with kernel 
version 2.6.23-rc3.  
Software Requirements: 
The GSABA Proxy/Server hosted an Apache (web server) with SSL support, modified 
FreeRadius server and Quagga routing daemon. 
5.6.3.2 Test-Scenarios 
For the purpose of a complete and consistent evaluation, three distinct scenarios were evaluated. 
The first scenario is the Predictive FMIPv6 operation over the GSABA architecture. The Second 
Scenario highlights the Reactive handover, and the third scenario illustrates the handover of a 
plain MIPv6 process. In all three scenarios, the MN undergoes an IPv6 handover by moving 
between AP1 and AP2 which are respectively connected to AR1 and AR2 belonging to different 
IP subnets. All the scenarios have been executed with a series of tests in which the MN receives 
a video stream from the CN using VLC player [54]. In the Video stream, data is sent as Real-
time Transport Protocol (RTP) packets [55]. RTP packets have an average approximate length of 
1336 bytes and are sent every 30ms.  
 
5.6.3.2.1 Performance Evaluation 
In this section the results obtained from the test-bed are analyzed in detail and benchmarked with 
other similar well known and validated test models/cases. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
146 
 
Predictive Handover 
The results presented in this section are obtained, by running the Wireshark tool [56] on the MN, 
CN and ARs, as well as using the timestamps displayed on the console of the MN, provided by 
the FMIPv6 suite when executed in a debug mode. Figures 5.21 and 5.22 present the predictive 
handover case. Figure 5.21 shows that the MN does not loose a single packet during handover. 
At 60.12 seconds after the entire process is started, the MN sends a HKReq to the pAR, and 
receives an HKResp after roughly 86ms. At 60.14 seconds, the MN senses that its signal from 
the currently attached AP has dropped below a certain threshold. Such a situation occurs because 
the signal strength of the AP that the MN was attached to was manually degraded by reducing 
the Tx power of the pAR, thus forcing it move to the nAR’s link. Before the MN moves to the 
nAR’s link, it has sufficient time to send the HKReq to the nAR and get an HKResp back with a 
RTT of 94ms. The L2 handover period, which is also the service interruption period (i.e. no 
packets being sent or received by the MN), is approximately 19ms. However, such a short 
handover period was only possible with the exclusion of the scanning time from the overall L2 
handover time.  
During the tests it was observed that the scanning process takes about 1.2-3.5 seconds depending 
on the type of wireless card used. On average, the Atheros based chipset card capable of 
802.11b/g had a scanning time of about 1.9 seconds. However, the scanning time is largely 
dependent on the test environment (e.g. number of surrounding APs to be scanned). Such 
findings support the empirical studies in [57]. Due to the long scanning delays, a dual wireless 
interface was used; one for scanning purposes only, and the other for the actual FMIPv6 
communication. As mentioned earlier, the MN in shown in Figure 5.21 incurs zero packet loss. 
This is possible only due to the tunnel established between the pAR and nAR. The tunnel was 
active for 150 ms which means the MN had sufficient time to move the nAR’s link and send the 
UNA message to receive the buffered packets.  
The results in Figure 5.21, support the findings in [93] and [94], where under similar conditions, 
FMIPv6 practical test-beds were deployed in an effort to study the effects of handover latencies. 
The connection loss times (i.e. handover delay) in [93] and [94] are around 10.5 ms which is 
8.5ms more than the loss times shown in Figure 5.21.  The small difference in handover latency 
can be attributed to the L2 trigger event delivery mechanism that exists in Linux based Operating 
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Systems. The conditions, under which these triggers are sent via RTNETLINK sockets, are 
specific to driver behaviour. Even though there is intensive work undergoing on standardising 
them, they are not currently standardised as yet [93]. 
 As mentioned earlier, the handover latency depicted in Figure 5.21 shows the handover latency 
where the scanning time is not included in the L2 handover. This is the reason why the overall 
handover latency is minimal (i.e. 19ms).  
In Figure 5.22, another case of predictive handover is shown. This time, only one wireless 
interface is used, and as result, the scanning time is imposed on the overall handover. The service 
disruption period (i.e. L2 handover) takes roughly 1.3 to 2 seconds, which is a drastic increase, 
when compared with the handover latency in Figure 5.21. Also, notice that due to the long 
handover latency, the packets at the nAR’s buffer arriving from the tunnel are dropped due to the 
long queue at the nAR’s buffer. As a result, 65 packets are dropped/lost causing substantial 
service interruption. 
 
   Figure 5.21: Predictive Handover (a) 
Chapter 5 
148 
 
 
The increase in the overall handover times presented in Figure 5.22 is quite drastic compared to 
the results shown in Figure 5.21 and the results of [93] and [94]. The low handover latencies 
reported in [93] and [94] are achieved by modifying the wireless drivers and also by using a 
secondary wireless interface for scanning purposes only. Such modifications are quite unrealistic 
since it cannot be expected that MNs will have a secondary interface just to reduce the L2 
scanning time. The results in Figure 5.22 support the results of the mathematical analysis of 
[117], where the overall handover latency increases as the L2 switching delay (i.e. handover) 
increases.  Due to the increase in the total handover delay, the buffer length at the nAR increases 
(as shown in equation (31) of chapter 4), which leads to packets being dropped and results in re-
transmissions of FMIPv6 signalling, and hence the overall handover latency increases. 
 
    Figure 5.22: Predictive Handover (b) 
Reactive Handover 
When a handover cannot be predicted because of a sudden drop or loss in signal from its 
attached pAR (i.e. link loss before the FBU is sent or the FBack received), the MN performs a 
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Reactive handover.  Prolonged service interruption is expected, since the MN would first execute 
a scanning process, and on completion would attach to an AP. Depending on the available 
channels and APs, it takes about 1.3-2 seconds for the entire scanning process to complete. 
During the testing of the reactive handover, the MN was forced to change its PoA by manually 
closing down the wireless interfaces of the pAR. 
The MADWiFi driver detects the link failure through missing beacons. During the testing the 
driver uses the default value of 7 beacons. Upon completion of a scan, the FMIPv6 software 
module will try to connect to the AR with the greatest signal strength. In the event of no 
scanning being performed before the link is broken, the FMIPv6 software module would execute 
a scanning process to make a list of candidate ARs. On establishing L2 connectivity, the MN 
sends a UNA message to the nAR followed by a FBU to the pAR. As shown in Figure 5.23, it 
takes roughly 1.89 seconds to complete a reactive handover. Moreover, since there has been no 
buffering or tunnelling (the pAR would tunnel packets for the MN only after receiving the FBU 
from the MN), a substantial loss of 50 packets was incurred. 
 
    Figure 5.23: Reactive Handover 
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The results illustrated in Figure 5.23 correspond to the in results [73] where an optimized 
solution is proposed which considers the available timing and accurate criteria of L2 triggers. 
The average reactive handover time in [73] is around 100 ms more than the results presented in 
Figure 5.23, which could be due to the different hardware used (i.e. wireless cards), which has an 
impact on the scanning time, or even due to varying channel and link conditions (low SNR, low 
throughput, queuing delays). Since in the reactive handover, the MN does not accurately provide 
L2 triggers (i.e. the MN moves to the new PoA without anticipating a handover), the overall 
handover latency drastically increases.     
Plain FMIPv6 
The results for the plain FMIPv6 (with a single wireless interface) are presented in Table 5.1. 
Average handover latency is calculated from five consecutive experimental runs.  
The handover for the proposed mechanism is the same as that of plain FMIPv6 handover. This is 
expected since the proposed mechanism (i.e. secured FMIPv6 over GSABA) performs all the 
required signalling pro-actively (i.e. before the handover occurs). However, the signalling 
overhead of the proposed mechanism would be much higher compared to the plain FMIPv6 
process. Also, the computation overhead (due to secured signalling) for processing the packets at 
the MN and the ARs would be slightly higher compared to plain FMIPv6. Such overheads are 
negligible and have no significant effect on the overall handover process.  
As mentioned earlier, the results in Table 5.1 drastically differ from the findings of [93] and [94] 
due to the inclusion of the scanning time in the overall handover latency.  
 Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 Average 
Handover 
Latency 
1.98sec 1.90sec 2.0sec 1.93sec 1.87sec 1.94sec  
 
Table 5.1 Plain FMIPv6 handover latency (single wireless interface) 
MIPv6 Handover 
The MIPv6 handover is very similar to that of the reactive case for FMIPv6. The MIPv6 protocol 
takes no advantage of any kind of L2 triggers to anticipate a handover. As result, the MN in 
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Figure 5.24 was forced to wait until it detected a link failure only after it moved to the new AR’s 
link. The MN detects the link failure through beacon messages sent from the AP. The default 
value set for the MIPv6 test case is 7 beacon frames. Unlike the FMIPv6 handover process, 
MIPv6 incurs a L3 handover latency, which simply means that the MN is unable send or receive 
any IP packets until the movement detection and BU process are complete. The movement 
detection process involves receiving a RA and the BU process involves formulating a CoA and 
sending it to the HA. In Figure 5.24, L2 handover takes 1.3 seconds (with a single wireless 
interface). The RA is received 50ms after the termination of the L2 handover. The BU process 
takes 610 ms which includes the DAD time. As a result, the overall MIPv6 handover latency is 
approximately 2 seconds.  The pattern of the results found in Figure 5.24 is similar to that of 
[73]. However, there are some differences. For example, CoA address configuration takes almost 
790 ms longer in [73] compared to results in Figure 5.24. Such an increase in the CoA 
configuration time could be due to differences in RA intervals which seem to be a lot higher than 
the MIPv6 test case presented in this chapter, which is set to 70ms. Also, it could be due to the 
fact that the result in [73] is possibly based on a lower transmission rate of IEEE802.11 beacons 
compared to the results of Figure 5.24.  
 
Figure 5.24: MIPv6 handover 
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5.7 Summary  
In this chapter, a novel FMIPv6 bootstrapping and authorization architecture is presented in 
order to provide the MN with necessary configuration parameters and distributed keying 
materials to secure FMIPv6 messages in terms of authentication and authorization. The 
experimental results suggest that the proposed mechanism can provide seamless mobility with 
almost no packet loss. However, this is only the case when a secondary primary interface is used 
for the L2 scanning phase. The handover latency for all three solutions drastically increases 
when only one wireless interface is used. Still the results suggest the proposed mechanism has no 
adverse effect on the overall handover latency due to the additional signalling and computational 
overhead it brings compared to plain FMIPv6. As expected the proposed mechanism drastically 
outperforms plain MIPv6.  
Also, a security analysis of the secured FMIPv6 along with the newly defined protocol/interfaces 
of the GSABA architecture has been done using a formal tool (i.e. AVISPA). The results suggest 
that the proposed mechanism is secure (i.e. safe) from the potential security threats it introduces. 
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CHAPTER 6- IEEE802.21 Assisted Fast Re-authentication Scheme 
over GSABA 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the key characteristics of NGNs is the diversity of access technologies (e.g. 802.11a/b/g, 
802.16e, UMTS etc.) that are available to end-users, and the ability to roam across these 
networks. With such a proliferation of heterogeneous access networks, it is only natural that 
mobility would also increase, creating demands for ubiquitous connectivity and pervasive 
services. However, roaming often implies a temporary service disruption due to handover from 
one PoA to another. Such a disruption is unacceptable for QoS stringent applications, such as 
VoIP, video conferencing, streaming media, etc. As discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, 
various mechanisms, namely, MIPv6 and FMIPv6 have been specified by the IETF as mobility 
standards to tackle the issues associated with handover latencies at the IP (i.e. L3) layer. 
Similarly, there are media specific mechanisms intended to improve the L2 handover, such as, 
the handover optimization in 802.16e and the fast BS transition in 802.11r [71]. Also, the 
IEEE802.21 WG has developed a standard for cross-layer interactions to enable handover and 
interoperability between heterogeneous network types including both 802 and non 802 networks 
[13].  
Wireless handover between PoAs (APs, BSs) is typically an intrinsic process that involves 
several layers of protocol execution [119], which results in long latencies causing undesirable 
service disruptions. It must be noted that additional latencies are incurred for networks, or a 
mesh of integrated networks (e.g. NGNs as described in previous chapters), due to AAA 
services. EAP based solutions will play a fundamental role in NGNs by providing a generic 
authentication framework. However, such solutions are responsible for contributing significantly 
to the overall handover latency. This is due to the fact that, existing EAP implementations run a 
full EAP method (a very time-consuming process) when a MN encounters a new authenticator 
(i.e. PoA), irrespective of whether it has been authenticated to the network domain recently and 
has unexpired keying material [119]. Additionally, the home domain is contacted each time the 
MN is authenticated and this may introduce long delays when the home domain is far way (e.g. 
inter-continental). The home domain is expected to send keys to the access devices (e.g. APs, 
ARs) within the visited domain for establishing security associations.  
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Within the IETF, several alternatives have been proposed to reduce the handover delay when 
EAP authentication is required. The PANA WG has proposed mechanisms to pre-authenticate 
users to a new domain while connected to their current PoA in [53]. On the other hand, the 
HOKEY WG has been responsible for developing solutions [60], [61], [62], and [63] for 
providing fast re-authentication mechanisms without re-executing a full EAP method and re-
using EAP derived keying material for handovers. However, such solutions either method 
specific or method independent, suffer from issues such as high signalling overheads and require 
major changes to the EAP protocol. 
 Recently, the IEEE802.21 WG has formed a task group (TG), known as IEEE802.21a to 
investigate the potential of applying MIH services to reduce latency caused by authentication and 
key establishment during handovers between heterogeneous access networks [121]. However, 
IEEE802.21a is in its infancy at the moment and there is a lack of clearly defined solutions to the 
question of how to use existing 802.21 MIH services to aid in the optimized re-authentication 
process.  
Concurrently, the 802.21a TG has also undertaken the responsibility to provide solutions for 
confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication and replay protection for the IEEE 
802.21 MIH protocol exchanges and allow for MIH services to be authorised [121]. At the 
moment, no such solution has been specified by the 802.21a TG. As a result there is great need 
to define mechanisms for 802.21 service authorization, and also for SAs to be established, so that 
IEEE802.21 MIH protocol messages are securely exchanged between end-points.  
In this chapter, a novel IEEE802.21 assisted EAP based Re-Authentication scheme over a 
service authorization and bootstrapping framework (i.e. GSABA) is presented. The purpose of 
the proposed scheme is to reduce the signalling latency during the EAP re-authentication 
process, and as a result reduce the overall handover delay. Moreover, the proposed scheme 
would enable 802.21 service authorization and allow for SAs to be established between the MN 
and IS for securely provisioning MIIS. It will be shown through analysis of the signalling 
process that the overall handover latency for mobility protocols will be reduced by the proposed 
scheme. 
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6.2 Problem Statement 
The issues associated with fast re-authentication are: 
6.2.1 Further optimization required for existing solutions 
There are many solutions that have been defined by the IETF to provide re-authentication 
solutions based on EAP. As mentioned earlier, the solutions either provide method specific or 
method independent re-authentication mechanisms. For instance [46] and [64] provide examples 
of method specific re-authentication mechanisms which are not suitable for NGNs. This is due to 
the fact that NGNs will comprise of heterogeneous access networks and will require re-
authentication support for any (not just a few) EAP method. On the other hand, the IETF has 
proposed a few method independent EAP re-authentication mechanisms such as those presented 
in [60], [61], and [63]. However, such solutions (i.e. [60], [61], [63]) have issues, such as high 
signalling (i.e. RTTs) overhead or require major changes to EAP state machines and message 
flows. Moreover, EAP is originally based on a 2-party trust model between the peer and the 
authentication server. This imposes certain issues described later in this subsection and also in 
[65]. As a result, there is great need to clearly specify a 3-party re-authentication infrastructure. 
Even though the solution proposed in [64] is essentially motivated by the 3-party approach, it is 
still a rough “straw man”. 
6.2.2 Need for a 3-party EAP re-authentication model 
Existing EAP methods perform authentication using a two-party approach, where only two 
parties perform the EAP authentication, namely the EAP peer and the EAP server. However, 
from a key distribution standpoint, three parties are involved and the two-party model proposed 
for EAP is not valid for a secure key distribution. In the fast re-authentication scenarios, a key 
must be sent from a server to the EAP authenticator (i.e. target PoA) which the EAP peer (i.e. 
MN) has recently attached to (or will attach to) in order to establish a SA between the EAP peer 
and the EAP authenticator through a security association protocol. In other words, the 
authenticator is another party involved in the key distribution process since it receives a key from 
a trusted server. 
The issues with using a two-party trust model have been noted in [65] and are generally referred 
to as a problem with "Channel Binding" [65]. Basically the MN infers the identity of the 
authenticator but it has no clear indication about the identity of the authenticator to which the 
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keying material was provided by the authentication server [65]. In other words, in event of the 
undesirable situation occurring where a NAS is impersonating another NAS, the peer and the 
authentication server will not have the same view of the NAS identity [65].  
As a result a 3-party model seems the right approach for key distribution in mobile scenarios to 
provide channel binding procedures in order to avoid a situation where the trust with an 
intermediate authenticator is compromised and but it still continues to provide unverified and 
conflicting service information to both the EAP server and peers [119]. 
6.2.3 Need for IEEE802.21 MIH services to assist re-authentication 
As mentioned earlier, recently, the IEEE802.21 WG established a TG (802.21a) to investigate 
ways to use the IEEE802.21 MIH services, namely the MIIS, to optimize authentication/re-
authentication and key establishment mechanisms during handovers. Additionally, 802.21a will 
define solutions for securely exchanging MIH protocol messages by providing data integrity, 
replay protection, confidentiality and data origin authentication for IEEE 802.21 MIH services. 
The 802.21a TG has liaised with IETF HOKEY WG to define solutions that utilize the MIIS to 
discover candidate PoAs with which the MN intends to start the fast re-authentication process 
with. Discovering only the candidate PoAs that offer the re-authentication capabilities will 
reduce the overall signalling overheads; i.e. target PoAs that do not support re-authentication will 
not be considered and contacted for handovers. However, at the moment there is a lack of clearly 
defined mechanisms that specify how the IEEE802.21 MIH Services (i.e. MIIS) could be 
integrated and deployed in an EAP based infrastructure. Moreover, the IEs that will be provided 
by the IS to discover the target/candidate PoAs and their capabilities need to be defined.  
6.2.4 Integration of IEEE802.21 MIH Services with an AAA based Service 
bootstrapping and Authorization Framework   
It was mentioned in chapter 5 that NGNs will be highly service oriented, and as such, a GSABA 
architecture (EAP/AAA based) to efficiently authorize and bootstrap services has been 
presented. On the other hand, in chapter 4 it has been shown that IEEE802.21 MIH can be used 
to drastically reduce the overall handover latency in heterogeneous access networks. Like any 
promising solution that can contribute significantly to the revenue stream, the IEEE802.21 
functionalities will be considered as a “payable” service, since they will be used to assist in 
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optimizing the overall handover process, which includes the authentication procedure. As a 
result, users need be authorized to be granted access to the 802.21 MIH services. Therefore, it is 
essential, to integrate the components of the IEEE802.21 MIH entities and services with 
GSABA, for the purpose of efficient service authorization and bootstrapping.  
It was mentioned earlier in section 6.2 of this chapter, that the IEEE802.21 MIH protocol 
messages must be securely exchanged between end-points. The 802.21 MIHF infrastructure is 
vulnerable to many security threats. For example, information sent by the IS to the MN can be 
tampered with in transit by an attacker which could result in malformed unreliable information 
being received, which could  possibly lead to denial of service or the MN being redirected to a 
wrong network (e.g. where price of accessing the network is more expensive).  
A detailed description of all the known security threats to 802.21 MIH services is provided in 
[72].  To date, there has been no solution defined by the IEEE802.21a TG which allows 
IEEE802.21 MIH messages to be securely transmitted.  However, the integration of IEEE802.21 
with the GSABA will allow for dynamic SAs (i.e. keys derived) to be established between the 
MNs and the IS. It will be shown later in section 6.4.3, how the derived keys can be used to 
secure the MIIS signalling. 
 
6.3 Architectural Overview 
An architectural overview of the proposed mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Before delving 
into the specifics of the proposed mechanism, it is important to understand the impact of 
integrating IEEE 802.21 with the GSABA framework. Specifically, for the MIIS provisioning, it 
is essential to investigate the IS deployment strategies and scenarios. 
6.3.1 Deploying an Information Server for MIIS Provisioning 
The IS is the main logical network entity that provides MIIS as defined in the 802.21 
specification. However, the 802.21 formal specification does not provide an explicit definition of 
the IS nor the mechanism for maintaining and accessing it. As a result, the IEEE 802.21 
specification provides flexibility in real IS deployments and implementations, with respect to  
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the proposed architecture 
how to store, collect and provide the information from the neighbouring access networks. The 
information at the IS could be stored in the following ways:  
• Pre-configured and stored locally in the MN.  
•  Stored in a distributed fashion across the network by multiple network nodes, which 
provide the information to the MN.  
• The information is stored, and provided by a separate network entity, i.e. the IS. 
Although the first option (i.e. pre-configure the information on the MN) is the easiest to 
implement, it is definitely the least flexible, since the information to be provided will be static in 
nature and composed of only a small subset of the all required network information for an 
optimized handover. For example, only fixed IEs such as Network Operators ID, geographic 
locations of the PoAs etc. could be included, whilst other useful information for handovers such 
as pricing/billing schemes and network capabilities, which may be dynamic in nature, cannot be 
included [130].  
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On the other hand, storing the information in a distributed manner will lead to significant 
transmission overhead and complicated discovery and maintenance mechanisms. Also, 
information synchronization will become an issue. It is therefore preferable to store all the 
desired information in a centralized manner (i.e. IS) or hierarchically by connecting individual 
ISs.  
6.3.2 Relationships between Business Entities and the IS 
Since the IS will be a new network entity that will be introduced into the NGN architectural 
models (e.g. GSABA), it is only natural to ask: who is going to deploy this entity and how it is 
going to fit in with existing business models for NGNs (see chapter 2, section 2.2). The 
relationship that the IS will form with business entities such as the ASA, ASP, MSA and MSP 
needs to be analyzed. As explained earlier, the IS will be the entity storing the information of 
neighbouring access networks within a geographic area inside a local domain (i.e. an operator's 
domain). It is thus reasonable to consider the IS as a part of the ASP network rather than the 
mobility infrastructure even though theoretically a third party MSP could also deploy ISs. 
Considering the sensitive nature of the information (e.g. billing/pricing, PoA capabilities, etc.) 
that could be involved, it is highly unlikely that the ASPs or MSPs belonging to different 
administrative domains (i.e. different operators) would wish to share much information (even if 
roaming agreements are in place). 
 Therefore, in answer to the question raised at the beginning of this sub-section: It is ideal for the 
IS to be deployed by the ASP [130]. The deployment of the IS and, furthermore, the maintenance 
of all the 802.21 MIH services will be the responsibility of the ASPs of an administrative 
domain. Even though, the introduction of 802.21 MIH services will bring new business 
opportunities, it doesn’t necessarily require any change to the established business relationships 
between the ASP, ASP, MSP, and MSA as shown in Figure 6.1. 
6.3.3 Considered Network Scenarios  
There are two possible network scenarios which arise from integrating IEEE 802.21 to assist in 
optimizing handover (i.e. re-authentication in this case): 
  • S1: (Intra-domain, intra-technology) handover between the same type of access 
network provided by ASPs and authorized by the same administrative domain. 
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 • S2: (Intra-domain, inter-technology) handover between different types of access 
networks provided by ASPs and authorized by the same ASA-AAA (i.e. same administrative 
domains). 
Of these two scenarios, S2 is a realistic option since re-authentication in NGNs will comprise of 
inter-technology handovers. Technology specific solutions for handovers and re-authentication 
(as in S1) already exist, such as those presented [66] and [67]. An emphasis is placed on the 
scenario S2 in using ISs for handling inter-technology (vertical) handovers, particularly, when a 
MN is roaming in a visitor/foreign network within the domain. It must be noted that inter-domain 
(i.e. between different operators) handover scenarios are not considered because, as explained 
earlier, the IS is part of the local access network (ASP). It will be unlikely that the ISs deployed 
in the home domain of a particular operator can provide any useful information to a MN about 
the access networks in a visited domain, belonging to a different operator. In that situation, the 
MN should try to access the local ISs provided by the ASP in the visited domain. Figure 6.1 
provides a reference architecture (IEEE802.21 integrated with GSABA) where there are ISs in 
the ASPs and another IS in the ASA network. 
6.3.4 IS Deployment strategy 
In this section, an IS deployment scheme is investigated and analyzed. In the scheme shown in 
Figure 6.2, the IS is deployed outside the MN’s subnet, serving several subnets. It is possible to 
deploy only one IS within a single domain that will serve all the access networks, or a 
hierarchy/chain of ISs could be deployed to provide information to different blocks 
(home/visiting) of the administrative domain. The latter approach has the advantage of tackling 
redundancy issues (in case one of the IS fails, other ISs could still provide information). The MN 
will discover the IS through DHCPv6 as mentioned in [13] and access it directly through a L3 
transport protocol. In must be noted that other deployment schemes can be derived, such as: 
i) An IS is deployed in each subnet and co-located with the AR/NAS. 
ii) IS or IS-Proxies are deployed in each subnet (co-located with the AR/NAS) and 
connected in a hierarchical manner. 
However, such schemes suffer from scalability problems. To deploy and maintain an IS or an IS-
proxy at each subnet in an access network requires a significant amount of work and effort by the 
ASPs since the AR needs to be heavily modified. Operators are likely to favour a solution that 
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involves minimal changes to the network infrastructure to support 802.21 MIH (MIIS in this 
case) services. The deployment scheme presented in Figure 6.2 is potentially the most appealing 
one to deploy because of its simplicity. Only one new network element will be introduced to the 
existing network [130]. Also only a single interface needs to be introduced to the MN at the IP 
layer. There is no need to modify each subnet in the access network [130].   
 
 
Figure 6.2: IS deployment in the ASP 
6.4 An Overview of the IEEE802.21 assisted EAP based Re-
Authentication Mechanism over GSABA 
As mentioned earlier, authentication in wireless networks (e.g. 802.11a/b/g, 802.16e etc.) is 
usually based on EAP; this could be a problem when the MN moves to a new PoA (i.e. 
authenticator), since it runs a full EAP method, regardless of the fact that the MN may have been 
recently authenticated by the domain and have unexpired keying material. The process of a full 
EAP authentication requires several roundtrips between the EAP client (MN) and the EAP server 
and takes significant time to complete (even in the minimal case where four EAP messages are 
AP
MN
AR
DHCP 
Server
DHCP 
Relay
NAS
ASP-AAA
AR
DHCP 
Server
NAS
DHCP 
Relay
AP
IS
MN-i L3 transport
ISP-a
Chapter 6 
162 
 
needed). The delay depends on the distance between the EAP server and the MN. As a result, it 
can take a significant time to perform re-authentication increasing the overall handover latency. 
In the subsequent sections, an EAP re-authentication mechanism is defined which is integrated 
with the IEEE802.21 infrastructure over GSABA to reduce the handover latency due to re-
authentication.  
6.4.1 The 3-party approach 
The HOKEY WG is working to specify a solution to reduce the latency introduced by EAP 
authentication during handover. The issues that have been described in section 6.2 present some 
drawbacks which triggered the investigation of a new solution based on the extension to EAP 
Re-Authentication Protocol (ERP) [68] defined by the IETF HOKEY WG. The ERP provides a 
fast re-authentication process between the MN and the server in a single roundtrip at the cost of 
modifications to existing EAP deployments. The basic idea consists of securely distributing 
specific keys between the MN and the PoA from a trusted server without incurring the delays 
associated with lengthy full EAP authentications. The distributed keying material will eventually 
serve for the establishment of SAs between the MN and the PoA.  
However, the ERP follows the traditional EAP two-party model for key distribution. As 
explained in section 6.2 of this chapter, this solution has inherited the EAP model for key 
distribution, that is, a two-party model which is inefficient and open to wider problems such as 
those related to the key distribution between the three parties involved in mobile handover. 
Taking this into account, a 3-Party approach solution described in [123] is extended to utilize the 
IEEE 802.21 MIH services (namely MIIS) over GSABA. The goal is to provide fast handover 
and smooth transition by reducing the impact (i.e. minimizing the number of roundtrips) of the 
EAP based re-authentication process when the MN changes authenticator. At the same time, the 
key distribution mechanism of the presented solution provides proper channel binding of the key 
to the parties that will use it. Taking into account the problem of handover keying, the proposed 
solution must meet the requirements listed below: 
• Confidentiality - disclosure of the keying materials to passive and active attackers must 
not be possible. [65] 
• Integrity protection – alteration of a network access credential must be detected. 
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• Validation of credential source – Once network access credentials are received, the 
recipients must validate the source of the credentials .[120] 
• Verification of identity - The three parties involved must confirm the identities of each 
other. [65][120] 
• Agreement by all parties – All three parties must agree on the disclosed keying material 
and the identity of the entities to which the keying material will be disclosed to [120]. 
• Peer consent –Without the clear consent of the client the credentials must not be 
distributed [120]. 
• Replay protection - The key distribution protocol must not be affected by replay attacks 
[120]. 
• Transport independent - The 3-party protocol must be independent of the transport 
protocol used for carrying the 3-party protocol messages. 
6.4.1.1 Keying Hierarchy to be used 
The proposed mechanism of the 3-party model for re-authentication over GSABA utilizes the 
EAP keying hierarchy described in [47] and [69]. On completion of the EAP authentication 
method, the EAP server produces the EAP EMSK as defined by the executed EAP method. From 
the EMSK, a Usage Specific Root Key (USRK) and further keys may then be derived for various 
purposes, including, handover keys, encryption, integrity protection, entity authentication/re-
authentication. The keys to establish SAs between the MN and IS to secure the MIIS signalling 
will be derived from the USRK key. As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, the USRK key is referred 
as the GSABA key. The GSABA key could also be called the Root Master Key (RMK).  
Specification of the generation of USRKs is in progress [69] but it is expected that since the EAP 
layer does not export the EMSK, the GSABA Proxy server needs to  request derivation of the 
GSABA Key (i.e. the RMK) from the EAP server after authorization has been provided. The 
EMSK root key hierarchy used to derive keys for efficient EAP re-authentication and IS SA 
establishment is shown in [69]. 
 
6.4.2 Detailed Explanation of the Proposed Mechanism 
To start with, there is an assumption that there exists a SA between the MN and GSABA server.  
The GSABA Proxy and GSABA Server have another SA. Also, another assumption is that the 
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EAP peer (i.e. the MN) has already completed a successful full EAP authentication with the EAP 
(i.e. GSABA Server) server through the currently attached EAP authenticator (i.e. the PoA). This 
allows the MN and the GSABA server to share a fresh EMSK. From the EMSK, a key hierarchy 
is derived for supporting the proposed 3-party re-authentication mechanism. This step is only 
performed once while the EMSK lifetime is still valid. 
When the MN senses (e.g. through L2 triggers) that it is losing connectivity with the currently 
attached PoA as a result of signal degradation, it immediately sends a MIH message that carries 
the ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request TLV as its payload to the IS. The IS can be discovered by 
using DHCP (please refer to chapter 4, section 4.4.3 for more details). The purpose of sending 
the MIH_Get_ Information’ request message is to discover neighbouring candidate 
PoAs/authenticators that support the proposed EAP re-authentication mechanism. Such security 
related information is crucial to make a handover decision and to prepare a fast handover using 
fast authentication options (e.g. pre-authentication, re-authentication, etc) supported by the 
network which the candidate PoA is associated with.  
As explained earlier, there is a substantial delay due to re-transmissions of EAP-Initiate/Re-auth 
messages before the MN realizes that a particular candidate PoA does not support EAP re-
authentication. As a result, there will be significant signalling overhead and resource wastage if 
there are many candidate PoAs that need to be contacted before the actual handover. Moreover, 
using the information provided by the IS (e.g. the HNI container described in chapter 4), the L2 
scanning phase will be eliminated. This will drastically reduce the overall handover delay, as 
shown by analysis and simulation in chapter 4.   
On receiving the ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request, the IS responds with a ‘MIH_Get_ 
Information’ reply message which contains the requested information as an Information Element 
(IE) container.  A container named ‘SEC_CONTAINER’ has been defined for this purpose. The 
‘SEC_CONTAINER’ will include information about the PoA MAC address, the PoA IPv4/6 
address, the supported EAP methods, and EAP re-authentication support etc.  
 
The contents of the ‘SEC_CONTAINER’ are presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Type = 
TYPE_IE_HNI_REPORT 
Length = Variable 
SEC_CONTAINER #1 
Open Authentication Support IE 
Password Support IE 
Certificate Authority IE 
Authentication Protocol Type IE 
Supported EAP Methods  IE 
Re-authentication Support IE 
Pre-authentication Support IE 
Roaming Partners IE 
PoA MAC address 
PoA IPv4/6 address 
SEC_CONTAINER #2 
... ... ... 
 
Figure 6.3: SEC_CONTAINER 
 
However, it must be noted that prior to the ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request/reply message 
exchange, the IS and the MN must establish SAs to secure the MIIS signalling. In the following 
subsection, the SA establishment with the IS is explained.  
 
6.4.2.1 SA Establishment between the MN and the IS 
After the MN has been successfully authenticated for initial network access, the GSABA Server 
delivers the GSABA key to the GSABA proxy. Details of when and how the GSABA key is 
delivered to the GSABA Proxy are provided in chapter 5 (see section 5.5.3).  Since the 
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IEEE802.21 functionalities will be considered as premium services, which would enable 
optimized handovers across heterogeneous networks, it is essential to authorize and bootstrap the 
offered 802.21 MIH services. As a result, the MN sends an ABIRES message to the GSABA 
Proxy. Like the solution provided in chapter 5 (refer to section 5.5), it also assumed here that the 
MN profile (i.e. statement that gives the authorization for services for the MN) is delivered in 
advance to the GSABA Proxy during the initial EAP full-authentication phase. This is an 
enhanced case, since the GSABA Proxy will be free to generate authorization decisions locally 
instead of having to contact the home AAA server (i.e. GSABA server) every time a service is 
requested. 
The MN secures the ABIREQ message with the BCA key which is derived from the GSABA 
Key. The minimum set of parameters in the ABIREQ message is the BCID, SRID (i.e. the ID of 
the IEEE802.21 service in this case), and the corresponding identifier intended to be used on the 
SP interface. In response, the GSABA Proxy sends an ABIRES message containing the needed 
parameters. All the parameters and message flows for the ABIREQ /ABIRES messages are 
provided in chapter 5 (see section 5.5.3). The BCA key protects the ABIREQ/ABIRES message 
by providing data confidentiality and integrity. 
Immediately after the initial network authentication and service authorization, the MN will use 
the HOKEY protocol (please refer to chapter 5, section 5.5.4.1) to create SAs (i.e. keys) to 
protect the MIIS signalling between the MN and the MIIS. The HOKEY protocol assumes that 
the MN shares a key, called the Information Master Key (IMK), with the GSABA Server. The 
IMK can be thought of as a GSABA key or a USRK which is derived from the EMSK. 
 A Message Integrity Key (MIK) is derived from IMK at the MN and the GSABA proxy. The 
MIK is used to provide data integrity for messages exchanged between the MN and the GSABA 
Proxy and can be referred as the BCA Key. The Information Key (IK), which is used to protect 
the signalling exchange between the MN and IS is also derived from the IMK as shown in Figure 
6.4. 
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1. HKReq(MSGID, PRF, CoA, 
N1, ID, [T], MN-HKS_MAC) 2. AAA-Req(MSGID, PRF, CoA, 
N1, ID, [T], MN-HKS_MAC)
4. AAA-Rsp(N2, PRF, 
[MN-HKS_MAC], IK)
5. HKRsp(MSGID, PRF, Code, 
SPI, N2, [MN-HKS_MAC], [T], 
MN-AR_MAC)
3. Authentication and 
authorization of MN;
Derivation of IK
6. Derivation of IK
 
Figure 6.4: SA Establishment between the MN and IS 
 
Prior to sending the ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request, the MN sends an HKReq message to the 
IS in order to start the HOKEY process. The integrity of the HKReq message is protected by the 
use of a MIK.  The IS  forwards the content of the HKReq message via an SIREQ message to the 
GSABA Proxy, as only the GSABA Proxy can verify the message and generate a new IK. The 
GSABA Proxy Server authenticates the MN and checks whether the MN is authorized for 
IEEE802.21 MIH Services (namely MIIS). If so, the GSABA Proxy derives the IK. The process 
of deriving the IK is shown in chapter 5, section 5.5.4.1. The GSABA Proxy delivers the 
Information Key (IK) and the AAA nonce N2 as well as the IK lifetime and the chosen PRF. 
Thereby; it is assumed that the IS and the HKS share a security association protecting the AAA 
messages. On receiving the SIRES, the IS sends an HKResp message to the MN, containing, 
beside other parameters, N2 and MN-AR_MAC, which is protected using theIK. Using the 
contents of the HKResp, the MN is able to derive the IK. As a result, a SA is established between 
the MN and the IS, which enables MIIS signalling (i.e. ‘MIH_Get_ Information’ request/reply) 
to be protected. 
Chapter 6 
168 
 
6.4.2.2 Details of the proposed Re-authentication process during Handover  
The re-authentication during the handover phase is presented in Figure 6.5. As mentioned earlier, 
this chapter presents an EAP Re-authentication based on a 3-party approach over GSABA as 
described in [123].Using an EAP based model is the ideal option due to the fact that many 
devices implement EAP. Extension of the EAP messages EAP Response Id and EAP Success is 
required. However such extensions have minimal impact on the EAP state machine, compared to 
others solutions such as [68]. 
MN
1.EAP Req/Id
2.EAP Resp/Id*(A,{Na,SEQas,B}Kas)
5.EAP Succ* ({A,B,Na,Nb,Ns}Kas)
3.AAA(B,{Nb,A}Kbs},
EAP Resp/Id*(A,{Na,SEQas,B}Kas))
4.AAA({A,B,Na,Nb,Ns,Kab}Kbs, 
EAP Succ* ({A,B,Na,Nb,Ns}Kas))
BAA
ProxyBCA
ASP AAA
GSABA Proxy
AP
EAP Auth.
GSABA
Proxy receives key rMK
 
Figure 6.5: Message flow for the proposed 3-party Re-authentication process 
In this phase the goal is to achieve the installation of a key in the new authenticator. It must be 
noted that if the MN needs to be authorized by the ASP as part of the proposed re-authentication 
process, then there needs to be an ABIREQ/ABIRES message exchange between the MN and the 
GSABA Proxy. The process of obtaining such authorization from the GSABA is identical to the 
process described in section 6.4.2.1 of this chapter. 
The message flow depicted in Figure 6.5 shows the movement of the MN when it wants to attach 
to another authenticator. The new authenticator sends an EAP Request Identity message in order 
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to authenticate the MN (step 1) [68]. The EAP Request Identity message is integrity protected 
using the rIK [68]. The rIK is derived from the GSABA key. As has been explained earlier, the 
GSABA Key is derived from either the EMSK or a DSRK. For the purpose of GSABA key 
derivation, this thesis specifies the derivation of a USRK or a Domain-Specific USRK 
(DSUSRK) in accordance with [47] for re-authentication. The USRK designated for re-
authentication is the re-authentication root key (the GSABA Key). Next, the MN responds with 
an EAP Response Identity message and this message is modified to allow the insertion of the 
additional information needed to perform the proposed 3-Party Protocol (step 2). 
The proposed model provides a protected facility to carry channel binding (CB) information to 
tackle the issues describe in section 6.2 and in [65].  The TLV type range of 128-191 is reserved 
to carry CB information in the EAP-Response Id [65] [68].  Examples of CB information such as 
Called-Station-Id will be included in the EAP-Response Id message sent to the authenticator, as 
shown in Figure 6.5.    
 The EAP Response Identity message sent by the MN to the authenticator is forwarded by the 
authenticator to the GSABA Proxy, where the authenticator adds additional information (i.e.  a 
NAS-Identifier as CB information) in the AAA message in order to be authenticated by the 
GSABA Proxy (step 3). At this point, both parties are authenticated by the GSABA Proxy and 
the key that it is going to be installed in the authenticator is derived by the GSABA Proxy. This 
key is known as the rMK and is derived from the GSABA key. A message which is a modified 
EAP Success message and the rMK is sent to the authenticator (step 4). The authenticator installs 
the key sent by the GSABA Proxy. With this key the authenticator and the MN establish a SA. 
Then, the authenticator sends a modified EAP Success message to transport the necessary 
information to derive the same key that was installed in the authenticator (step 5). Finally to 
finish, the MN receives the modified EAP Success message. The MN is now authenticated by 
the network and derives the same rMk that was derived by the authenticator in order to establish 
a SA for the re-authentication mechanism. 
6.5 Performance Evaluation  
In this section, the overall latency due to the security signalling of the proposed EAP based re-
authentication scheme is analyzed, and compared to the un-optimized (i.e. full) EAP re-
authentication mechanism. The performance of the two schemes is evaluated using the 
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authentication signalling and the EAP method latency metrics. The authentication signalling 
latency DSA is defined as the time elapsed between the sending of the first authentication 
message (i.e. L2 SA such as the 4-way handshake in 802.11) until the Acknowledgment of the 
last authentication message is received by the MN. On the other hand, the EAP method latency, 
DEAP, is defined as the time elapsed between the sending of the first EAP message and the 
reception of either an EAP SUCCESS or EAP FAILURE message. The notation used to express 
the parameters and variables of the authentication signalling latency is provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Notation used in expressing the security latencies 
 
6.5.1 Full Authentication  
The latency incurred by a full EAP method authentication exchange is expressed as: 
 
DEAP = 2dMT + ( dMT + dST ). SEAP + dST + CFA                                             (1) 
 
where, 2dMT is the delay caused by the initial two EAP messages. It is the delay incurred at the 
very beginning, when the authenticator sends an EAP-Request message, which contains a Type 
SEAP Total number of signalling messages required for the successful execution of an EAP 
method. It must be noted that this parameter does not include the EAP Start message  
SAuth Total number of messages required for the execution of the authentication signalling of 
the lower layers (e.g. 4-way handshake in 802.11i). This parameter does not include the 
EAP message exchanges. 
dMC Average propagation delay between the MN and the currently attached PoA. 
dMT Average propagation delay between the MN and the target PoA. 
dST Average propagation delay between the EAP Server (i.e. GSABA Proxy) and the target 
PoA. 
CFA Time required for the involved parties to perform all the cryptographic operations, 
including key derivations, for a full EAP authentication. 
CRA Time required for the involved parties to perform all the cryptographic operations, 
including key derivations, needed by the proposed re-authentication mechanism. 
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field, requesting a MN’s Identity. In response to a valid request, the MN sends its identity in a 
Response message.  Here, (dMT + dST). SEAP is the time taken to complete a full authentication. 
The delay introduced by the key distribution procedure is represented by dST.  
After a successful EAP authentication, media dependent SA protocol exchanges take place. For 
example, in 802.11 the MN undergoes a 4-way handshake to establish unicast and multicast SAs 
for protecting the signalling between the MN and the PoA (i.e. the authenticator). The delay 
introduced by the media dependent SA protocol exchange is shown in (2). 
        DSA = dMT x SAuth                     (2) 
where, DSA is the latency incurred by exchanging media specific authentication messages. The 
total latency for the overall authentication phase is expressed as: 
     DTotal = DEAP + DSA                       (3) 
6.5.2 Proposed Re-authentication Scheme  
The EAP latency for the proposed re-authentication mechanism is expressed in (4) below. 
                     DPr-reauth = 2dMT + DRe-auth  + CRA                                          (4) 
where  
                             DRe-auth = 3dMT + 2dST              (5) 
In (5), the EAP re-authentication method exchange is composed of a total of five messages. 
Three of the messages, including the EAP Success/Failure message, are between the MN and the 
target PoA, and two of them are between the target PoA and the EAP Server (i.e., the GSABA 
Proxy) as shown in Figure 6.5.  
Here, 
                   CRA  < CFA  
since most of the cryptographic operations will be eliminated and key derivation is much more 
lightweight and simpler. The overall authentication latency for the proposed scheme is, therefore, 
expressed as:  
           
           DTotal = DPr-reauth + DSA         (6)
 where                
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                 DPr-reauth < DEAP         
6.5.3 System Modelling  
With reference to the system model in [70] the GSABA Proxy in the proposed mechanism 
presented in section 6.4 of this chapter can manage a number of ARs in its management domain. 
The GSABA Server is in the home domain and other layers containing the GSABA Proxy 
disperse from it. It is assumed that the distance from a GSABA Server to a GSABA Proxy 
follows a Poisson distribution with a parameter value of μ. It is also assumed that a MN needs to 
move its PoA m times until it leaves the domain of the GSABA Proxy, which means that there 
are m-1 intra-domain authentications and the mth one is the inter-domain (i.e. inter GSABA 
Proxy) authentication. The probability that a MN moves out of a PoA’s coverage area (i.e. intra 
domain) is: 
                                                                      (7)                           
 
Where N is the number cells visited by the MN in a given domain.  
 
The probability of a MN moving out of the GSABA Proxy’s domain is provided in [70] and 
expressed as: 
   
 
                                                                      (8) 
where  and K is the radius of a GSABA Proxy’s domain.  
 
Based on (7) and (8), the total authentication cost Ctotal can be derived as: 
                                              Ctotal = (9) 
where T is the total time,  and  are the cost of inter (i.e. mobility from a GSABA server to a 
GSABA Proxy) and intra domain (mobility within a GSABA Proxy’s domain) authentication 
respectively.  
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The total cost of the full EAP based authentication solution Corg (i.e. Ctotal for the full 
authentication) is: 
         Corg =                               (10) 
          Where, 
                                        Cfirst  = DEAP  + DSA                                                                       (11) 
Cfirst is the authentication cost incurred when the MN moves to the GSABA’s Proxy’s domain 
for the first time. Ceach is the authentication cost every single time the MN moves to a new 
authenticator’s (i.e. PoA) link. In the case of the un-optimized EAP mechanism (i.e. Corg), Cj 
would be equal to Cfirst, since the home domain (i.e. GSABA server) will be contacted every 
time the MN moves to a new GSABA Proxy’s domain. In essence, Cfirst is a case of an inter-
domain authentication (i.e. Cj = Cfirst). In equation (10), Ceach can be considered as the cost of 
the intra-domain authentication (Ci), since the MN moves within the boundary of a GSABA 
proxy. However, the total authentication cost for the full EAP authentication, Corg in equation 
(10) can be derived as:-    
     Corg  =                  
       (12) 
where 
                Ceach = Cfirst                                                      (13) 
Based on equation (9), the total cost of the proposed scheme, Cpr can be derived as: 
                                            Cpr  =                   (14) 
where 
                                               Cother  =   DPr-reauth + DSA                                 (15) 
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Cother is the cost of the re-authentication mechanism. As mentioned earlier, it can be inferred 
that : 
    Cpr < Corg 
since 
Cother  <  Ceach   
The cost of the proposed re-authentication scheme (i.e. Ctotal ) is expressed as: 
     Cpr = 
  (16) 
In equation (16), Ci is equal to Cother due to the fact that Cother is the cost for an intra-domain 
handover (i.e. Ci). 
6.5.4 Results Analysis 
The results presented in this sub-section have been derived using parameters provided in [70] 
and from the simulation and experimental results presented in chapters 4 and 5. From the 
analytical results presented in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, it is clear that the proposed IEEE802.21 
assisted re-authentication scheme outperforms the original (i.e. full EAP authentication) solution 
in terms of the reducing the overall handover latency for both FMIPv6 and MIPv6. The results 
suggest that the overall handover latency can be reduced by roughly 70% by using the proposed 
mechanism. This is due to the fact that the proposed mechanism reduces the total EAP 
authentication signalling (i.e. DPr-reauth) and the required cryptographic operations (i.e. CRA < 
CFA). Also, by using the IEEE802.21 MIIS, the scanning phase of the L2 handover is eliminated 
which drastically reduces the overall handover latency.  
The results of Figures 6.6 and 6.7 support the findings in [70] where the total cost (i.e. handover 
and authentication latency) increases as the Average Residence Time (AVR) decreases. The 
AVR is defined as the average time a MN stays within the coverage of a PoA.  Even though the 
results in Figure 6.6 compare the overall handover latency with the EAP authentication delays as 
opposed to the total cost versus AVR in [70], the results in [70] still support the concepts of the 
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proposed scheme presented in section 6.4 of this chapter and the results shown in Figure 6.6.  For 
instance, a decrease in the AVR means that the MN stays within an authentication server’s 
domain for a shorter period of time, which will lead to an increase in the rate of handover and 
authentication signalling. An increase in the total authentication signalling leads to an increase in 
the authentication cost. Since authentication is a fundamental component of a NGN handover, an 
increase in the authentication signalling/cost will lead an increase in the handover latency. 
The results in Figure 6.6 which take into account the total cost (i.e. Authentication signalling 
cost) presented in equations (12) and (16) of this chapter are a testament to the fact that an 
increase in the total cost due to an increase in the authentication signalling will result in an 
incremental increase in the overall handover latency.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Overall Handover Delay for FMIPv6 
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Figure 6.7: Overall Handover Delay for MIPv6 
 
The impact of the distance between the MN and the EAP server (the GSABA Proxy/Server in 
this case) on the overall handover latency is illustrated in Figure 6.8.  In Figure 6.8, the distance 
is directly proportional to the end-to-end delay between the MN and the GSABA Proxy/Server. 
Unsurprisingly, the overall handover latency increases with the end-to-end (i.e. distance) delay 
between the MN and the GSABA server. If the GSABA Proxy is far away from the MN, then the 
packet transmission cost for the EAP authentication signalling is also increased.   
The results in Figure 6.8 support the findings in [70] where an increase in the distance between 
the MN and the AAA server (i.e. GSABA and GSABA Proxy) would result in an increase in the 
overall handover latency. The findings hold true to the conventional wisdom for end-to-end 
latency which depends on many factors such as processing delays at intermediate routers due to 
queuing, the number of hops between the MN and the EAP server, transmission delays, 
bottlenecks at public exchanges, etc, as explained in chapter 4 (see section 4.5.6). 
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Figure 6.8:  Impact on EAP Latency of end-to-end delay 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a mechanism has been proposed which optimizes the EAP re-authentication 
procedure with the assistance of IEEE802.21 MIH services over a GSABA infrastructure. To do 
this, the MIIS has been exploited to provide information about discovered target PoAs in 
neighbouring networks that support the re-authentication mechanism. A new Information 
Container, the ‘SEC_CONTAINER’, has been defined for this purpose. Also, using the MIIS 
eliminates the need to perform a L2 scanning process which dramatically reduces the overall 
handover delays. Moreover, the proposed scheme enables 802.21 service authorization and 
allows for dynamic SAs to be established between the MN and the IS to secure the MIIS 
signalling. It is shown analytically that when the proposed mechanism is applied, it drastically 
reduces the overall EAP re-authentication latency, and as a result, also reduces the overall 
handover latency for both MIPv6 and FMIPv6. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
The research conducted throughout this thesis provides mechanisms to facilitate optimized 
and intelligent handovers across converged IP-based heterogeneous access networks. The 
results gained from the experimental evaluations and analysis will provide valuable insight to 
the relevant research and standards community at a time when mobility management for 
NGNSs using cross-layer techniques is an extremely “hot” topic of discussion. Already, 
mobile phone manufactures (e.g. Apple Inc's iPhone, Nokia, Huawei) [102], chip makers 
(e.g. Intel) [103] and telecoms operators, such as BT are investing huge amounts of finance 
geared towards research efforts for the commercial product developments of IEEE802.21 
MIH Services. 
7.1.1 Summary of the Thesis 
In this sub-section, a summary of the research work undertaken and accomplished by this 
thesis is presented. Also, a subsection is devoted to a discussion of future work.  
In chapter 1, the thesis starts with a brief overview of IP based Next-Generation Networks 
(i.e. 4G) and then discusses the current research issues in the area of the mobility 
management across NGNs. The overall contribution that the thesis has made towards the 
relevant research community is also discussed.  
Chapter 2 provides background information relevant to the thesis, such as supported services 
in NGNS, business models, mobility scenarios, types of handovers, mobility protocols (e.g. 
MIPv6, NEMO, and FMIPv6), IEEE802.21 MIH Infrastructure, Service Authorization and 
Bootstrapping, etc. The chapter discusses the motivation (in terms of the tackling the current 
issues of mobility management across heterogeneous access networks) for pursuing the 
chosen area of research. 
In chapter 3, a comprehensive survey of the related research work in the area of mobility 
management across heterogeneous IP based networks is provided. The survey details the 
issues with existing mobility management solutions across NGNs and highlights (i.e. 
justifies) the need for the extensive research this thesis has undertaken.  
In chapter 4, FMIPv6 integrated with IEEE802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH) 
services is used to optimize the handover procedure of the FMIPv6 protocol in vehicular 
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environments. With the aid of the lower three layers’ information of the MN/MR, the 
neighbouring access networks, the radio access discovery, and candidate AR discovery issues 
of FMIPv6 are tackled. Through detailed analysis, it is shown that the anticipation time in 
FMIPv6 is reduced, thus increasing the probability of the predictive mode of operation. A 
cross-layer mechanism is proposed for making intelligent handover decisions (i.e. appropriate 
network selection) by using a Policy Engine (PE). It is shown through analysis and 
simulations of the signalling process that the overall expected handover latency in FMIPv6 is 
reduced drastically by the proposed mechanism by the eliminating the L2 scanning phase. 
Also, the signalling overhead and packet loss for the proposed mechanism is improved by 
50% and 79% respectively. 
In chapter 5, a novel FMIPv6 authorization and bootstrapping architecture is presented in 
order to provide the MN with necessary configuration parameters and distributed keying 
materials to secure FMIPv6 messages in terms of authentication and authorization. In this 
respect, a practical Linux operating system based FMIPv6 authorization and bootstrapping 
test-bed has been implemented to provide experimental analysis. The experiments presented 
the handover performance of the secured FMIPv6 over the GSABA architecture compared to 
plain FMIPv6 and MIPv6 by providing quantitative measurements and results on the quality 
of experience perceived by the users of IPv6 multimedia applications. The results showed the 
inclusion of the additional signalling of GSABA architecture, for the purpose of authorization 
and bootstrapping (i.e. key distribution using HOKEY), has no adverse effect on the overall 
handover process. In fact, the handover for the proposed mechanism is the same as that of 
plain FMIPv6 handover. As expected, the plain MIPv6 takes drastically longer compared to 
the proposed secured FMIPv6 over GSABA. Also, a security analysis of the secured FMIPv6 
along with the newly defined protocol/interfaces of the GSABA architecture has been done, 
using a formal (i.e. AVISPA) analysis tool. The results suggest that the proposed mechanism 
is secure (i.e. safe) from the imposed security threats.   
In chapter 6, a novel IEEE802.21 assisted EAP based Re-Authentication scheme over a 
service authorization and bootstrapping framework (i.e. GSABA) is presented.  Moreover, 
the proposed scheme enables 802.21 service authorization and SAs to be established between 
the MN and IS for securely provisioning MIIS. It is shown through mathematical analysis of 
the signalling process that the overall handover latency for mobility protocols will be reduced 
significantly by the proposed scheme. 
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In conclusion, the thesis shows that the transparent migration of data flows between two 
PoAs belonging to independent heterogeneous technologies using cross-layer techniques 
(i.e.IEEE802.21 MIH Services) is achievable. This is justified as follows: 
The thesis defines mechanisms for the integration IEEE802.21 with a mobility protocol 
(namely FMIPv6) that enables vertical handovers between the disparate access technologies. 
This convergence poses challenging research issues such as the two topics that this thesis 
tackled: (a) how to minimize mobility disruptions (i.e. handover latency) when roaming and 
(b) how to provide efficient mobility service authorization and bootstrapping. To address the 
former, FMIPv6 has been integrated with IEEE802.21 to make intelligent handover decisions 
to reduce the overall handover latency (both L2 and L3). Moreover, the thesis shows that 
reducing the mobility protocol latencies is not enough to optimize the overall handover 
process. Therefore, a fast re-authentication scheme has been defined to reduce the EAP 
authentication latency in order to optimize the overall handover process across heterogeneous 
access networks. To address the latter, a GNU Linux based test-bed has been developed to 
provide generic service authorization and bootstrapping solutions. As shown from the results 
in the earlier chapters (4, 5 and 6), the performance of the proposed mechanisms that this 
thesis contributes to, are very promising. Therefore, using the solutions that have been 
presented and evaluated in this thesis, it is practical to deploy a suitable architecture that 
supports seamless mobility in forthcoming 4G systems. 
Some overall observations can be derived from the outcome of the research this thesis has 
undertaken: 
 
i)  Through thorough theoretical analysis, simulation, and deployment of practical test-beds, 
this thesis proves and reinforces the fact that mobility protocols such as MIPv6, FMIPv6, 
alone are not capable of efficiently handling mobility across heterogeneous access networks. 
The overall handover procedure across integrated IP-based access networks is a very 
complicated process, which occurs almost at every layer of the protocol stack. Therefore, in 
order to perform an intelligent and optimized handover, it is essential to exchange and utilize 
cross-layer information between different layers of the protocol stack. 
 
ii) In order to clearly define a sophisticated, yet practical solution, i.e., in terms of the 
deployment of  large heterogeneous IP based converged networks this thesis has successfully 
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proposed an optimized handover mechanism (namely for FMIPv6) using cross-layers 
techniques with the assistance of the IEEE802.21 MIH services. The proposed solution (see 
chapter 4) has been applied in simulated vehicular environments in order to optimize the 
NEMO handover process. The proposed solution successfully tackles the issues related with 
vertical handovers in NGNs, such as network discovery, PoA/PoS discovery, Network 
Selection, seamless (i.e. with no service disruption) mobility.  In particular, the MIIS plays a 
vital role in optimizing the Network/PoA discovery and selection to drastically reduce the 
overall handover. On the other hand, if cross-layers mechanisms (e.g. IEEE802.21) are not 
used then network discovery and selection becomes a real issue which causes undesirable 
service disruptions. Such behaviour is shown in chapter 5, where the L2 scanning phase is 
reported as taking between 1-3.5 seconds to complete, and as a result causes long handover 
delays. The findings provide extremely useful insight into the actual issues in real-world 
deployments and how they can be mitigated and solved.   
iii) This thesis takes into consideration the business architecture/components of NGNs and 
presents a generic service authorization and bootstrapping architecture (see chapter 5). The 
thesis shows that a highly scalable and efficient service authorization and bootstrapping (in 
particular for mobility services) framework can be developed using existing technologies and 
infrastructure, such as AAA using EAP and Radius. As a proof of concept, a GSABA 
framework has been developed and deployed for mobility services (i.e.FMIPv6). The 
HOKEY protocol, which is a topic of great interest in the research community, along with the 
other protocols/interfaces have been developed and deployed. Such a test-bed is believed to 
be “first of its kind” and through its novelty will significantly contribute to the relevant 
research and standards organization. 
iv) This thesis provides the novel concept of considering IEEE802.21 MIH as a profitable 
service and shows how to authorize and bootstrap the IEEE802.21 MIH supported services. 
As a result, a mechanism to securely exchange MIH service messages has also been defined. 
To the best of knowledge such work has not been done before and will contribute effectively 
to the relevant research communities, such as the IETF and the IEEE802.21 WG. Also, this 
thesis draws attention to a much neglected, but a very important issue; i.e., re-authentication 
delays during handovers in NGNs. In this respect, a novel optimized fast re-authentication 
scheme utilizing IEEE802.21 has been presented to reduce the overall handover delay. Such 
work paves way for an area of much needed research and can contribute to existing research 
groups, such as the IEEE802.21a WG (the security new task group within IEEE802.21).   
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7.2 Future Work 
This thesis has raised various issues that have yet to be addressed. Several of the most 
interesting problems are discussed below, as well as potential avenues for further research are 
discussed. 
• The proposed mechanism presented in chapters 4 and 6 are heavily dependent on the 
IS. How the IS collects information about its neighbouring access networks is beyond 
the scope of the IEEE802.21 WG and the IETF. As a result, this is an open issue 
which will require active research.   
• The intelligent network selection scheme presented in chapter 4, section 4.4.7 is a 
very simple one. A much more sophisticated and intrinsic scheme is required which 
would take into account a wider array of parameters to make a more intelligent and 
optimized network selection. 
• The solution presented in chapter 4 is meant for vehicular environments. The 
performance of the proposed mechanism is evaluated through NS2 simulations. 
However, there are limitations to the simulations and the results are not necessarily as 
accurate and realistic as would be necessary for real world roll out of the solution. As 
a result, it would be ideal to develop experiments for a field trial to evaluate real-
world deployments.  
• In chapter 6, a mathematical model has been presented to evaluate the performance of 
the IEEE802.21 fast EAP re-authentication mechanism. Due to the lack of security 
tools available in NS2 a simulation has not been possible. In order to provide a more 
detailed analysis, simulation results are required.  
• Lastly, this thesis has considered most of the existing access technologies (both IEEE 
and non-IEEE, such as UMTS). However, it does not consider the upcoming uni-
directional broadcast technologies, such as DVB-H [105].  Very recently, the 
IEEE802.21b TG has taken the initiative to define mechanisms to support optimized 
handovers between these technologies and other technologies already supported by 
IEEE 802.21. Currently, there is no standard which specifies such handovers. 
Therefore, much research is required in this field. 
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GLOSSARY 
  
Third Generation (3G): A family of standards for mobile communications that fulfil 
specifications of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which includes 
UMTS, and CDMA2000. Compared to its precursors, 3G offers simultaneous use of 
speech and data services and higher data rates (at least 200kbits/s peak bit rate).  
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP): The scope of 3GPP is to make a globally 
applicable third generation (3G) mobile phone system specification within the scope 
of the ITU's IMT-2000 project. 3GPP specifications are based on evolved GSM 
specifications, generally known as the UMTS system. 
Fourth Generation (4G): 4G is also known as “beyond 3G” or “fourth-generation” 
wireless technology. It offers an improvement over 3G networks and may stand as a 
successor thereof.  A 4G system is expected to provide a comprehensive and secure 
all-IP based solution where services such as VoIP, high speed Internet access, 
streamed multimedia, gaming services etc may be provided to users. According to 
ITU requirements, 4G networks must have target peak data rates of up to 
approximately 100Mbit/s for high mobility and up to approximately 1Gbit/s for low 
mobility such as nomadic/local wireless access. 4G comprises different standards 
such as LTE Advanced and WiMAX (e.g.IEEE802.16m). 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA): AAA refers to the process of 
providing network security through Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
mechanisms. 
Access Point (AP): A wireless access point, identified by a Medium Access Control 
address, providing service to the wired network for wireless nodes. 
Access Router (AR): The entity interconnecting the access network to the Internet or 
other IP-based networks; The AR provides connectivity between hosts on the access 
network at different customer premises. It is also used to provide security filtering, 
policing, and accounting of customer traffic. 
Access Service Authorizer (ASA): A network operator that authenticates a mobile node 
and establishes the mobile node's authorization to receive Internet service. 
Access Service Provider (ASP): A network operator that provides direct IP packet 
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forwarding to and from the end host. 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL): A type of broadband communication 
technology where the data is sent over existing copper telephone lines, when 
compared to traditional modem lines.  ADSL offers more downlink speed (24 Mbit/s) 
compared to its uplink speed (3.5Mbit/s) 
Bootstrapping Authorization Agent (BAA): The BAA is a functional component that is 
responsible for asserting authorization statements which are conveyed to the mobile 
nodes.  
Bootstrapping Configuration Agent (BCA): The BCA is a functional component that is 
responsible for providing necessary bootstrapping information to the mobile node 
(e.g. Home Agent address, the security association and the Home address).  
Bootstrapping Target (BT): Entity that is part of the service providing server and is 
responsible for obtaining the service and Mobile Node related information from the 
BAA and BCA, and converting the obtained information into service target function 
understandable format. 
Binding Update (BU): During the MIPv6 handover process, the BU is the message sent 
by the MN to inform the Home Agent of the new IPv6 address of the MN. The Home 
Agent uses the new IPv6 address to tunnel packets destined to the MN in the foreign 
link.  
Base Station (BS): A wireless station, providing services to the wired network for 
wireless nodes. 
Care-of Address (CoA): A unicast routable address associated with a mobile node while 
visiting a foreign link; the subnet prefix of this IP address is a foreign subnet prefix. 
Among the multiple care-of addresses that a mobile node may have at any given time 
(e.g., with different subnet prefixes), the one registered with the mobile node's home 
agent for a given home address is called its "primary" care-of address. 
Correspondent Node (CN): A node on either a foreign network or the home network or 
other network with which the MN communicates 
Denial-of-service attack (DoS):  A malicious attempt to make computer resources (e.g. 
web site) unavailable to users. A common method of attack is by bombarding the 
target machine with packets requesting services, such that it cannot respond to 
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legitimate traffic since all the resources are consumed by the ill-intended requests. 
Digital Video Broadcasting – Handheld (DVB-H): A standard that defines the digital 
transmissions of video and audio signals via antenna to mobile devices such as mobile 
phones, smart phones, PDAs, etc.  
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL): A family of technologies that provide transmission of 
data over the local telephone network. The data throughput typically ranges from 384 
KB/s to 20 MB/s in the direction of the customer.  
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP): EAP is an authentication framework which 
is frequently used in wireless networks and point-to-point connections to provide 
authentication services. 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS): The GPRS is an overlay network on top of the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) infrastructure. GPRS is a mobile 
data service available to users of GSM mobile phones 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM): GSM is the international digital 
radio standard created by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. GSM 
allows users to roam freely among GSM networks.  
High Speed Packet Access (HSPA): HSPA is a collection of two cellular telephony 
protocols; High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) and High Speed Uplink 
Packet Access (HSUPA). HSPA improves the peak data rates up to 14 Mbits/s and 
doubles the capacity for the uplink. 
High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSPDA): HSDPA is an evolution of the W-
CDMA standard, designed to increase the available data rate by a factor of 5 or more. 
High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA): It is an upgrade of the uplink introduced 
by HSPA. 
Host Identity Protocol (HIP): A mechanism to separate the end-point identifier and 
locater roles of IP addresses. It introduces a new Host Identity (HI) name space which 
is based on public keys which are typically self-generated by the Host.  
Home Address (HoA): A unicast routable address assigned to a mobile node, used as the 
permanent address of the mobile node. This address is within the mobile node's home 
link. Standard IP routing mechanisms will deliver packets destined for a mobile node's 
home address to its home link. Mobile nodes can have multiple home addresses, for 
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instance when there are multiple home prefixes on the home link. 
Home Agent (HA): A router on a mobile node's home link with which the mobile node 
has registered its current care-of address. While the mobile node is away from home, 
the home agent intercepts packets on the home link destined to the mobile node's 
home address, encapsulates them, and tunnels them to the mobile node's registered 
care-of address. 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU): A United Nations agency which is 
responsible for regulating information and communication technology issues. 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF): The IETF develops and promotes Internet 
standards for the TCP/IP and Internet Protocol suite, by cooperating with other 
standards bodies such as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)  
Internet Service Provider (ISP): A company that offers Internet access to its customers 
using technologies such dial-up, Digital Subscriber Line, cable modem etc.  
Information Societies Technologies (IST): The priorities set out for the European Union 
Framework Programmes for research, technological development and demonstration 
in the area of Information Technologies. 
Internet Protocol (IP): A protocol used to identify an end-device in the Internet and used 
for communicating data and routing packets across a packet-switched internetwork.  
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec): A protocol suite for securing IP communications by 
providing authentication and encryption of each IP packet of a data stream. IPSec also 
includes protocols for mutual authentication and negotiation of cryptographic keys to 
be used during a communication session.  
Local Area Network (LAN): A network of end-devices (typically computers and 
servers) for data transmission, which covers a small physical area like a home, office, 
or small groups of buildings, such as a school, or an airport. Ethernet (i.e.IEEE802.3) 
and twisted pair cabling are the two most common LAN technologies currently in use. 
Medium Access Control (MAC): The MAC layer is a sub-layer of the Data Link Layer 
of the TCP/IP protocol suite. It provides addressing and channel access control 
mechanisms that allow for multi-point network communication.  
Mobile Node (MN): A node that can change its point of attachment from one link to 
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another, while still being reachable via its home address. 
Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA): A service provider that authorizes Mobile IPv6 
service. 
Mobility Service Provider (MSP): A service provider that provides Mobile IPv6 service. 
In order to obtain such service, the mobile node must be authenticated and be 
authorized to obtain the service. 
Mobile-Stream Control Transmission Protocol (MSCTP): A transport layer protocol 
which is similar to TCP and UDP. It provides message-oriented services like UDP and 
ensures reliable transport with congestion control like TCP. MSCTP is defined as 
providing the capability of dynamic address reconfiguration to aid IP handover. 
Network Access Server (NAS): A server that provides access to a network. 
Portable Digital Assistant (PDA): Generally, a PDA is a small portable device that 
works as an organizer. 
Point-of-Attachment (PoA): The PoA is a device with which a mobile device has 
wireless connectivity such as an Access Point or Base Station. 
Point-of-Service (PoS): Any network entity with which a mobile device exchanges 
Media Independent Handover Information (MIH) messages is referred as the PoS in 
this thesis.  
Received Signal Strength (RSS): The RSS is the power (in mW) of a received signal in 
a wireless environment.  
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP): A standard for packet format and delivery of 
audio and video data over the Internet.  
Roaming Broker (RB): An entity that provides (global) services for Home Entities and 
Hotspot Operators by operating as an intermediary and trading broadband access 
between them at a fixed or transactional price (buying and re-selling roaming airtime 
usage), and performs clearing and settlement services. Brokers may provide 
centralized authentication services in order to compute and validate the broadband 
traffic. 
Round-trip delay time (RTT): Is the time taken for a segment to be sent and the time it 
takes to receive an acknowledgment of that segment. 
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Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): An IETF defined signalling protocol used for 
controlling communications for voice and video calls over IP. The protocol can create, 
modify and terminate two-party (unicast) or multiparty (multicast) sessions consisting 
of one or several media streams. 
Level 3 Multihoming for Shim Protocol for IPv6 (SHIM6): The shim6 protocol 
specifies a layer 3 shim approach and protocol for providing locator agility below the 
transport protocols, so that multihoming can be delivered for IPv6 for load sharing 
and failover.  
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP): A transport layer protocol which is 
similar to TCP and UDP. It provides message-oriented services like UDP and ensures 
reliable transport with congestion control like TCP. 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS): UMTS is a next generation 
network for mobile communication. UMTS is a 3G network (3rd generation) and is 
the successor of the 2nd generation GSM. 
Ultra Wide Band (UWB): UWB is a technology for transmitting information spread 
over a large bandwidth that should, in theory and under the right circumstances, be 
able to share spectrum with other users. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP): Is a general term for an umbrella of transmission 
technologies for transmitting voice data over the Internet. VoIP systems employ 
session control protocols to control the set-up and termination of calls as well as audio 
codecs which encode the voice data.   
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): A network where devices are linked via a 
wireless method (typically spread spectrum or OFDM) which usually provides shared 
access connectivity with an Access Point to the wider Internet. The WLAN is 
synonymous with the IEEE802.11 family of standards, which is the most mature and 
widely used set of Wireless LAN standards.  
(Wi-Fi): A Wi-Fi is usually referred as a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance that 
manufacturers use to brand certified products that belong to a class of wireless 
devices which provides Internet access over a Wireless Local Area Network through 
the use of a router connected to an Internet service provider. 
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Wireless Code Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA): An air interface standard for the 
3G specification. It is the most commonly used member of the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) family.  
Quality of Service (QoS): Quality of Service refers to resource reservation control 
mechanisms rather than the achieved service quality. Examples of QoS metrics are 
delay, jitter, packet dropping probability, etc.  
 
